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19971 Jury as Lie Detector
We say that lie detecting is what our juries do best. In the liturgy of the
trial, we name the jurors our sole judges of credibility and call on them to
declare each witness truthteller or liar.' All hierarchies of rank, learning, and
technical prowess give way in the face of this asserted power of common
jurors to spot a lie: In most jurisdictions today, no trial judge may advise the
jury that a witness has lied.2 No psychiatric expert may comment on a
witness's credibility.3 Rarely may a polygraph technician lecture to jurors
about a witness's pulse and pressure, tension or temperature.4 The job of lie
I. See, e.g., FIFTH CIRCUIT CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 1.09 (1990) ("You arc the sole judges
of the credibility or 'believability' of each witness and the weight to be given the witness's testImony."):
CALIFORNIA JURY INSTRUCTIONS, CRIMINAL § 2.20 (West 1993) ("You arc the sole judges of the
believability of a witness .. "); 17 LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE: CRIMINAL JURY INSTRLCTIO.S §
3.04 (Cheney C. Joseph, Jr. & P. Raymond Lamonica eds.. 1994) (-(You arc) the sole judges of the
credibility of witnesses .... "); WISCONSIN JURY INSTRUCT'ONS. CRIMINAL § 300 (1962 & Supp. 1976)
("You are the sole judges of the credibility of the several witnesses ....- ): United States v Barnard. 490
F.2d 907, 912 (9th Cir. 1973) ("Mhe jury is the lie detector in the courtroom.").
2. Even in our federal system, which still permits judges to comment on the evidence, a judge who
dares comment on credibility risks likely reversal. See. e.g., Quercia v. United States. 289 U.S. 466. 471
(1933) (reversing a conviction after the judge said that wiping one's hands, as the defendant had done on
the stand, was a common sign of lying, because "[i]t was for the jury to test the credibility of the defendant
as a witness"). The great majority of American states long ago barred judges from commenting to juries
on the weight of the evidence or the credibility of the witnesses. In a small number of states, however.
judges still may do so. See infra note 597.
In England, where judges generally retain the power to comment on the evidence. it is nonetheless
clear that they "should never give an express indication of [their) own disbelief in relation to the evidence
of a witness, especially the evidence of an accused, even in a case in which the evidence warrants
incredulity." ADRIAN KEANE, THE MODERN LAW OF EVIDENCE 31 (3d ed. 1994) (citing a 1988 case in
which the court criticized a judge for telling the jury he thought the defendant was lying): see ROSEMARY
PATTENDEN, JUDICIAL DISCRETION AND CRIMINAL LMGATION 180-81 (1990). But not that long ago. a
commentator could say that "[s]uch remarks as-I should not be surprised, gentlemen of the jury, if you
will attach but very little weight to the testimony of Mr.' are not uncommon." PENDLETON HOWARD.
CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN ENGLAND 377 (1931).
3. An expert's opinion about another witness's credibility ordinarily does not assist the jury. the cases
say, and so falls short of the threshold for admissibility of expert evidence. See FED. R. EvID. 702; see
also, e.g., Bachman v. Leapley, 953 F.2d 440, 441 (8th Cir. 1992) ("It is the exclusive province of the jury
to determine the believability of the witness .... An expert is not permitted to offer an opinion as to the
believability or truthfulness of a victim's story."); United States v. Benson. 941 F.2d 598. 604 (7th Cir.
1991) ("Credibility is not a proper subject for expert testimony: the jury does not need an expert to tell it
whom to believe .... ), modified, 957 F.2d 301 (7th Cir. 1992): State v. Boston. 545 N.E.2d 1220. 1240
(Ohio 1989) (holding that an expert may not give an opinion about the veracity of a child witness). Some
courts and commentators, however, reject such categorical holdings and say that expert testimony at times
may help the jury assess credibility, especially when the witness is young or mentally impaired. See. e.g.,
United States v. Shay, 57 F.3d 126, 131-34 (1st Cir. 1995); Margaret A. Berger. United States v. Scop: The
Common-Law Approach to an Erpert's Opinion About a itmess's Credibility Still Do's Not Work. 55
BROOK. L. REV. 559 passim (1989).
4. The very case that stands for the system's suspicion of scientific evidence, Frye v. United States.
293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923), rejected lie-detecting machinery. In the few years since the Supreme Court
held that the Federal Rules of Evidence displaced the Frye test. see Daubers v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc.,
509 U.S. 579, 589 (1993), two federal appeals courts have retracted per se bars against polygraph evidence.
See United States v. Cordoba, 104 F.3d 225, 228 (9th Cir. 1997); United States v. Posado. 57 F3d 428.
434 (5th Cir. 1995); see also United States v. Piccionna, 885 F.2d 1529. 1535 (11 th Cir. 1989) (rejecting
the per se bar pre-Daubert). A third appeals court has restated its general ban. See United States v. Sherlin.
67 F.3d 1208, 1216 (6th Cir. 1995) ("As a general rule, the results of a polygraph are inadmissible.-) see
also United States v. Kwong, 69 F.3d 663,668 (2d Cir. 1995) (stating that -[elvcn assuming that polygraph
results are admissible under Rule 702 (and we are unlikely to so hold because the specific testimony here
would not likely 'assist the trier of fact')"). I have found only three federal district court cases in which
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detecting belongs to the jurors alone. Nor may we later, once the jurors have
done their job of sifting truth from falsehood, review how they did it. In a trial
process in which we hide so much of the law and evidence from the jurors,
this they hide entirely from us.
We do not leave our jurors wholly unequipped for this task of lie
detecting. They come to court, as we so often tell them, with their common
sense and may reject any evidence that defies it. Inside court, we give them
three more lie-detecting tools: the oath, demeanor evidence, and cross-
examination. Every witness must promise to tell the truth, face the jurors for
their scrutiny, and endure the challenge of opposing counsel. If these tools are
lacking, we do not put the jury to the task of detecting lies. Hence we usually
do not ask jurors to judge the truthfulness of an out-of-court witness. But this
general bar against hearsay is our only broad exception to the otherwise
unqualified rule that leaves questions of credibility to the jury.
Of course, many cases impose no particular burden on the jury's powers
to ferret out lies. In many cases there is no conflict in testimony. In many
others there is a conflict, but the jury is able to attribute it to mistake or
misperception or memory loss. In many cases, however, two witnesses tell two
stories that cannot innocently be reconciled. Here the jurors must call someone
a liar-indeed they must call someone a perjurer. Still, at least in civil cases,
in which the jurors must merely say which witness was more truthful, their
task remains relatively simple. Criminal cases mount a starker challenge. If the
defendant has taken the stand to refute the testimony of a prosecution witness,
then the jury may not convict unless it is prepared to credit the accuser's
testimony over the defendant's and to do so beyond a reasonable doubt. To be
sure, it is not wildly uncommon for defendants to proclaim their innocence in
the face of a freight train of evidence-and when they do, jurors may readily
brand them perjurers as well as thieves. But there are many criminal cases in
which we give the jurors no substantial evidence other than the oath of the
accuser and the oath of the accused. In such cases, we put jurors to the
intractable task of searching the faces and gestures of strangers for the signs
of deceit.
Our unguarded confidence that jurors are up to this task is the more
remarkable for being so probably wrong. There is little evidence that regular
people do much better than chance at separating truth from lies. We tend to
rely on worthless clues and to misread others.5 But although the jury does not
polygraph evidence was admitted. See United States v. Galbreth, 908 F. Supp. 877, 896 (D.N.M. 1995);
Ulmer v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 897 F. Supp. 299, 304 (W.D. La. 1995); United States v. Crumby,
895 F. Supp. 1354, 1364-65 (D. Ariz. 1995).
On November 3, 1997, the Supreme Court heard argument on the constitutionality of a per se ban
against the use of polygraph evidence by criminal defendants in military court. See United States v.
Scheffer, 44 M.J. 442 (C.M.A. 1996), cert. granted, 117 S. Ct. 1817 (1997).
5. See infra notes 606-607 and accompanying text.
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guarantee accurate lie detecting, it does detect lies in a way that appears
accurate, or at least in a way that hides the source of any inaccuracy from the
public's gaze. By permitting the jury to resolve credibility conflicts in the
black box of the jury room, the criminal justice system can present to the
public an "answer"-a single verdict of guilty or not guilty-that resolves all
questions of credibility in a way that is largely immune from challenge or
review. By making the jury its lie detector, the system protects its own
legitimacy.
This error-erasing function of jury lie detecting disables other mechanisms
that are supposed to guard against wrongful verdicts. It relieves both judge and
prosecutor of their usual charge to evaluate the evidence before passing the
case to the jury. At the motion for directed verdict, which is usually a chance
for the trial judge to rid the system of a flimsy prosecution, the judge simply
assumes the truthfulness of the government's witnesses and leaves the problem
of lie detecting altogether to the jury.6 Appellate courts refuse to revisit the
jury's judgments of credibility. And prosecutors, who normally must assure
themselves that they have probable cause to bring charges, are able to avoid
any meaningful duty to screen out weak cases when guilt turns on a question
of credibility. The sworn testimony of a named witness who is not obviously
7delusional is all the prosecutor needs to satisfy probable cause.
In the pages ahead I want to search out the source of this quiet confidence
that the jury can answer all credibility questions. When and why did the
system declare that jurors had the wisdom to arbitrate unvarnished credibility
conflicts at criminal trials? To the question "when," the surprising answer is
very recently. If we walk back a mere 140 years through the nearly 800-year
history of the criminal trial jury, we find ourselves at a time when no jury had
to choose between the sworn testimony of accuser and accused at a criminal
trial. Not until the second half of the nineteenth century could accused
criminals anywhere in the common law world testify under oath at their own
trials. Defendants could tell their stories, but they could not swear to them, and
ajury torn between two conflicting stories could choose simply to credit sworn
accusation over unsworn denial.
If we walk back another 160 years, we arrive at a time when no jury had
to choose between the sworn testimony of prosecution and defense witnesses
at a serious criminal trial. Not until the turn of the eighteenth century could
accused felons call sworn witnesses. They could call unsworn witnesses, but
6. See 26 JAMES WM. MOORE Er AL., MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE § 629.06. at 628-29 (3d ed. 1997)
("The rule is well settled, of course, that on a motion for acquittal, all doubts as to credibility must be
resolved in favor of the government.").
7. Many prosecutors, however, impose on themselves a higher charging standard. See. e.g.. Carol A.
Corrigan, On Prosecutorial Ethics, 13 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 537, 539-40 (1986) (citing California
prosecutors' charging standards, which provide that prosecutors should be "satisfied" of the defendant's
guilt before bringing charges).
1997]
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a jury in doubt could simply prefer the sworn evidence. Walking back 150
more years, to the middle of the sixteenth century and before, we come to a
time when only the prosecution could present any sort of witness at a criminal
trial. Although defendants could speak, they were not sworn, and they could
call no witness to speak for them. The juries that presided over the rump trials
of these early years faced nothing like our modern conflicts of oaths.
This thumbnail history suggests that the "why" question is somewhat more
complicated than we might have anticipated. Before we can inquire why the
system gave the jury the unbounded discretion to resolve credibility conflicts
between sworn witnesses, we must first examine why the system in its early
days sought to avoid such credibility conflicts altogether. The answer to both
questions, I will argue, turns on the system's need for legitimacy-for public
confidence in the accuracy of its outcomes.' In the early years of the criminal
trial jury, the system sought to stake its claim to legitimacy primarily in the
oath and in the perceived divine power of the oath to compel truthful
testimony. The oath's central role demanded that the system avoid sworn
credibility conflicts, because any such conflict would reveal in a visible and
obvious way the oath's inadequacy to assure truthful testimony. Hence when
the system first permitted conflicts in testimony to emerge, it did not permit
sworn conflicts.
This and other contrivances to avoid conflicts in oaths permitted the
system to embrace an evidentiary presumption that all sworn evidence was
truthful-a presumption that sounds distinctly alien to us, yet persisted in
stronger or weaker form throughout much of the jury's history. In time,
however, for reasons I will discuss later, the system gradually had to release
its grip on the oath as a source of legitimacy. As it did, it turned to the jury
as an alternative. During the last several centuries of the jury's history, the
system has committed ever more-and more intractable-credibility conflicts
8. When I speak of the system's need for legitimacy, I mean only this: Systemic actors believed it was
in their interest to make the system's judgments acceptable to the public and therefore packaged those
judgments in a way they believed the public would accept. I would add-though it is not essential to my
argument-that the authorities' instincts about what the public would accept were probably sound and
probably responded to public expressions of confidence or discontent. I am, however, making no claim
about the legitimating power of law-its power to shape what the public wants-of the sort Alan Hyde
finds so unsustainable. See Alan Hyde, The Concept of Legitimation in the Sociology of Law, 1983 Wis.
L. RE v. 379, 385 n.5 ("It is this last model [of legitimation], the process that leads from law to belief in
legitimacy to particular political behavior, that I criticize in this article."). Much less am I offering a
judgment about "the substantive standard that the law is intended to project," of the sort Charles Nesson
seems to embrace when he argues that "[t]he aim of the factfinding process is ... to generate acceptable
[verdicts]." Charles 0. Nesson, The Evidence or the Event? On Judicial Proof and the Acceptability of
Verdicts, 98 HARV. L. REv. 1357, 1359, 1362 (1985).
I use the concept of legitimacy to suggest simply that a "regime that announces [popular] norms and
appears to be pursuing them is ... somewhat more likely to become popular among the population" and
therefore, a regime that hopes for popular support will at times defer and conform to popular ideals of
justice. Hyde, supra, at 414. Hyde allows that this proposition "is probably true but hardly interesting," Id.
at 415.
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to the jury's black box. And the jury, in loyal support of the system's
legitimacy, has issued crisp and impregnable verdicts.
This Article tells the long story of the jury's slow coming of age as the
system's lie detector at criminal trials. It chronicles the deaths of the old
evidence rules that effectively withheld from the jury the task of settling
credibility conflicts between sworn witnesses. Like the characters of many
good stories, these rules led uneventful lives but suffered noteworthy deaths,
touched by the intrigue of treachery and factional strife. I will emphasize two
features of the evolutionary process. First, it was astoundingly slow. Despite
the jury's attractiveness as a means of resolving credibility conflicts, the
system displayed a remarkable resistance to change, an inertia of planetary
proportions disturbed only by explosive events. Second, the most important of
these explosions were external to the system. As a result, the evolutionary
process was not principled, driven by a conviction that the jury can and should
resolve credibility conflicts. Instead, the rule changes that most greatly
expanded the potential for sworn credibility conflicts at criminal trials were
products of political firestorms. In this sense, faith in the jury's powers of lie
detection only followed the force of events.9
Before I begin, it would be wise to say more clearly what I mean by the
task of lie detecting. Although I hope to prove that the jury's formal and
complete role as the system's lie detector is relatively new, I do not aim to
persuade the reader that the thought processes of modern jurors are new. For
as long as witnesses have made claims to juries about past events, jurors have
had the power-and perhaps the inclination-to disbelieve those witnesses and
to disregard what they said. In fact, the lie-detecting role of juries in past
generations may have been much like the lawmaking role of juries today.
Today we officially declare that juries play no role in making law. Yet not
only do juries manifestly make law-witness the repeated refusals of Michigan
9. I do not mean by emphasizing the role of these external events to embrace a "social" theory of legal
evolution-one in which the moving forces are found in the society at large and not in legal actors or
institutions. See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, LAW AND SOCIETY 93-99 (1977) (defining and distinguishing
"internal" and "social" theories of law). Nor by stressing how the justice system's need for legitimacy
helped to shape legal rules do I mean to embrace an "internal" theory of change. In fact. I am in no
position to evaluate the relative importance of external and internal forces on the changes I study here. I
exclude altogether from my study (because of external constraints of time and space) the role played by
two hugely important external developments-the progressive secularization and democratization of English
and American societies, which did much both to break down faith in the power of the oath to assure truth
and to build up confidence in the power of juries to detect lies.
In any event, it seems futile to try to maintain this extemal-iternal distinction. Even if social forces
determine "the general drift, the long run trend" of legal evolution, an "'internal' theory may work
reasonably well in explaining minor, short-run legal events." Id. at 96-97. Conversely, even if law is
"largely autonomous and not shaped by societal needs." it is nonetheless influenced by "the lawmakers'
being members of the society and sharing its values and experiences." ALAN WAsON. DiE EvoLtnO.'o
OF LAW 118-19 (1985). In a study covering as much territory as this one, eomprehending both long-run
trends and minute doctrinal shifts, both external and internal forces are bound to play a role.
1997]
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juries to convict Jack Kevorkian of assisting suicide'--but many observers
regard their power to do so as a fundamental part of our trial system." In a
similar way, I will argue that the ideology of the jury trial system at one time
required the system to claim that the jury did not act as lie detector, even when
the jury's power to make credibility determinations was fundamental to the
system's just operation.
Nor do I hope to prove that the task of lie detecting, as a larger,
epistemological matter, has changed over time. At least one historian has
sought to explain some of the developments I describe here as a function of
the evolving way in which people in general-not merely jurors-have
resolved conflicts among sources of information.12 Although such an evolving
epistemology may have played a role in the historical transformation of the
jury's lie-detecting function, there are many reasons, which I will review in
time, to think it did not. In any event, one can explain the jury's changing role
without assuming complex changes in the way most of us think.
Instead, I will argue that the jury's role as lie detector has grown in this
somewhat formalized sense: The system has become more and more willing
over time to declare that the jury-and not the oath-has the job of screening
untrustworthy evidence from the decisionmaking process. We see the system's
changing declaration of the jury's role in the gradual erosion of those evidence
rules that had spared juries the task of deciding which of two competing
witnesses lied under oath. As the system gave the jury ever greater authority
to resolve conflicts between sworn witnesses, it thereby declared the jury to be
the system's lie detector. It did so, I will argue, because it perceived the jury
to be an ever more reliable guarantor of the legitimacy of the system's
verdicts-and because it perceived the oath to be an ever less reliable
guarantor. Whether juries in practice actually did anything different is largely
beside the point, except to the extent that what jurors did might have reflected
what the system declared they should do.
In telling the story of the jury's rise as lie detector, I focus on criminal
trials for both a principled and an accidental reason. The principled reason is
that the task of lie detecting, at least in the modern setting, poses a far greater
challenge in criminal than in civil cases. As I noted earlier, although a civil
jury may resolve a credibility conflict by a mere preponderance of the
evidence, a criminal jury (at least one that chooses to believe the government's
10. See Jack Lessenberry, Jury Acquits Kevorkian in Common-Law Case, N.Y. TIMES, May 15, 1996,
at A14; Jack Lessenberry, Kevorkian Again Not Guilty ofAiding Suicide, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 9, 1996, at A7;
David Margolick, Jury Acquits Dr Kevorkian of Illegally Aiding a Suicide, N.Y. TIMES, May 3. 1994, at
Al.
I1. See, e.g., Alan Scheflin & Jon Van Dyke, Jury Nullification: The Contours of a Controversy, LAW
& CoNTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1980, at 51, 85-111; Katherine Bishop, Diverse Group Wants Juries To
Follow Natural Law, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27, 1991, at B 16 (reporting on the Fully Informed Jury Association,
a group that lobbies for nullification instructions).
12. See infra notes 118-122 and accompanying text.
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witnesses over the defendant's) must settle the dispute beyond a reasonable
doubt.' 3 The accidental reason is that contemporary chroniclers, like legal
historians, tended to find criminal cases more interesting-so, for better or
worse, we simply know more about them. That is not to say that what we do
know about the evolution of civil trials cannot shed light on this study of the
criminal jury trial, and in the historical journey that lies ahead, I will from
time to time incorporate insights from the civil side.
That journey begins in England in the second decade of the thirteenth
century. We start in England because the criminal trial jury emerged there.
Later, as the jury moved with the English to America, I will broaden our focus
to gather in events from both sides of the Atlantic. We start in the early
thirteenth century because the sudden end of trial by ordeal in 1215 gave rise
to the first jury trials. When the Church abruptly forbade priests to take part
in the ordeal, European justice systems lost a trial mechanism that had served
to reveal God's judgment on the guilt of the accused. In Part I, I will explore
how the English sought to replace the divine legitimacy of the lost ordeal. I
will argue that by staking its verdicts on the oaths of witnesses, the justice
system found it could claim that the threat of divine vengeance assured truthful
outcomes. Rules that permitted only the prosecution to call witnesses helped,
in turn, to protect the legitimacy of the oath by guarding against the
embarrassment of conflicting oaths.
As this framework slowly broke down, the system began to tolerate certain
kinds of credibility conflicts and to complicate the jury's lie-detecting task.
Part II traces the first stages of this dissolution. The appearance of unsworn
defense witnesses sometime in the sixteenth century gradually accustomed
juries to conflicting stories, if not conflicting oaths. Then, at the very end of
the seventeenth century, came a great lurch forward, the first sudden
transformation of the jury's lie-detecting role. By two acts of 1696 and 1702,
Parliament gave accused traitors and felons the right to call sworn witnesses.
Suddenly, for the first time in the criminal jury trial's 500-year history, juries
in serious criminal cases routinely risked having to resolve sworn credibility
conflicts. Telling the story of this minor legal revolution will draw us into the
vortex of the most violent political and legal storm of the age, which blew
about the Stuart treason trials of the 1670s and 1680s and ultimately impelled
Parliament to act.
Even after criminal defendants began to call sworn witnesses, the system
struggled to maintain the old order and to protect juries as far as possible from
having to choose between competing oaths. Part III will examine how it did
so. For at least a century and a half following the acts of 1696 and 1702,
several wide-ranging rules of evidence helped to prevent sworn credibility
conflicts at trial and to protect the old presumption that all sworn evidence was
13. On the timing of the development of the reasonable doubt standard. see infra note 417
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true. Among these was a broad series of witness competency rules that barred
whole categories of witnesses-those thought most likely to lie-from
testifying. An evidence rule of narrower application advised juries to reconcile
conflicting testimony in a way that would avoid branding any witness a
perjurer. Little known today, this rule of Bethel's Caset4 amounted in practice
to an admonition that juries should call one witness mistaken before calling
either witness a liar. These rules worked side by side with others to protect
juries from the task of separating truthteller from liar. Taken together, they
betrayed the system's continuing anxiety over the jury's emerging role as lie
detector.
Part IV recounts the nineteenth-century demise of many of these rules and
the resulting rise of the jury as the full-fledged arbiter of credibility disputes.
The last and by far most important step in this progress was the end of the rule
that barred criminal defendants from testifying under oath. Defendants are,
after all, the most prolific witnesses on their own behalf, 5 and they are for
obvious reasons the most likely to lie. Once they won the right to testify under
oath, the average jury in the average criminal case could expect to confront a
credibility conflict that would require it to declare one of two sworn witnesses
a liar. In 1864, the unlikely state of Maine became the world's first common
law jurisdiction to take this transformative step, and a host of mainly Northern
states followed. The search for the triggering force behind this North-first burst
of modernizing activity will lead us into a far greater historical firestorm-the
clash between North and South over the legal status of African Americans. The
North's decision to grant criminal defendants the right to speak under oath
proves to have been, in part at least, one tactic in a very separate battle about
the right of freed slaves to testify in Southern courts.
Without such massive external jolts as the Stuart treason trials and the
American Civil War, the force of legal inertia might have delayed for decades
the jury's progress toward its distinctly modern role as lie detector. Yet there
is no question about the direction in which legal evolution was carrying the
jury: By some sort of a historical one-way ratchet, the lie-detecting power of
the jury has grown consistently and has never, for any sustained period,
diminished. In Part V, I will try to explain the forces that dictated the forward
direction of the jury's evolution as lie detector. I will suggest that the answer
has much to do with the problem of legitimacy and the system's need to
14. THE TRYAL OF SLINGSBY BETHEL ESQ. 9 (London, R. Harbottle 1681); see infra Section III.A.
15. Based on their 1950s case sample, Harry Kalven and Hans Zeisel reported that the defendant took
the stand in 82% of all cases, but called a friend or family member (the next largest category of defense
witness) in only 47% of cases. See HARRY KALVEN, JR. & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 33 n. 1. 137
(1966). Dan Klerman has suggested to me that the doctrine of Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 615
(1965), which bars prosecutorial comment on the defendant's failure to testify, may encourage more silence
by defendants today.
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reduce hard questions to clear answers that the public will accept. For this
task, the jury's black box has an undeniable allure.
Now, however, we must begin at the beginning. Part I therefore returns to
the jury's earliest years, where we may hope to find the roots of the criminal
jury trial's later devotion to the sanctity of a witness's oath.
I. THE ORDEAL AND THE JURY TRIAL: THEORETICAL PRELUDE
Although the jury's origins lie hidden in Dark Ages rituals, we can trace
the origins of the sort of jury that concerns us here-the criminal trial
jury-with something like pinpoint accuracy: The first true criminal jury trial
seems to have taken place at Westminster in 12 20 . 6 Juries had long acted to
resolve various civil disputes, especially claims about land, and they had for
decades served as accusing bodies in criminal cases in the manner of modern
grand juries. But not before 1220 did a jury sit in judgment of a criminal
accused with the discretion either to acquit or to condemn.
The occasion of this sudden birth of trial by jury was the sudden death of
trial by ordeal. 7 Before 1215, criminal trials had proceeded by ordeal or by
battle. In the ordeal of cold water, the accused was tossed in a pool with a
rope tied around his hips. If he sank, he was hauled out an innocent person,
for the purity of the water had accepted him;'8 but if the water repelled him
and he floated, he was condemned. In the ordeal of hot iron, the accused
walked barehanded with a hot iron bar. Three days later, when her bandages
were removed, her healing hands revealed her fate: if the wounds were healing
cleanly, she was absolved; if corruptly, condemned. 19 In all events, the
16. See Roger D. Groot. The Early-Thirteenth-Cenur v Crinnal Jun. in TwIvELv GOOD MILN AND
TRUE: THE CRIMINAL TRIAL JURY IN ENGLAND. 1200-1800. at 3, 17-18 (J.S. Cockburn & Thomas A-
Green eds., 1988) [hereinafter TWELVE GOOD MEN AND TR'EI. At least one histonan of the early jury has
argued that the criminal trial jury could be seen in nascent form as early as 1194-1195 See Cathanne
Hamilton Kappauf, The Early Development of the Petty Jury in England: 1194-1221. at 153 (1973)
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Illinois (Urbana-Champaign)) (on file wsith author) I think
that Groot, who argues that the power to condemn distinguished the true criminal tnal jury from earlier
incamations, see Groot, supra, at 19, has the stronger position.
17. Scholars of the ordeal disagree about whether its death really was sudden Compare Paul R,
Hyams, Trial by Ordeal: The Key to Proof in the Early Common Law. in ON THE LAWS AND CLSTO'.tS
OF ENGLAND 90, 101 (Morris S. Arnold et al. eds.. 1981) (framing an argument that centuries-long social
developments brought about the slow end of the ordeal). with ROBERT BART-rr. TRIAL ay FIRE AND
WATER: THE MEDIEVAL JUDICIAL ORDEAL 42-43. 69-70. 100. 128 (1986) (arguing that the ordeal was
"flourishing" in the I1th and 12th centuries before being abruptly -abandoned- in 1215) 1 think the
stronger arguments favor the conclusion that the Church's actions in 1215 brought a thriving institution to
a quick end.
18. Being cleared by the ordeal did not. however, mean that the accused would go free If. despite the
ordeal's verdict, the defendant was regarded as guilty by common report. he would be sent into exile See
HENRY CHARLES LEA. SUPERSTITION AND FORCE 400 (Philadelphia. Lea Brothers & Co 4th ed 1892)
(citing the Assize of Clarendon of 1166).
19. See. e.g., BARTLETT, supra note 17. at I (describing the ordeal by hot iron). THiO.IAS ADREW
GREEN, VERDICT ACCORDING TO CONSCIENCE: PERSPEcIVES ON THE EGLISii CRIMINAL TRIAL JURY.
1200-1800, at 8 n.18 (1985) (describing both ordeals): Hyams. supra note 17. at 93 (describing both
ordeals); Margaret H. Kerr et al., Cold Water and Hot Iron: Trial by Ordeal in Eigland. 22 J, %I-rERDtSC.
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judgment was God's. But in 1215 the Church forbade priests to officiate at
ordeals and suddenly stripped these rituals of their divine imprimatur.20
English and other European justice systems soon abandoned the ordeal in
criminal cases.2 Though the Church took no action against trial by battle,
that form of trial lacked the popular support needed to fill the role of the lost
ordeals; too often, combat between accuser and accused ended badly for a
worthy but weak litigant.22 Moreover, it was not always obvious who should
do battle for the prosecution.23 Criminal justice systems throughout Europe,
therefore, suddenly sought a new form of trial.2
In the familiar history of these events, the English turned to trial by jury,
elevating an institution that once had served in lesser roles to be final arbiter
of guilt or innocence. At the same time, the countries of the European
Continent adopted the "rational" Roman-canon forms of proof, which exalted
the probative power of sworn eyewitness testimony and of the accused's
confession, often coerced through torture. 25 Those commentators and
historians who feel the English took the wrong road at this juncture sometimes
argue that with trial by jury the English simply substituted one ordeal for
another. They say that in trial by jury, as in the old ordeals, inscrutable
HIST. 573, 582-83, 588-89 (1992) (describing both ordeals). Kerr and her colleagues note that women were
more often sent to the ordeal of hot iron, while men more often faced the ordeal of cold water. See Kerr
et al., supra, at 582; see also infra note 78.
20. See Groot, supra note 16, at 3; see also Rebecca V. Colman, Reason and Unreason in Early
Medieval Law, 4 J. INTERDISC. HIST. 571, 582 (1974) (noting that, after the introduction of Christianity,
ordeals were usually conducted by clergy). Hence the Fourth Lateran Council of 1215-and not the Magna
Carta of the same year, which had little to do with it-prompted the birth of the criminal jury trial in
England. See Groot, supra note 16, at 10.
21. See BARTLETT, supra note 17, at 100 (citing an English law of 1219 and a Danish law of 1216).
22. See id. at 116 ("The idea that the justice of the cause was, therefore, the single relevant datum for
victory ... was, perhaps, not always entirely convincing."). It is true that the weak could hire champions
to do battle for them, but then trial by battle worked against the poor.
23. Before 1215, publicly initiated prosecutions, or indictments, were resolved by ordeal, while
privately initiated prosecutions, or appeals, were tried by battle. See THE TREATISE ON THE LAWS AND
CUSTOMS OF THE REALM OF ENGLAND COMMONLY CALLED GLANVILL 171-73 (G.D.G. Hall ed. & trans.,
Nelson 1965) (c. 1188) [hereinafter GLANVILL]. One-on-one combat may have appeared to be more
appropriate to private than to public prosecutions.
Though unused since 1492, trial by battle survived on English statute books until 1819. See An Act
To Abolish Appeals of Murder, Treason, Felony or Other Offences, and Wager of Battel, or Joining Issue
and Trial by Battel, in Writs of Right, 1819, 59 Geo. 3, ch. 46; BARTLETT, supra note 17, at 122; see also
ANTHONY MUSSON, PUBLIC ORDER AND LAW ENFORCEMENT: THE LOCAL ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL
JUSTICE, 1294-1350, at 169 n.4 (1996) (reporting that trial by battle became obsolete as early as 1300).
24. Cf. 2 FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW
BEFORE THE TIME OF EDWARD I, at 650 (Boston, Little, Brown, & Co. 2d ed. 1899) ("The abolition of the
ordeal had disturbed all [of the law's] arrangements.").
25. Although there is debate about what gave rise to judicial torture in continental Europe, compare
JOHN H. LANGBEIN, TORTURE AND THE LAW OF PROOF 3-8 (1976) (arguing that strict Continental standards
of proof made criminal convictions too difficult to obtain except by recourse to confessions coerced by
torture), with Richard M. Fraher, Conviction According to Conscience: The Medieval Jurists' Debate
Concerning Judicial Discretion and the Law of Proof, 7 LAW & HIST. REV. 23, 24, 29, 62-63 (1989)
(arguing that judicial torture may have developed as a form of punishment, not proof, especially in
hard-to-prove crimes), there seems to be no disagreement that a good number of confessions were extracted
through torture.
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decisionmaking produced irrational results. 26 I agree that the criminal trial
jury took on certain characteristics of the ordeals, but not those (or at least not
exclusively those) complained of by the jury's critics. And I think there is
more to be learned by looking at the useful attributes that these systems shared
than by dwelling on the historical irony that one flawed system of adjudication
succeeded another. By identifying the common features that enabled the ordeal
and trial by jury to command people's respect, we may discover the essential
attributes of a successful system of proof in the premodern world. In fact it
may be impossible to understand even the later history of the criminal trial jury
without a theory about why the ordeal worked so well and about what its
demise left lacking.
This theory focuses on three common features of the ordeal and jury trial.
The first shared trait-and the most fundamental-is the inclination to wrap
the system's judgments in the word of God. The second trait, an elaboration
on the first, is the tendency to rely most heavily on the divine sanction when
the system's judgment would take the defendant's life or limb. The third is the
need, in a world in which God rarely speaks clearly through either blistered
hands or witnesses' words, to ensure discreet human control under the cover
of divine judgment.
A. Seeking Divine Sanction for Criminal Verdicts
That the ordeal drew its legitimacy from the apparent intervention of God
is a historical clich6,27 but probably true. Hence when the Church decertified
the ordeal, it wrecked it, for the system no longer could claim that God-and
not some mere human authority-had decreed the accused's guilt and
authorized punishment. With the ordeal gone, the system must have sought out
a substitute that would reassure the public of God's continuing role in meting
out human justice. The old system of trial by ordeal bespoke a social humility,
an unwillingness to take life or limb without divine sanction. The authorities
could not have thought that the public would grow quickly vain about the
adequacy of human judgment and transfer its faith from God's word to the
word of mortals.
28
26. See. e.g.. LANGBEIN, supra note 25. at 77-78. see also BARTLETr. supra note 17. at 139 ("Tlhe
inscrutability of the jury's verdict was reminiscent of ordeal procedure "). Colman. supra note 20. at 591
("The modem verdict of the jury in perplexing cases often has all of the inscrutability of a judgment of
God .... ).
27. See Colman. supra note 20. at 582 (noting that ordeals' "outcomes ,,ere interpreted as
manifestations of divine judgment"): Hyams. supra note 17, at 92 (stating that ordeals "purport[edl to wtork
by revealing God's judgment").
28. See JEROME FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL: M)-H AND REALIT' IN AMERICA, JLsncE 44 (1950)
("Leave to the inadequate judgments of mere human judges the testing of the truth-telling of witnesses.
when life or property are at stake? By no means."): GREE". supra note 19. at 3. LN%,GBEI',. supra note 25.
at 6 ("It is almost impossible for us to imagine how difficult it must hase been for the ordinar) people of
that age to accept that substitution .... You who are merely another mortal like me. sho are you to sit
1997]
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The clearest evidence of the system's sense of illegitimacy in the early
years after the ordeal's death was its failure to force trial by jury upon those
accused of crime. One had to consent to jury trial. 29 The prisone forte et
dure-literally "harsh and long imprisonment"-was the system's way of
compelling "consent." This institution was established by statute in 1275,30
but may have existed since the jury trial's very earliest days. 3' An early
observer described it this way:
And if they will not put themselves upon their acquittal [that is, elect
trial], let them be put to their penance, until they pray to do it; and let
their penance be this, that they be barefooted, ungirt and bareheaded,
in the worst place in the prison, upon the bare ground continually
night and day, that they eat only bread made of barley or bran, and
that they drink not the day they eat; nor eat the day they drink, nor
drink anything but water, and that they be put in irons.32
In later times the prisone took a new name-the peine forte et dure-and a
more sinister form-placing heavy weights on prisoners' chests until they
either elected jury trial or died.33
The peine forte et dure survived on the books, if not in practice, until the
eighteenth century.34 Its existence discloses as eloquently as anything could
in judgment upon me?"'). James Fitzjames Stephen noted that the author of the Mirror complained during
the reign of Edward 1 (1272-1307), "It is an abuse that proofs and purgations be not by the miracle of God
where other proof faileth." I JAMES FITZJAMES STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND
253 (London, MacMillan 1883) (quoting article 127 of the Mirror).
Barbara Shapiro's solution to the historical paradox-that the jurors' personal knowledge of the facts
gave them a "special, near divine, spark"--seems unsatisfying. BARBARA J. SHAPIRO, "BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT" AND "PROBABLE CAUSE": HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN
LAW OF EVIDENCE 241 (1991).
29. In contrast, under the pre-1215 law, a person refusing to submit to the ordeal could be put to
death. See 2 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 24, at 650.
30. See The Statute of Westminster, the First, 3 Edw., ch. 12 (1275); 2 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra
note 24, at 651-52.
31. Groot believes the prisone forte et dare began in the 1220s, see Groot, supra note 16, at 20 n.71,
35 n.157, but his evidence is slim. It is unclear how the system dealt with persons who refused to plead
before 1275. Bracton wrote in the 1250s that the defendant would "remain undefended and
quasi-convicted." 2 HENRY BRACTON, ON THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF ENGLAND 390 (Samuel E. Thorne
ed. & trans., Harvard Univ. Press 1968) (c. 1250).
32. BRrr'ON: AN ENGLISH TRANSLATION AND NOTES 21-22 (Francis Morgan Nichols ed., 1901)
[hereinafter BRITrON]. Although of uncertain authorship, this late-13th-century treatise is commonly
attributed to Britton. See id. at viii-xi.
33. See GREEN, supra note 19, at 15. Prisoners sometimes held out until death because the government
could not seize their lands without a criminal conviction. In the case of high treason, however, the accused
who refused to plead was condemned as if convicted. See EDWARD COKE, THE THIRD PART OF THE
INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 217 (London, E. and R. Brooke 1797). For a brief history of the
peine forte et dure, see H.R.T. Summerson, The Early Development of the Peine Forte et Dare, in LAW,
LITIGANTS, AND THE LEGAL PROFESSION 116, 116-25 (E.W. Ives & A.H. Manchester eds., 1983).
34. In 1692, a suspected wizard was pressed to death in Salem. See I THE SALEM WITCHCRAFT
PAPERS 26-27 (Paul Boyer & Stephen Nissenbaum eds., 1977). Peter Linebaugh cites a case from 1721.
See Peter Linebaugh, The Tyburn Riot Against the Surgeons, in ALBION'S FATAL TREE 65, III (Douglas
Hay et al. eds., 1975). But examples so late are rare. In 1772, Parliament deemed refusals to plead to
constitute guilty pleas. See An Act for the More Effectual Proceeding Against Persons Standing Mute on
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how acutely the loss of the divine sanction embarrassed the criminal justice
system-and how suspicious the English remained about the legitimacy of
human judgment. A student once remarked of today's search and seizure law
that "consent is what you get when you don't have probable cause.""5 In
medieval England, the need to win the prisoner's consent to trial by jury
betrayed the system's felt lack of legitimacy. As I will argue in Parts II and
III, the system responded to this crisis of legitimacy by exalting a different
source of divine sanction for the verdicts of its very human juries: the
witness's oath, enforced (as it was thought to be) by the threat of divine
vengeance.
36
It would be surprising if this crisis of legitimacy had been peculiar to the
English. Continental justice systems also had staked their claims to legitimacy
in part on the divine sanction of the ordeal. Indeed, one can see in the
"rational" rules of proof adopted on the Continent after the fall of the ordeal"7
evidence of an impulse to exalt the oath that was much like that in England.
Charles Donahue paraphrases Tancred's treatise from around 1215, which
explained what a Continental judge should do when confronted with a conflict
between two sworn witnesses:
[T]he judge ought to attempt to reconcile their statements if he can.
If he cannot, then he ought to follow those who are most
trustworthy-the freeborn rather than the freedman, the older rather
than the younger, the man of more honorable estate rather than the
inferior, the noble rather than the ignoble, the man rather than the
woman. Further, the truth-teller is to be believed rather than the liar,
the man of pure life rather than the man who lives in vice, the rich
man rather than the poor, anyone rather than he who is a great friend
of the person for whom he testifies or an enemy of him against whom
he testifies. If the witnesses are all of the same dignity and status,
then the judge should stand with the side that has the greater number
of witnesses. If they are of the same number and dignity, then absolve
the defendant.38
Donahue's interpretation of this elaborate method, which so sharply limited
the judge's discretion to act as lie detector, is particularly revealing. For the
Their Arraignment for Felony, or Piracy, 12 Geo. 3, ch. 20 (1772) In 1827. it deemed refusals to be pleas
of not guilty. See An Act for Further Improving the Administration of Justice in Cnminal Cases in England.
1827, 7 & 8 Geo. 4, ch. 28.
35. My colleague Barbara Babcock passed this on to me.
36. Cf. Colman, supra note 20, at 587 ("It should be emphasized that all forms of mediesal proof were
considered dependent upon God's judgment, and that perjury at any stage of the proceedings vas fully
expected to bring its own punishment.").
37. See BARBARA J. SHAPIRO, PROBABILITY AND CERTAI'vT' 1% SEVE.\ -ni'-Cv l RY EGLAND
173 (1983) (explaining that many secular jurisdictions on the Continent adopted canonist procedures that
were considered to be more rational).
38. Charles Donahue, Jr., Proof b Witnesses in the Church Courts of Medieval Engand An Imperfect
Reception of the Learned Law, in ON THE LAWS AND CUSTOIS OF ENGLAND. supr note 17. at 131
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system to abandon the judgment of God for the judgment of mortals, he writes,
it was necessary for people to believe-and perhaps even for it to be
true-that the ultimate decision of the case not be within human
discretion but be dictated by the rules of law. People might accept a
judgment of the law rather than a judgment of God; it was less likely
that they would accept a judgment of man rather than one of God.39
I would push Donahue's analysis one step further. The point of Tancred's
series of rules was not to substitute the power of law for the hand of God, but
to maintain insofar as possible the power of God, as expressed through the
oath. The first of Tancred's rules was that the judge should try to reconcile
conflicting oaths-and hence avoid conceding that the oath is any less than a
divine guarantor of truthful testimony. The next series of rules merely
established a hierarchy of oaths and provided that weightier oaths would defeat
lesser oaths. For the most part, the Roman-canon law avoided even this much
uncertainty by barring altogether "the testimony of those who were unlikely
to tell the truth":40 slaves, women (in certain circumstances), those below the
age of fourteen, the insane, the infamous, paupers, infidels, criminals, parties
to the cause, children of parties, parents of parties, servants of parties, and
enemies of parties.4 Tancred's third principle-that if the oaths are of equal
status, the greater number of oaths should prevail-and his fourth
principle-that if the oaths are equal in both status and number, the defendant
must go free-were clear expressions of the primacy of the oath. They placed
no discretion in either human judges or human laws, but retained all power in
God.
We will see shortly that by the late seventeenth century, English evidence
rules roughly tracked Tancred's treatment of the problem of conflicting oaths.
One rule was that, when possible, juries should reconcile conflicting oaths to
avoid calling either witness a perjurer-this was the principle of Bethel's
Case.2 A broad series of competency rules helped to avoid the problem of
conflicting oaths by forbidding the testimony of those thought most likely to
lie. When both Bethels rule and the competency rules failed to prevent a
conflict in oaths, the jury was (according to some authorities) to prefer the
testimony of the greater number of witnesses. At an earlier stage, before and
39. Id. at 133. Richard Fraher believes that Donahue is taking Tancred's principles too much at face
value. He argues that there were in reality several mechanisms by which judges recaptured the discretion
that inflexible rules seemed to take away. See Fraher, supra note 25, at 56-62. Fraher sees these
mechanisms as evidence of faith in human judgment. See id. at 57. It is possible, though, that the system
profited by maintaining a rigid set of rules that seemed to deny human discretion while in fact permitting
much discretion in practice. See infra notes 81-82 and accompanying text.
40. Donahue, supra note 38, at 132.
41. See id. at 130-31. The last several categories were all eligible to testify against their sympathies-
children, for example, could testify against their parents. See id.
42. THE TRYAL OF SLINGSBY BETHEL ESQ., supra note 14, at 9; see infra Section III.A.
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through the mid-sixteenth century, English law protected the power of the oath
even more completely: By forbidding defense witnesses in serious criminal
cases altogether, it virtually assured that the accuser's oath would not be
contradicted.
In arguing that an emphasis on the power of the oath permitted the jury
trial to replace in some measure the divine sanction once supplied by the
ordeal, I do not mean to claim that there was a seamless transfer of divine
legitimacy from ordeal to jury trial. The very existence of the prisone forte et
dure suggests otherwise, for if early jury trials could have claimed the divine
cachet of the ordeal, there would have been no need to demand the defendant's
consent to trial. Nor do I mean to argue that any systemic actor affirmatively
went out in search of a new source of legitimacy and settled upon the
witnesses' oaths. It is enough to say that the history of the ordeal suggests that
systemic actors from King to county sheriff preferred to present criminal
verdicts to the community as divinely ordained. After the ordeal's demise, if
only gradually and over time, the institutions of justice gravitated toward a
formula for the jury trial that permitted the system to reassert its old claim to
divine legitimacy.
4 3
There is little reason, then, to expect that the jury trials that rose up within
several years after the passing of the ordeal should immediately have taken on
the early-modern form centered on witnesses and their oaths. Indeed, many
historians argue that the early criminal trial jury had very little to do with
witnesses sworn by divine oath and had instead a rather human face. The early
jury, they say, was composed of "Men of the Neighbourhood," who hailed
from the community of the crime and either witnessed the crime themselves
or spoke with those who had-and who "came to court more to speak than to
listen."'  Though the scant trial records of those early years 5 make it hard
43. I cannot explain the English attraction to the oath oser other concci'.able source-. of dl',ne
legitimacy. Oaths, as Wigmore noted, played a prominent role in Saxon times. %.hen the, ,,cre "tfricaciou-.
per se and irrespective of personal credit." John H. Wigmore. Required Numbers of Wttneses. A Brief
History of the Numerical System in England. 15 HARv L RE\ 83. 88 (19011. se also 9 W S
HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LA%, 204 (1926) The English mas hae inherited a recrence for
the oath from the Roman-canon la\%. which governed in English ecclesiastical courts and at tines had
treated oaths as conclusive proof. See R.H. HELMiHOLZ. THE SPIRIT O- CLASSICAL C. %' O L\% 145-73
(1996). There is clear evidence in other contexts that the common la%% borroscd Roman-canon la\% fortw
See. e.g., 2 W.S. HOLDSWORTH. A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw 204-06. 267-86 (3d ed 1923) [hereinafter
HOLDSWORTH 3d ed.]; SHAPIRO, supra note 28, at 187-90.
For my purposes here, it is not necessary to decide exactly %hat question the ordeal and trial JuD
were answering. Robert Palmer's sinking argument that both (he ordeal and the earl% trial jur) made moral
judgments of culpability and not factual judgments of guilt, see Robert C Palmer. Cans tein e andi the Dz
The English Criminal Jury., 84 MICH. L. REv. 787. 792-94 (1986). does not bear on m> question % hcthcr
the source of authority behind that judgment %%as perceised to be human or di' ine
44. LANGBEIN, supra note 25. at 78: see also. e g . I HOLDS%% ORTH 3d ed. .upra note 43. at 333-34.
1 STEPHEN, supra note 28, at 426: 2 JOHN HENRY VIGMORE. A TREATISE O, Tile A.GtO-AtIRICA,
SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMO-\ LAU § 575. at 676 t3d ed 1940)
45. See MUSSON. supra note 23, at 189 (noting the 'sparseness of reference-, concerming jut)
personnel" in the records): 2 POLLOCK & MAITLAND. supra note 24. at 653 l"The curt brcsit% of our
records allows us to say but little."); Edward Powell. Juri Trial at Gaol Deln eri in the Lat tuldh Ages
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to confirm or rebut this theory of the "self-informing" criminal jury, on the
whole they incline the reader to doubt that the early jury was entirely self-
informing, in the sense that it received no information from witnesses in court.
One finds little affirmative evidence that witnesses were absent from early
courtrooms4 6 and a fair amount of evidence that witnesses were present and
gave evidence, at least occasionally.47 Those historians who have embraced
The Midland Circuit, 1400-1429, in TWELVE GOOD MEN AND TRUE, supra note 16, at 78, 81 ("Medieval
legal records are notoriously uninformative about trial procedure.").
46. Traditional proponents of the theory of the self-informing jury have relied heavily on arguments
from silence: As contemporary chroniclers said nothing of witnesses, there must have been none. But
arguments from silence are always treacherous. For one thing, most medieval case reports are simply too
short to shed much useful procedural light. A typical trial record might be this brief: "Celestria of Hlatton
[above Aune], taken on suspicion of robbery, puts herself on the neighborhood [elects a jury trial] for good
and ill. The jurors say that she is not guilty and therefore she is quit therein." ROLLS OF THE JUSTICES IN
EYRE: BEING THE ROLLS OF PLEAS AND ASSIZES FOR GLOUCESTERSHIRE, WARWICKSHIRE AND
STAFFORDSHIRE 623-24 (Doris Mary Stenton ed., Bernard Quaritch 1940) (1221-1222) [hereinafter
GLOUCESTERSHIRE ROLLS]. For another, silence is always ambiguous: "[E]ven in the nineteenth century.
the formal 'record' will say no word of any witnesses and will speak as though the jurors had agreed on
a verdict before they came into court." 2 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 24, at 628.
47. Scattered records of early jury trials specifically mention the testimony of witnesses. See, e.g.,
ROLLS OF THE JUSTICES IN EYRE: BEING THE ROLLS OF PLEAS AND ASSIZES FOR YORKSHIRE IN 3 HENRY
III, 1218-1219, at 300 (Doris Mary Stenton ed., Bernard Quaritch 1937) (1218-1219). 1 thank Dan Klerman
for this reference. See also 9 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 43, at 183-84 (citing early examples of the use of
witnesses, including a murder trial from 1235).
The procedural forms of the private prosecutions known as "appeals" suggest a stronger role for
witnesses than historians generally have allowed. To launch an appeal, the appellor had to claim (whether
it was true we cannot be sure) that he was "ready to prove by his body [by combat] as one who wts
present and saw and heard this." Kappauf, supra note 16, at 184, 197 (quoting LINCOLNSIIIRE AND
WORCESTERSHIRE PLEAS 544 (Doris Mary Stenton ed., Bernard Quaritch 1934) (1218-1219, 1221)). The
reports of some such cases, although ambiguous, support the supposition that the jury heard testimony not
merely from the appellor, but from other witnesses as well. See, e.g., 2 BRACTON, supra note 31, at 406
(noting that the sheriff and coroners may testify about whether an appellor raised the hue and cry and about
the appellor's wounds); Kappauf, supra note 16, at 180-81 (quoting GLOUCESTERSHIRE ROLLS, supra note
46, at 413-14). In the earliest court sessions after the abolition of the ordeal, appeals accounted for more
than a third of all serious felony prosecutions, raising the very real possibility that in many criminal jury
trials, an eyewitness was present in court and spoke to the jury. See id. at 66.
Moreover, Robert Palmer notes that civil trial juries were hearing evidence as early as the 1290s. See
Palmer, supra note 43, at 796. He argues that it "would be both surprising and interesting" if criminal trial
juries did not begin hearing witnesses for another 200 years, as traditional historians argue. Id.
We also should not ignore the use of witnesses in non-trial settings. Stephen cited a case from 1221,
in which "several ... who were present when [the victim] was killed, testified that they saw" the defendant
holding the weapon. I STEPHEN, supra note 28, at 259-60. Thayer, as well as Pollock and Maitland,
criticized Stephen's reliance on this case because it was not strictly a trial, but a proceeding to determine
whether the defendant, as a manifest slayer, should be condemned without trial. See JAMES BRADL.Y
THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE COMMON LAW 13 n.I (Boston, Little. Brown
& Co. 1898); see also 2 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 24, at 654 n.4. But whatever the formal
denomination of the proceeding, it demonstrates that authorities turned to eyewitnesses when hoping to
learn the truth about a past event.
One final piece of evidence gives cause to doubt the traditional theory. If the early trial jury truly was
self-informing, then it is at least a little puzzling that the defendant had the right to challenge trial jurors
for cause-and even to have all of them removed, see 2 BRACTON, supra note 31, at 405-a right that
would have held out to the defendant the power to scuttle trial altogether unless other informed jurors
waited nearby. This difficulty grew larger by the end of the 13th century, when Britton suggested that the
defendant could of right challenge any juror who had served on the presenting jury. See BRITTON, supra
note 32, at 25. The most recent evidence suggests that, in the early 14th century, challenges "were more
commonly employed ... than has hitherto been assumed." MUSSON, supra note 23, at 189, 195-97. But
see J.B. Post, Jury Lists and Juries in the Late Fourteenth Century, in TWELVE GOOD MEN AND TRUE,
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the theory of the self-informing jury perhaps have focused too heavily on early
civil juries, which almost certainly were self-informing, although there is good
reason to think that criminal juries would not have mimicked their civil
counterparts in this regard. 8
On the other hand, it would be rash to suggest that early trial jurors came
to court entirely ignorant of the facts in the manner of modern jurors. The
mechanics of pretrial and trial procedure made it likely that at least some
jurors had at least some knowledge of the event or the defendant before
supra note 16, at 65, 71-72 (arguing based on late-14th-century evidence that defendants %%ere not pernitted
in practice to challenge jurors). Of course, as Thomas Green argues. even if only a fea premformd juror
remained on a panel, those few could have informed the rest See Thomas A. Green. A Rerrospecrite on
the Criminal Trial Jur. 1200-1800, in TWELVE GOOD MEN AND TRUE. supra note 16. at 358. 365. 367.69.
373.
48. Almost all of the frequently cited examples of civil juries acting on their own knowledge
concerned one of these four grounds of dispute: the value or ownership of land. the despoilation of land
by nuisance or waste, the relationship between a deceased and a claimed heir, or the age of a party Such
suits were authorized by ordinances of Henry II. the earliest of which dates to 1164. See I POLLOCK &
MAITLAND, supra note 24, at 149-50 (discussing Henry's ordinances); Kappauf. supra note 16. at 69-70
(same). A number of authorities discuss suits concerning the value or ownership of land See. e g. 2
BRACTON, supra note 31, at 143-45, 214-15 (citing the use of a jury to determine the '.alue of land).
WILLIAM FORSYTH, HISTORY OF TRIAL BY JURY 124. 152-53 (New York. Cockcroft & Co 1878).
GLANVILL, supra note 23, bk. XIII. at 150. 157; I POLLOCK & MAITLAND. supra note 24. at 93 tdescnbing
a suit from early Norman times decided by verdict of English jurors who knew how the disputed lands lay
in the time of King Edward); I REEVES' HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH LAW 398 (WF Finlason ed..
Philadelphia, M. Murphy 1880) [hereinafter REEVES]; I ST'PIimN. supra note 28. at 255-56. TiiAYER. supra
note 47, at 91 (citing a 1374 case). On suits about nuisance or waste. see, for example. BRrT-rON. supra
note 32, at 244.45; and 2 POLLOCK & MAITLAND. supra note 24. at 619-20. On inheritance suits. se. for
example, GLANVILL, supra note 23. bk. 11. at 27: id. bk. XIII. at 150. I POLLOCK & MAITLAND. supra note
24, at 148; 2 id. at 76; and I REEVES, supra, at 395. On disputes about a person's age. see. for esample,
GLANVILL, supra note 23. bk. XIII, at 159-60; 1 STEPHEN. supra note 28. at 262-63. and TIHAYER. supra
note 47, at 20-21. See also GLANVILL, supra note 23. bk. XIII. at 150-51 (describing a suit concerning a
person's date of death).
These questions had one thing in common: Each turned on facts that %%ere well within the observation
of many members of the community. See Kappauf. supra note 16. at 70. Other questions presented to juries
fit this description. Thayer relied on a case from 1158 in which jurors were asked what the defendant's
market rights had been during the last king's reign. See THAYER. supra note 47. at 53-54 Pollock and
Maitland reported that jurors were called upon during the Conqueror's reign to tell him what the law was
during the reign of Edward. See I POLLOCK & MAITLAND. supra note 24. at 103.
Even a rational designer of social systems might propose to answer such questions by calling together
a dozen neighbors to say what they knew. Criminal cases, in contrast, presented an entirely different kind
of factual dispute. As crimes tend to be ephemeral and witnessed only by a few. the only way to learn
about a crime (absent sophisticated forensics or a confession) is to ask one of those fea ,ho happened to
see it. There is no reason to think that early legal authorities failed to grasp this distinction betsccn the trial
of a land dispute and the trial of a crime. Indeed. one of the fea, histonans to focus on the different forms
of dispute found that, when land, age, or birth was at stake, jurors tended to come from the local
community (and hence were more likely to be "self-informed"). whereas "'[c]nminal rial jurors %ere less
likely to originate from one locale." George Stephen Sipek. Five Studies in the Early History of the Jury
4-5, 7-8 (1976) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation. University of Chicago) (on file ssith author), see also td.
at 11-12 (noting that local jurors were also called to decide whether someone had been a particular master's
serf).
One can find very few old reports of criminal cases in which jurors %%ere specifically chosen because
of their familiarity with the facts. Powell mentions two such cases. One of these involved an offense
committed in open court, the other a theft of financial documents-an offense that arguably required
factfinders with specialized knowledge. See Powell, supra note 45. at 80. These were. as Powell notes.
"'exceptional" cases. Id. We should not conclude from them how the typical, largely pnate crime %%as tried
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trial. 49 For my purposes, the more important question is not what the jurors
knew beforehand, but what they learned in court-and whether the process of
transferring information to the jury in court might have given cause to claim
that the jury's verdicts were somehow divinely ordained. Even fast adherents
of the old theory have allowed that early juries might not have been entirely
self-informing. They acknowledge that juries might have collected at least
some of their evidence from witnesses in the modem fashion.50 And although
traditionalists had once supposed that the criminal trial jury remained
self-informing as late as the sixteenth century, more recent studies suggest the
jury had ceased to be entirely self-informing, if it ever was, within about a
century of its birth.5'
49. Thomas Green argues that most trial juries included at least a small number of local jurors and
that those few "may well have dominated proceedings." Green, supra note 47, at 365, 367-69, 373.
Moreover, he says elsewhere, most trial juries also included some men of status, who, although "not likely
to have firsthand knowledge of slayings and thefts .... were well positioned to make inquiries." GREEN,
supra note 19, at 17; see also infra note 55.
50. Green, who once suggested that the early trial jury was entirely self-informing, see GREEN, supra
note 19, at 26-27, has more recently written that "[t]here must have been some, perhaps many, cases in
which inculpatory evidence came forward during" trial, Green, supra note 47, at 363. Green resists the
conclusion that such evidence was "common," at least in the trial jury's earliest years, but adds that our
evidence is so thin that "[i]t is perhaps unsound to conclude in either direction." Id. at 370. At all events,
he says, "the opportunity for self-informing was always present in the Middle Ages," perhaps alongside
other sources of evidence. Id. In correspondence with the author, Green has proposed the term "pre-
informing" as a substitute for "self-informing." Letter from Thomas Green, Professor, University of
Michigan Law School (Sept. 6, 1997) (on file with author). The former term suggests that the trial jury
came to court with some information in hand, but does not imply that no more information was
forthcoming in court.
51. This evidence appears in the work of several current historians of the early trial jury. Anthony
Musson reports the most direct evidence that early-l4th-century juries heard witnesses in court. See
MUSSON, supra note 23, at 189. He finds at least occasional examples of a seemingly modem panoply of
evidence produced before criminal trial courts, including both prosecution and defense witnesses, statements
by the accused, witnesses to the defendant's reputation, and physical and documentary evidence. Public
officials sometimes served as prosecution witnesses, and at least in one circumstance-prison break-the
case could not go forward without official testimony. See id. at 201-05. Musson concludes that in the early
14th century,
the self-informing character of trial juries was tempered by the recognition that witnesses and
some form of evidence were an acceptable and sometimes essential part of medieval criminal
trials. This was especially so in cases where the circumstances were unclear and the jury lacked
the knowledge to be truly self-informing.
Id. at 205.
Other recent scholarship approaches the problem indirectly, by challenging the belief that criminal
trial jurors were "men of the neighbourhood," who brought local knowledge of the crime with them to
court. For example, Bernard William McLane's study of a special court session in Lincolnshire in 1328
reveals that criminal trial jurors were drawn from the county at large and "rarely ... lived at the scene of
the crime and only infrequently came from the villages within five miles of the scene." Bernard William
McLane, Juror Attitudes Toward Local Disorder: The Evidence of the 1328 Lincolnshire Trailbaston
Proceedings, in TWELVE GOOD MEN AND TRUE, supra note 16, at 36, 56-57.
J.B. Post reports mixed findings in his study of late-14th-century jury lists. On the one hand, a fairly
great proportion of jurors in the late 14th century came from the same hundred (a sub-county geographical
district) as the crime. See Post, supra note 47, at 69. On the other hand, only about half of those summoned
for jury duty showed up. Officials apparently had to gather the balance of the panel from bystanders. In
fact, because jurors were so unlikely to show up, sheriffs took to summoning persons who had other
business in the court. There is little reason to think such persons came to court with any knowledge of the
crimes to be tried. See id. at 65, 67-68, 70-73.
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As for those first hundred years, we can do little better than guess at the
system's source, if any, of divine legitimacy. Perhaps the jurors' own oaths,
combined with their claimed status as witnesses, filled the part that the oaths
of true witnesses played in later years. Or perhaps, contrary to the theory of
the self-informing jury, jurors really did hear witness testimony much as they
did later. Or perhaps there was a period of transition during which a system
that had lost its claim to the divine legitimacy of the ordeal clumsily felt its
way toward a reconfigured trial process that let it stake that claim anew. The
prisone forte et dure is evidence of such a clumsy transition.
We need not now unravel the mystery of those first hundred years. By the
middle of the fifteenth century, as the writings of John Fortescue make plain,
the English trial system had come to stake great importance on the evidence
of witnesses sworn under oath.52 And as we will see in Part II, by the middle
of the sixteenth century, when the historical record first lets us see the shape
of criminal jury trials with any clarity, a form of trial was in place that exalted
the power of the oath to reveal the truth and permitted the system to reassert
its claim to divine sanction for its verdicts.
B. The Special Case of Capital Convictions
Although the jury trial system, like the ordeal before it, sought to present
its verdicts to the public with a divine imprimatur, in both systems there were
certain decisions that seemed to require a merely human say-so. Human
Edward Powell has concluded that jury panels in the Midland circuit in the carl) 15th centuO did not
regularly include more than one or a few jurors from the same hundred as the crime-and a hundred
included dozens of towns. See Powell, supra note 45. at 85-88 Sometimes not a single juror came from
the same hundred as the crime. Even within hundreds, there was no consistent attempt to get jurors from
the same location as the offense. See id. Powell argues that. as juries regularly heard more than one case.
and as those cases could originate anywhere in the county (and as most counties sere quite large), it %%a5
almost impossible that jurors could have visited crime scenes to question .,itneases See id at 96-97 He
also notes affirmative evidence of the use of witnesses. At least b) the earlN 15th ceniur). crime sictims
were an integral part of criminal prosecutions. After indictments issued. the sheriff vould make a
proclamation for all those wishing to prosecute or having information to come forward See id- at 107-08
He hypothesizes based on suggestive, though not overshelming. evidence that constables and other law
officers gave evidence before early juries. See id. at 110- I .
Powell acknowledges evidence on the other side. He allows that the geographical correlation bectseen
crime and jurors was stronger when there were only one or two cases to be tried-indicating perhaps an
aspiration to have local jurors. See id. at 82-88. And he notes that coroners, bailiffs, and constables served
frequently as jurors, lending some support to the idea that jurors Investigated cnmes before trial See id
at 90-94; see also MUSSON, supra note 23, at 190-91 (reporting similar findings). Povell s cms to believe.
however, that these men were selected for their status, not their knowledge. See Posell. supra note 45. at
96-97. And based on the whole of his evidence, he draws a sweeping conclusion about the theory of the
self-informing jury: "My suspicion is that criminal trial junes were never entirely sclf-informing in the strict
sense in which the term has been interpreted, and that even in the earliest days of jury trial. accusers and
witnesses had the chance to inform the jury in court.- Id. at 115-16.
52. At least in the civil context, the use of sworn witnesses %%as already highl) elaborated by
Fortescue's day. He described the process of sequestering witnesses. -so that the evidence of one of them
shall not instruct or induce another to testify in the same manner " JOHN FoRTEScL E. DE LAL DIL s LEGL %t
ANGLi,E 61 (S.B. Chrimes ed.. 1942). Stephen concludes that Fortescue wrote betsseen 1460 and 1470 See
I STEPHEN, supra note 28, at 263.
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authority was sufficient, first of all, for an accusation: At least since the Assize
of Clarendon of 1166, the jury of presentment returned indictments against
those rumored to be criminals. 3 As its delegated task was to report what
people said about others,54 the presenting jury perhaps relied on unswom (and
very human) chitchat and innuendoes.55 Moreover, for decades before the
Church disavowed the ordeal in 1215, human juries could render final verdicts
in criminal cases: By declaring that the defendant, although "accused," was
"not suspected," the presenting jury could spare him the rigors of the ordeal.56
In a similar way, defendants who were brought to bar by a private accusation
known as an "appeal" could plead that the appeal had been made from hate
and spite--de odio et atia-and ask a jury to decide the issue. If the jury
agreed, the accused would escape the ordeal.
But "while these juries could almost acquit, they could not convict." 8
That is, although human authority was sufficient to adjudge the defendant's
innocence and protect her from corporal punishment, the power to adjudge
guilt in the face of uncertainty was purely divine. It is true that cases of
53. See Groot, supra note 16, at 5. Indictments represented but a part of the business of the presenting
jury. Among other functions, the jury reported appeals (private criminal prosecutions) to the court. See
Kappauf, supra note 16, at 70-71.
54. See 2 BRACTON, supra note 31, at 403-04. The relevant standard, as Bracton wrote, was "popular
rumour." Id. at 403.
55. In this sense, the presenting jury was clearly self-informing. What is more, crime victims
sometimes served on presenting juries and presumably offered their personal knowledge of the facts. See
MUSSON, supra note 23, at 178-79.
Some historians point to the overlapping memberships of presenting and trial juries as evidence that
trial juries, too, were self-informing. Thomas Green makes this argument with respect to the "early period"
of the trial jury-the first half-century or so after its birth. See, e.g., Green, supra note 47, at 370. As Green
notes, however, procedural changes soon reduced the likelihood of an overlap between presenting and trial
juries. See GREEN, supra note 19, at 20-22. The most recent evidence suggests that, at least by the early
14th century, defendants often exercised their right to challenge prospective jurors, see MUSSON, supra note
23, at 189, 195-97, with the result that most trial juries included several members--and often a
majority-who were not members of the presenting jury, see id. at 198-99 (reporting evidence from 1326).
See also BRtTrON, supra note 32, at 25 (suggesting in the late 13th century that defendants' challenges of
trial jurors who served on presenting juries should be allowed). After legislation of 1352 established the
general principle that membership of presenting and trial juries should be separate, challenges on this basis
became unnecessary. See MUSSON, supra note 23, at 197, 200-01.
There are two other reasons to question the view that the self-informing nature of the presenting jury
is evidence that the trial jury was self-informing. First, when the criminal charge originated with a private
party's appeal and not with the presenting jury's indictment, the presenting jury merely notified the court
of the existence of the appeal and had, for all we know, no knowledge of the underlying facts. See 2
BRACrON, supra note 31, at 402-04 (noting that the appeal itself, even if abandoned by the person bringing
the charges, can substantiate an indictment); Kappauf, supra note 16, at 138.
Second, as Dan Klerman has pointed out to me, even when defendants were presented based on rumor
and suspicion, the presenting jury might not have been available to try them. Records of i3th-century jail
deliveries suggest that defendants were often indicted long before the trial court metand that the presenting
jury had long since disbanded by the time of trial. Such cases might have constituted a majority of felony
trials even by the 1240s and almost all felony trials by the 1290s. See Letter from Daniel Klerman,
Professor, University of Chicago Law School (Dec. 8, 1996) (on file with author); see also MUSSON, supra
note 23, at 197 (noting that the presenting jury probably had disbanded by the time of jail delivery, but
reporting evidence that "an overlap [between presenting and trial juries] may still have existed").
56. See Groot, supra note 16, at 6-8.
57. See id. at 8-9.
58. Id. at 9.
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manifest guilt-where the defendant had confessed, for example, or was taken
in possession of stolen goods-could proceed directly to condemnation. 9
When the evidence was uncertain, however, human judgment was insufficient
to support a verdict of guilt and the sentence of mutilation or death that,
barring a pardon, inevitably would have followed. 60 Here we see a premodern
notion that death is different: Only God's judgment, as revealed through the
ordeal, could condemn.6'
If, as seems probable, this singular status of the ultimate punishment
survived the ordeal, it might account for a peculiar inconsistency in the rules
regarding sworn witnesses that prevailed throughout the early-modern era.
Until 1702, criminal defendants in felony trials generally could not call sworn
witnesses.62 Yet criminal defendants in misdemeanor cases, as well as both
plaintiffs and defendants in civil cases, could call sworn witnesses. Although
conflicting oaths were almost impossible in felony cases, therefore, they must
have occurred fairly often in misdemeanor and civil cases. This is not to say
that the system was indifferent to the prospect of conflicting oaths in these
other cases: Many of the same rules that guarded against open conflicts of
oaths in felony trials, including the web of competency rules and Bethel's
rule,63 operated with full force in misdemeanor and civil cases. In
misdemeanor cases, as in felonies, defendants could not give sworn testimony.
Yet in these other cases the system must have been somewhat less averse to
the prospect of a jury choosing between sworn witnesses, for it ultimately
permitted such swearing contests to occur.
This distinction between felony cases and all others reflected, I suggest,
the belief that a jury's merely human choice between two sworn witnesses was
insufficient to support a judgment of death. Felonies, after all, were those
crimes that carried the capital sanction.6 If, in the liturgy of the ordeal, only
divine sanction could justify the ultimate punishment, then we can expect the
same might have been true in the liturgy of the jury trial. And in the liturgy
of the jury trial, only the unopposed oath of a sworn witness carried the divine
sanction. Human mediation of conflicting sources of God's truth would have
been an obvious oxymoron.
It is not easy to find this understanding that death was different expressed
in so many words by contemporaries. Yet we do find it exactly where we
59. See id. at 6.
60. See GREEN, supra note 19, at 11, 13-14. An adverse verdict by the presenting jury. however, meant
that the accused had to leave the country even if the ordeal turned out favorably. See Groot. supra note 16.
at 7. 8 n.15.
61. See 2 POLLOCK & MArTLAND, supra note 24. at 650 (positing a communal feeling that "'mcre
human testimony is not enough to send a man to the gallows-).
62. See I Anne, ch. 9. § 3 (1702) (allowing defense witnesses in any felony trial to be swom).
63. See infra Section III.A.
64. See Thomas A. Green, Societal Concepts of Criminal babilht.for Homicide in Mediaeval England.
47 SPECULUM 669, 671 (1972) (noting that the penalty for felony convictions in the Middle Ages was
invariably death).
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might expect-in the debate surrounding what was probably the earliest
proposal to permit sworn defense witnesses in felony cases. 65 As Parliament
weighed such a proposal in 1607, the Earl of Salisbury objected that sworn
defense witnesses would violate not merely English laws but "all lawes, for in
perplexitie of Evidence where the [J]udge is to give sentence of life or death
our Law taketh away witnesses from the guilty."66 Salisbury used the word
"perplexitie," as did his contemporaries, to mean a conflict in evidence. His
argument therefore amounted to this: Because no system of law can justly
impose a sentence of death in the face of conflicting oaths, the defendant must
be denied his witnesses.
Other theories could possibly explain the distinctive treatment of the
problem of sworn witnesses in capital cases. Although these alternatives to the
"legitimacy" theory I have set out have some force, none provides as
persuasive an account of the body of rules that governed criminal trials in the
early-modern era. The first of these theories took the following expression in
the 1607 parliamentary debates just mentioned: "In favor of Life the Law doth
presuppose, and not in other Cases, that Men will bee more prone to forswear
themselves, and therefore to prevent Perjury, doth not admitt of
witnesses .... 67 That is to say, because witnesses will be tempted to lie to
save the defendant's life, we must not permit defense witnesses in death cases.
As phrased, this rationale presents merely a slight twist on the theory I have
set out above: We must be especially mistrustful of a jury's judgment of
credibility in death cases, because witnesses have far greater incentives to lie.
In later years, however, this theory found a somewhat different form.
Around the turn of the eighteenth century, Jeffrey Gilbert68 put this spin on
the problem of the greater incentives to lie in capital cases:
69
In Cases of Treason or Felony no Witnesses are sworn against the
King; and the Reason seems to be because Men think it an Act of
65. As I will set out in more detail below, see infra note 98, it is possible-though unlikely-that
Parliament granted sworn defense witnesses to persons charged with a single narrow felony in 1589.
66. THE PARLIAMENTARY DIARY OF ROBERT BOWYER, 1606-07, at 325 (David Harris Willson ed.,
1931) [hereinafter BOWYER]. Another example of a procedural rule that distinguished between capital and
noncapital crimes comes from George Mackenzie's late-I7th-century treatise on Scottish law, which held
that the privilege against self-incrimination applied only in capital cases:
Neither is the Defender forced to give his Oath [against himself] in Criminals, as he is in civil
Cases .... But because the excessive love which we bear to Life, is the occasion of this
exemption; therefore where the punishment is not corporal .... the Defender will be forced
sometimes to give his Oath ....
SIR GEORGE MACKENZIE, THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF SCOTLAND ON MATrERS CRIMINAL 261-62
(Edinburgh, The Heirs and Successors of Andrew Anderson 2d ed. 1699).
67. BOWYER, supra note 66, at 314 n.l (reprinting a summary of the debate).
68. Michael Macnair reports that contemporary sources use this spelling of Gilbert's first name, though
more modem texts use "Geoffrey." See Michael Macnair, Sir Jeffrey Gilbert and His Treatises, 15 J. LEO.
HIST. 252, 261 n.1 (1994).
69. For more information on Gilbert, his treatise on evidence, and when he wrote it, see infra notes
160-161 and accompanying text.
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Piety to save the Life of a Man, and therefore may stretch a little
beyond their Knowledge, and for that Reason are not admitted to hurt
their Consciences by Swearing .... .0
Gilbert's emphasis here was not on the jury's capacity to detect lies or on the
danger that perjury poses to the search for truth, but rather on the solicitude
we must show to those who might be tempted to lie: We should not let them
"hurt their Consciences by Swearing" a false oath.
It is difficult to know today whether protecting the souls of possible
perjurers was a genuine purpose of the rule barring defense witnesses in capital
cases or was instead a mere "rationalization and an afterthought."' I am for
various reasons inclined to think the latter. One reason is that it is hard to
reconcile a systemic solicitude for the souls of the defendant's witnesses with
the system's apparent unconcern for the defendant's own fate. After all, the
system apparently preferred to let innocent defendants die for want of
witnesses than to hurt the souls of witnesses who might lie to save the guilty.
(I must allow, though, that the authorities may have regarded the damnation
of a witness to be a greater evil than a wrongful execution," and they may
have been concerned for their own souls should they tempt witnesses to lie.73)
A second reason to doubt the solicitude rationale is that a theory founded on
the system's concern for the souls of perjurers cannot explain other evidence
rules, such as Bethel's rule, which sought to erase apparent conflicts of oaths
by advising the jury, when possible, to reconcile conflicting testimony. By
papering over one witness's lies, Bethel's rule worked to support the apparent
legitimacy of verdicts, but it did nothing (if we assume a canny deity) to
protect the souls of those who actually lied. A third reason is that the
solicitude theory surely cannot explain the common law's failure to punish
witness perjury.74 This omission would have been altogether out of line with
a systemic concern to protect (and deter) witnesses from perjury-but it adds
substantial support, as I will argue in Part II, to the legitimacy theory. Still, at
bottom, both the solicitude theory and the legitimacy theory can help to
explain those rules that dictated which witnesses had access to the oath. To
that extent, they must exist side by side.
Another alternative to the legitimacy theory is less subtle: Perhaps the
system forbade defense witnesses in capital cases to insure that the Crown, in
70. JEFFREY GILBERT, THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 159 (London. Henry Lintot 1756).
71. Albert V. Alschuler, A Peculiar Privilege in Historical Perspective: The Right To Remain Slent.
94 MICH. L. REv. 2625, 2645 n.77 (1996) (debating how to charactenze the solicitude rationale)
72. I thank Kenji Yoshino for pressing me on this point.
73. A tract writer of Gilbert's day explained the danger of tempting another to lie under oath: "He who
exacts an Oath of another, whereby he either certainly knows, or may reasonably suppose, that the Person
of whom he requires it will forswear himself. . must expect to render an Account for his
Uncharitableness towards his Neighbour's Soul." WILLIAM WAKE. A PRACTICAL DISCOURSE CONCERNING
SWEARING 25-26 (London, Richard Sare 1696) (emphasis omitted).
74. See infra note 106 and accompanying text.
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the most serious of criminal cases, would win. Several historians 75 and at
least a couple of seventeenth-century critics 76 attributed the rule against
defense witnesses in part to a frank desire to favor the prosecution. But why
should a King powerful enough to ban opposing witnesses in major cases be
so content to see his authority flouted in minor (misdemeanor) cases? Not all
of the latter, as we will see when we address Bethel's Case, were unimportant
to the King. Indeed, why should such a King have been content to lose so
many felony trials? There is fairly good evidence that throughout the history
of the English criminal jury trial, a solid proportion of all prosecutions ended
in acquittals. 77 That an all-powerful monarch could have put an end to such
lawlessness simply by abolishing trial by jury merely points out how far short
the King fell from omnipotence. His justice had to wear a mantle of
legitimacy. If the King had the power to ban opposing witnesses in capital
cases, it is perhaps because the resulting verdicts, supported by an unopposed
and divinely enforced oath, would have a claim to legitimacy greater than any
the Crown could grant or take away.
C. The Reality Beneath the Illusion
But if the system staked its legitimacy so fully upon the oath, then what
need did it have for the jury? What purpose did the jury serve beyond
acknowledging the witnesses' oaths and acting upon them? For that matter,
why were there so many acquittals in a system that contrived so well to protect
the oaths of prosecution witnesses from contradiction? These questions lead us
to the third trait that the trial jury shared with the old ordeal: Each institution
permitted the system to lay claim to a divine sanction for its verdicts while in
reality meting out a very human form of justice.
As for the ordeal, it is nothing new to say that human judgment often
tinged its verdicts. After all, someone had to determine when the iron was hot
enough and whether the wounds were clean enough or whether a partly
75. See, e.g., I STEPHEN, supra note 28, at 354 ("The true reason for the rule as to restricting the
defence is obvious. It increased the power of the prosecution, and saved trouble to those who conducted
it."); THAYER, supra note 47, at 157 ("Mhe king, in criminal cases, was no mere ordinary party to an
action; the procedure was heavily weighted in his favor."); 2 WIGMORE, supra note 44, § 575, at 685 ("No
doubt also a general disinclination prevailed to concede anything that would weaken the hands of the
prosecution.").
76. See, e.g., JOHN HAWLEs, REMARKS UPON THE TRYALS 22 (London, Jacob Tonson 1689) ("The
reason given that the Indictment is the Suit of the King, and no Councel or Witness is allowable in a capital
matter against the King, is foolish .... ); BOWYER, supra note 66, at 311 (quoting a member of the House
of Commons at a 1607 debate); see also Trial of Udall, I Howell's State Trials 1271, 1281 (1590) ("And
the witnesses offering themselves to be heard, were answered, that because their Witness was against the
queen's majesty, they could not be heard.").
77. See Green, supra note 64, at 671 ("Throughout the entire mediaeval period for which written
records are extant, the great majority of defendants who stood trial were acquitted.").
[Vol. 107: 575
Jury as Lie Detector
submerged body had sunk or floated.78 And into any justice system in which
human action can distort outcomes, a certain amount of corruption will
inevitably seep. Many historians have said as much, 79 and even a few
contemporary complaints have survived. 0
But while it may be unspectacular to note the potential for manipulation
in the administration of the ordeal-we are all familiar with the vagaries of
even well-designed justice systems-it is slightly startling to realize that
medieval justice systems apparently chose a manipulable system over one that
might have been relatively immune from human interference. That is, we can
easily imagine an ordeal not so subject to the vagaries of human justice. Given
that an omnipotent God surely could have spoken through a throw of the dice,
we must assume that the system preferred an ordeal that left room for human
discretion.8 The institutional brilliance of the ordeal was that it so neatly
merged the appearance of divine judgment with the reality of a great measure
of human control. Its verdicts at once satisfied the public desire that judgments
of death be divinely ordained and flattered human notions of substantial
justice. In the trial jury, the English justice system managed to reproduce this
very useful combination of traits. By forbidding conflicts of oaths in capital
cases, the system assured that a jury's verdict of guilt would seem to bear a
divine imprimatur. Yet, by granting the jury an unbounded discretion to acquit,
the system also assured that the trial process would not devolve into a
mechanical totting of oaths, subject to manipulation by those willing to swear
82a false accusation.
78. See LEA, supra note 18, at 404 ("ITlhe result depended mostly upon those who administered the
ordeal."); Peter Brown, Society and the Supernatural: A Medieval Change. 104 DAEDALLS 133, 139 (1975)
("There was a built-in flexibility in the ordeal that enabled the group . to maintain a degree of inittatve
quite contrary to the explicit ideology of the ordeal."); Colman. supra note 20. at 589 ("A somewhat
disturbing feature of all forms of ordeal is the lack of quantitative precision in their application.")
Margaret Kerr and her colleagues argue that the ordeals "were engineered to ensure a high rate of
success." Kerr et al., supra note 19, at 580. Their evidence shows that men were generally sent to the
ordeal of cold water, while women were usually sent to the ordeal of hot iron. The reason, they argue. was
that because of higher body fat, "a woman was much less likely than a man to pass the ordeal of cold
water." Id. at 582. As for the ordeal of hot iron. they argue that because bum wounds do not tend to
become infected before the fifth day after injury, the design of the ordeal, which looked for signs of
infection after three days, was tilted toward innocence. See id. at 593.
79. See, e.g., BARTET, supra note 17, at 41 ("Having the power to determine, they also had the
power to defraud."); Colman, supra note 20, at 589 ("[Sluch trals allowed wide scope for manipulation
of all kinds .... ).
80. See BARTLEt-, supra note 17, at 94 (noting that 12th-century popes ordered priests not to take
bribes in the conduct of ordeals); LEA. supra note 18. at 406 (citing a 12th-century Scottish law forbidding
bribery by those administering ordeals); Hyams. supra note 17. at 102-03 & n.57. 116 n.140 (citing
contemporary cases).
81. 1 am grateful to Adam Hirsch for pointing out the significance of nonrandom ordeals
82. Some have argued that medieval and early-modem Continental justice systems embraced just such
a mechanical totting of oaths. See. e.g., JOHN H. LANGBEIN. PROSECIrNG CRIME IN THE RENAISSANCE
238 (1974) (noting that under the Roman-canon law of proof of Continental Europe. the job of the tner
of fact "was to apply the rules, to assign arithmetic values to evidence according to the tariff of cogency
which the later jurists had worked out").
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Juries did many things with their unbounded discretion to acquit.
Sometimes they protected the accused from government persecution.
Sometimes they rejected as unsound a particular provision of the criminal law.
Sometimes they bestowed mercy on guilty but worthy defendants. 3
Sometimes they concluded that the sworn testimony they had heard, even if
true, did not add up to a factual case of guilt. And sometimes, no doubt, they
rejected the prosecution's sworn witnesses as perjurers-that is, they acted as
the system's lie detectors. When they did so, however, they did so privately,
without the system's formal invitation and without disturbing the public's
perception of a verdict founded on the witnesses' oaths. With an elaborate
array of evidentiary devices, the system managed to preserve for a very long
time the principle that guilty verdicts in capital cases (and most verdicts in
most other cases) should never rest on a merely human choice between two
competing versions of a divinely revealed truth. The story that follows traces
that principle's long dominance, its slow erosion, and its eventual collapse.
II. THE RISE OF DEFENSE WITNESSES
A. Curtains Open: The Sixteenth Century
Given how thin the evidence has grown with age, we perhaps can do no
better than to theorize when speaking about the jury in its earliest years. It
would be three centuries after the abolition of the ordeal in 1215 before the
workings of criminal jury trials would be revealed with any clarity. A
sixteenth-century tract of Sir Thomas Smith84 and the 'accounts of a few
high-profile cases of the same era, later bound in Howell's collection of State
Trials,85 lend some detail where there had been little. Still, it is easy to
exaggerate what these sources can tell us about criminal jury trials in the
sixteenth century. Smith's description of a sixteenth-century criminal trial,
which has served as the basis for self-assured generalizations by modern
historians,86 occupies only a few pages of his treatise.87 And the State Trials
are an uncertain source in this era. Not for another century or so did verbatim
83. Each of these falls under the general heading of jury nullification. Thomas Green has assembled
striking evidence of nullification by medieval juries. He concludes that juries sought to moderate the law
of homicide, which as yet made no distinction between murder and manslaughter, by manipulating facts
to fit them within the law's narrow notion of proper self-defense. See GREEN, supra note 19, at 28-64. John
Langbein reports evidence from a much later era of juries' acting to temper the law's severity, even in the
face of clear evidence of guilt. See John H. Langbein, Shaping the Eighteenth-Century Criminal Trial: A
View from the Ryder Sources, 50 U. CHI. L. REv. 1, 52-55 (1983).
84. THOMAS SMITH, DE REPUBLICA ANGLORUM (Mary Dewar ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1982)
(1583). Smith wrote his treatise in the 1560s; it was published in 1583. See SHAPIRO, supra note 28, at
159-60.
85. 1 will refer to this collection as Howell's State Trials, as that is the more common designation.
Some of the volumes were in fact edited by William Cobbett and bear his name.
86. See, e.g., I STEPHEN, supra note 28, at 346-50.
87. See SMITH, supra note 84, at 112-15.
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shorthand reporting become a common feature even of celebrated trials.s"
Sixteenth-century trial reports were short, incomplete, and subject to distortion
according to the allegiances of the source.
Even allowing for the shortcomings of our sources, we may safely draw
three useful conclusions about sixteenth-century criminal procedure. The first
is that the defendant could call no witnesses. There seem to be few explicit
statements of this negative proposition, but all the major authorities have
accepted it as true.89 The trial of Nicholas Throckmorton of 1554, contained
in the State Trials, supplies the most famous expression of the rule.r
Throckmorton attempted to call a witness on his behalf, but the witness "was
not suffered to speak."9' "[W]hy," Throckmorton asked the court, "be ye not
so well contented to hear truth for me, as untruth against me?' 92 He pointed
out that Queen Mary herself had instructed the court that "notwithstanding the
old error amongst you, which did not admit any witness to speak [against the
Queen] .... her highness's pleasure was, that whatsoever could be brought in
the favour of the subject, should be admitted to be heard." 9' The chief justice
did not respond to Throckmorton's allegation,' but merely told him: "[Y]ou
have no cause to complain, for you have been suffered to talk at your
pleasure." 95
A trial at which only one side may present evidence will never in the
normal course of events call on the jury to choose between sworn witnesses.
Yet, as the chief justice told Throckmorton, defendants were "suffered to talk
at [their] pleasure." Hence our second bit of information is that defendants
themselves could speak at trial, and juries therefore often must have heard
competing versions of events. Smith made as much clear in the most famous
passage of his treatise:
88. See John H. Langbein, The Criminal Trial Before the Law'ers. 45 U C L REv. 263. 264-67
(1978). For a particularly sharp warning to those who would rely on the accounts in State Trials. see G
KITSON CLARK, THE CRITICAL HISTORIAN 92-96. 107-15 (1967).
89. See, e.g., 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *359. Anthony Musson has recently reported
at least scattered instances of defense witnesses speaking at early-14th-century rials. See MUSSON. supra
note 23, at 202-03, 205. His descriptions do not, however, leave the impression of anything like a
regularized practice.
90. See Trial of Throckmorton, I Howell's State Trials 869 (1816).
91. Id. at 885.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 887-88.
94. He said that the Queen had delivered her command not to him. but to the chief justice of the Court
of Common Pleas. See id. at 888. Perhaps his meaning was that the Queen had merely authorized civil
adversaries to call witnesses against her. The origin and general importance of Mary's dispensation are
unclear.
95. Id. at 888. The only other contemporary source I have seen for the proposition that defendants
could not call witnesses is the Trial of Udall. I Howell's State Trials 1271. 1281 (1590) ("And the
witnesses offering themselves to be heard, were answered, that because their Witness vas against the
queen's majesty, they could not be heard.").
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The Judge first after [the witnesses] be sworne, asketh first the partie
robbed, if he knowe the prisoner, and biddeth him looke upon him:
he saith yea, the prisoner sometime saith nay. The [victim says], I
knowe thee well ynough, thou robbest me in such a place, thou
beatest mee, thou tookest my horse from mee... : the theefe will say
no, and so they stand a while in altercation .... 96
But although the jury indeed faced a conflict in testimony, it was not a sworn
conflict. And this is the third bit of information we can draw from these
records: While the accuser's allegations were sworn, the defendant's denial
was not.97
The defendant's inability to take the oath made the jurors' task as lie
detectors easier. By choosing simply to credit sworn evidence over unsworn,
they could avoid a difficult comparison of credibility. Many small comments
in various treatises and trial records, which I will report in time, suggest that
juries routinely did just that. Although some juries no doubt chose to credit the
defendant's unsworn tale over the prosecution's sworn testimony, the system
never put juries in capital cases to the task of weighing competing oaths. And
it never put juries in a position where, in order to condemn the defendant, they
would have to reject sworn testimony.
It therefore should be no surprise that when the system did begin to permit
defendants to call witnesses, it did not permit defense witnesses in felony cases
to be sworn. The first defense witnesses probably appeared in the late sixteenth
century, not long after Queen Mary reportedly endorsed the change. 98 By the
middle of the next century, unsworn defense witnesses had become a regular
fixture of the criminal courts. 99 In one sense, their presence did little to
96. SMITH, supra note 84, at 114.
97. Once again, finding affirmative contemporary evidence for this negative proposition is not easy.
Robert Palmer reports that, in the 1290s, "the accused was specifically not to testify under oath." See
Palmer, supra note 43, at 795 n.24. The rules of pretrial examination developed during Queen Mary's reign
neglected to provide that defendants be swom. See LANGBEIN, supra note 82, at Ii, 17, 25. It is possible
that contemporaries would have understood a defendant's right to give sworn testimony as an imposition,
analogous to a coerced confession. See Alschuler, supra note 71, at 2645.
98. A 1589 statute allowed "lawful witness[es]" for those charged with embezzling the Queen's
munitions. See An Act Against the Imbezzelling of Armour, Habilaments of War and Victual, 31 Eliz., ch.
4 (1589). Although neither the Act nor Blackstone's treatment of it, see 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 89, at
*359-60, specifies whether these "lawful" witnesses were to be sworn, I think it is likelier they were not.
In the Act To Abolish Hostilities with Scotland of 1607, Parliament specifically provided that defendants
covered by that Act should have "good and lawfull Witnesses upon their oathes." 4 Jam., ch. I, § 16
(1607). But see 2 MATTHEW HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 283 (Philadelphia, Robert
H. Small 1847) (saying that the 1589 statute "seems virtually to allow the prisoner's testimony upon oath").
99. See LANGBEIN, supra note 82, at 25 & n.6; THAYER, supra note 47, at 157, 159 n.4; 2 WIGMORE,
supra note 44, § 575, at 685 & n.46. Both Coke and Hale suggested there was no authority for barring
sworn defense witnesses in felony trials. See COKE, supra note 33, at 79 ("[Trhere is not so much as
scintilla juris against it."); 2 HALE, supra note 98, at 283 ("Regularly the evidence for the prisoner in
capital cases is given without oath, tho the reason thereof is not manifest ...."). Neither author, however,
disputed that such a ban was in place. See also Trial of Roswell, 10 Howell's State Trials 147, 267 (1684)
(Jeffreys, C.J.) ("I think it is a hard case, that a man should [not have] his witnesses examined upon oath:
But yet you know as well as I, that the practice of the law is so; and the practice is the law.").
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enlarge the jury's role as lie detector. In the face of the prosecution's sworn
testimony, the jury remained free to disregard these new witnesses' unsworn
allegations. ° Again, as I will report later, trial records suggest some juries
did just that.
James Fitzjames Stephen, one of the few historians to consider this state
of affairs in any depth, traced the bar against sworn defense witnesses to
Roman-canon law principles, which exalted the primacy of the oath. Because
it would have been "'most unformal' under the civil law to confront one oath
with another,'0 ' the system simply forbade one party's witnesses to take the
oath. Stephen went on to quote David Hume (a nephew of the philosopher),
who attempted in his Commentaries on the Law of Scotland of 1790 to explain
the system's old aversion to conflicting oaths:
"The sort of argument, as far as I can collect it, by which our
lawyers justified so strange a restriction of the [defendant's] proof,
was to this purpose, that the accuser had set forth certain facts and
qualities in his libel, and must establish these with evidence to be
used in his prosecution; that if he failed to prove them the [defendant]
must be acquitted, of course, for that reason only, though there were
no evidence on his part at all; and that, on the other hand, if the
prosecutor proved his libel, it could serve to no purpose, but to
occasion perjury, to admit a contrary proof on the part of the
[defendant], whose witnesses, if they contradicted what had already
been proved by those for the prosecution, must be swearing falsely,
which it was the business of the Court to deny them an opportunity
of doing.... In short, the notion of a conjunct probation of the libel
and defences before the assize was thought too dangerous to be
admitted: the prerogative of proving, and the choice of the witnesses,
were to be given to one of the parties only; and on the evidence taken
by that party the issue was entirely to depend."' '
Lawyers, Hume said, believed that once "the prosecutor proved his libel," then
any contrary defense witness "must be swearing falsely." As lawyers of this
era often used the word "prove" to mean nothing more than to swear to
100. See 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 89. at *359-60.
101. 1 STEPHEN, supra note 28, at 350-51. Stephen was quoting DAINES BARRINGTON. OBSERVATIONS
ON THE STATUTES, CHIEFLY THE MORE ANCIENT. FROM MAGNA CHARTA TO THE TWErY-FIRST OF JAMES
I. CAP. XXVII, at 89-90 (London, W. Bowyer 1766). Barrington in turn was quoting from a paper read to
the House of Commons during the 1607 debates on the Act To Abolish Hostilities with Scotland. see I
H.C. JOUR. 378-79 (June 4, 1607), which I will take up shortly. see infra Section 1.B. There is no
particular reason to trust facts stated in the 1607 paper, which has neither a byline nor citations. My
purpose now is to try to explain why the common law banned defense witnesses. Contemporary beliefs
about civil law rules, however inaccurate, can help in this inquiry.
102. 1 STEPHEN, supra note 28, at 352-53 (quoting 2 DAVID HUmE. COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF
SCOTLAND RESPECTING TRIAL FOR CRIMES 70-72 (Edinburgh. Bell & Bradfute 1800) (1790)). Hume is
writing here about Scottish law in earlier times, but he does not specify the era. whether Scottish law
permitted sworn defense witnesses was a point of confusion at House of Common debates on the Act To
Abolish Hostilities with Scotland in 1607. See infra text accompanying notes 126-128
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something, 10 3 there was implicit in this belief a presumption that sworn
evidence is truthful. At a time when people took the power of the oath
seriously,'14 such a presumption must have sounded less odd than it does
today. But to protect that presumption, the system had to avoid the spectacle
of competing oaths.'05
By forbidding defense witnesses to testify under oath, the system permitted
itself the luxury of pretending there was no perjury in its midst. And in fact,
during the first centuries of the criminal trial jury, it appears there was no
crime of witness perjury recognized at common law.'1 6 Denying the very
103. See, e.g., GILBERT, supra note 70, at 156-57.
104. Popular tracts of the late 17th century, when defense witnesses in felony cases remained unswom.
attest to the awesome power accorded the oath. See, e.g., JOHN ALLEN, OF PERJURY 15 (London, Benjamin
Tooke 1682) ("[A]n Oath is ... [tlhe greatest assurance, that a Man can give of the truth of his Testimony;
the last result, the highest and utmost appeal that we can make; ... and the best means to find out the
truth of Matter of Fact, to determin[e] of Right and Wrong, to give every Man his due, to clear the
Innocent, and discover the Guilty .... ); A GUIDE TO ENGLISH JURIES 49-50 (London, Thomas Cockerill
1682) ("[I]f one forswear one's self, one virtually in so doing utterly forsakes God, and his Mercy and
Truth. Says a Learned Man, part of the Oath is So help me God, viz. I pray God he will never help me,
if I shall not sincerely and faithfully keep this my Oath.... Perjury is of its Nature a contempt of God.");
PERJURY THE NATIONAL SIN 4 (London, Randall Taylor 1690) ("That many are not struck dead with an
Oath in their mouths, or come to some other fearful end, as some do, is a luculent testimony both of God's
great patience, and of a Judgment to come .... ); see also SUSAN STAVES, PLAYERS' SCEPTERS: FICTIONS
OF AUTHORITY IN THE RESTORATION 193 (1979) (arguing that during the Restoration, "the idea that sworn
testimony must be believed because it was sworn was only very slowly abandoned").
105. Thomas Comber explained the problem of competing oaths in a 1681 assize sermon: "One would
imagine nothing could tempt a Rational Man [to peijuryl if the too frequent and sad Experience of
Opposite, yea of Contradictory Oaths (in this Impious Age of ours) did not convince us, that nothing is
too monstrous or unreasonable for an Ill Man to do." THOMAS COMBER, THE NATURE AND USEFULNESS
OF SOLEMN JUDICIAL SWEARING 39 (York, Samuel Roycroft for Robert Clavell 1682), quoted in STAVES,
supra note 104, at 231.
106. See Damport v. Sympson, 78 Eng. Rep. 769 (K.B. 1596) ("Until the statute of 3 Hen. 7. c. I,
which gives power to examine and punish perjuries in the Star-Chamber, there was not any punishment
for any false oath of any witness at the common law .... "); Onslowe's Case, 7 & 8 Eliz., Mich., 2 Dyer
242b, 242b (C.P. 1565); 2 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 24, at 542-43; 3 STEPHEN, supra note 28,
at 241-48. The only form of perjury known in the early centuries of the criminal trial was the perjury of
jurors who returned a knowingly false verdict, punished by a process known as "attaint." See 3 STEPHEN,
supra note 28, at 241-42; Sipek, supra note 48, at 65. Coke's opinion that "perjury of witnesses was
severely punished by the ancient laws of the realm," COKE, supra note 33, at 163-64, was, Stephen said,
"a good illustration of the unintelligent patchwork way in which [Coke] writes on all subjects," 3 STEPHEN,
supra note 28, at 248.
There is some suggestion that witness perjury was punished in ecclesiastical courts, see Damport, 78
Eng. Rep. 769 (K.B. 1596); 2 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 24, at 542-43; 3 STEPHEN, supra note
28, at 243-44, but Coke wrote that the ecclesiastical courts had no jurisdiction over "perjury concerning
any temporall act," COKE, supra note 33, at 164. Michael Gordon comments that "[ilt is certain that if an
ecclesiastical court had attempted to assert jurisdiction over pejury committed in a common-law
proceeding, it would have been immediately and all but automatically prohibited." Michael D. Gordon, The
Perjury Statute of 1563: A Case History of Confusion, 124 PROC. AM. PHIL. SOC'Y 438, 442 (1980). The
Court of Star Chamber, he adds, probably also lacked jurisdiction over witness perjury in common law
courts. See id. at 443-44.
Gordon argues that although there was no common law crime of "perjury," false testimony could be
punished as "maintenance," usually defined as an officious interference in a suit in which one has no
interest. See id. at 445-48. Gordon says that the argument about whether perjury was a crime is therefore
one of mere semantics. See id. Even if Gordon is correct, however, and perjury was punished under the
guise of maintenance, the distinction was hardly one of semantics. As I will argue shortly, the system's
aversion to "peijury" prosecutions was that they broadcast the failure of the oath to secure truthful
testimony. The ruse of "maintenance" prosecutions might not have done that.
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existence of perjury was convenient for the system in two ways. First, and
most obviously, it avoided the damage that a perjury prosecution might have
caused to the public's confidence in the accuracy of jury verdicts. Even to
acknowledge the possibility of perjury would have revealed to the public that
the system's main means of ensuring truth did not work. As a sixteenth-
century court reasoned, "[T]he law intends the oath of every man to be true;
and therefore ... there was not any punishment for any false oath of any
witness at the common law."' 7 By the same token, the system contrived that
two oaths should never conflict-a circumstance that would have trumpeted
one witness's perjury and the failure of the oath. Second, denying the existence
of perjury avoided a dilemma that was inherent in the system's reliance upon
the oath as a source of truth: If a felony conviction may not rest on a jury's
choice between two oaths, then the system may never condemn a perjurer. For
at any perjury trial, the jury would have to choose between the accuser's oath
and the defendant's own (allegedly perjured) oath.
That dilemma may explain why, after Parliament finally made perjury a
crime in 1563,108 many and perhaps most perjury prosecutions took place in
the Court of Star Chamber. In the Star Chamber, the Continental rule,
requiring the oaths of two witnesses to sustain a criminal prosecution, seems
to have prevailed. '° 9 The two-witness rule ensured that a perjury prosecution
would never reduce to a simple and (by hypothesis) unprincipled choice
between two oaths-the accuser's versus the defendant's. When the common
law courts took over perjury trials after the abolition of the Star Chamber in
1640,"' they soon imposed a rule that the oath of a single prosecution
107. Damport, 78 Eng. Rep. at 769 (emphasis addcd}.
The gradual, grudging development of the crime of perjury betrays the system's embarrassment at
having to admit the phenomenon existed. Parliament recognized the crime of subornation of perjury in
1540, a full generation before creating the crime of perjury. See Against Maintenance and Embracery
Byeng of Titles &C., 32 Hen. 8, ch. 9. § 3 (1540); Sipek. supra note 48. at 66 Subornation of perjury, at
least if not successful, does not so greatly threaten the power of the oath. And even after perjury was made
a crime, there seems to have been a rule that a witness's perjury in a capital case would not be prosecuted
after verdict and sentence are read, "lest it should bring a public scandal upon the justice of the kingdom
if the cause of a person so committed should receive new examination." WILLIAM HUDSON. A TREATISE
IN THE COURT OF STAR CHAMBER 71-82 (photo. reprint 1986) (1792). quoted in 3 STEPIIEN. supra note
28, at 247; see also Michael D. Gordon. The Invention of the Common Law Crime- Perjurn and the
Elizabethan Courts, 24 AM. J. LEGAL HisT. 145. 164-66 (1980) (discussing doubts that persisted after
passage of the perjury statute about whether perjury by a crown witness and perjury at a proceeding that
was initiated by indictment were punishable).
108. See An Act for Punishment of Such as Shall Procure or Commit Any Wilful Perjur,. 5 Eliz . ch
9 (1563).
109. See Gordon, supra note 107. at 159-63: Wigmore. supra note 43. at 107. see also 9
HOLDswORTH, supra note 43, at 206 (observing disagreement in the cases and suggesting that the
two-witness rule was "almost ... accepted" in the Star Chamber but not "invariable"). Note that the
process of attaint, by which a jury was charged with returning a perjured verdict, required a new jury of
24 persons to try the first panel of 12-that is. two new oaths for each old oath. See FORTESCVE. supra
note 52, at 61-63; I HOLDSWORTH 3d ed.. supra note 43. at 338-39 (discussing the law in Bracton's time).
110. See Wigmore, supra note 43. at 107.
1997]
The Yale Law Journal [Vol. 107: 575
witness was insufficient to convict."' Blackstone's famous justification for
the rule-that "one witness is not allowed to convict a man indicted for
perjury; because then there is only one oath against another" 12-merely
repeated what common law judges had been saying for generations." 3 Even
today, in most jurisdictions, a single oath remains insufficient to support a
perjury prosecution."4
The dilemma of perjury prosecutions also may explain why Parliament did
not make perjury a capital offense-it was created a mere misdemeanor and
has remained noncapital."15 Here we have, I suggest, a consequence of the
111. Wigmore labored without much success to reconcile this bit of English numerology with his
insistence that Continental ideas about the oath never took hold on English turf. He argued, first, that by
the time the common law courts inherited the prosecution of perjury cases from the Star Chamber in 1640,
the need for two witnesses in perjury cases (enforced in the Star Chamber) was too well-established to
change. See id. He did not attempt to explain why the two-witness rule did not survive in the case of other
offenses traditionally prosecuted in the Court of Star Chamber. He argued, second, that the "real
explanation" for the survival of the numerological rule in perjury was probably a simple if delicate matter
of timing. Id. At the time the common law took over perjury cases in the early 17th century, Continental
notions of the oath were still viable, but the "corrective notion-that of the jury as witnesses-had
practically disappeared, and thus the way was open." Id. at 107-08. The difficulty with this latter argument
is that the corrective notion of the jury as witnesses, as I have argued above, see supra notes 46-51 and
accompanying text, may never have amounted to all Wigmore thought. In the end, Wigmore fell back on
the very traditional argument that perjury is different from all other crimes because "if but one witness was
offered, there would be merely (as Chief Justice Parker said) oath against oath." Id. at 108. That is, I think,
the right answer, but it begs the question of why Wigmore's common law jury should have been unable
to resolve the conflict between oaths.
112. 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 89, at *358. Blackstone cited similar reasoning to explain the
two-witness rule that generally prevailed in treason prosecutions (a rule that survives in Article Il, Section
3 of the United States Constitution). Two oaths are needed, he said, perhaps to overcome the defendant's
sworn allegiance against the King. See id. But Blackstone then added that "the principal reason" for the
rule, "undoubtedly, is to secure the subject from being sacrificed to fictitious conspiracies, which have been
engines of profligate and crafty politicians in all ages." Id. Later authorities endorsed this second rationale.
See, e.g., W.M. BEST, A TREATISE ON THE PRINCIPLES OF EVIDENCE AND PRACTICE AS TO PROOFS IN
COURTS OF COMMON LAW § 409, at *450-51 (Philadelphia, T. & J. W. Johnson 1849); THOMAS PEAKE,
A COMPENDIUM OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 9-10 (London, Brooke & Clarke 2d ed. 1804); S.M. PtIILLIPPS,
A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 107-08 (London, A. Strahan 2d ed. 1815); Wigmore, supra note
43, at 101 (arguing that legislators felt more vulnerable to prosecutions for treason than for petty crimes).
Note that the latter rationale suggests a lack of faith in the jury's lie-detecting powers (why fear false
accusations if we trust juries to detect them?), but it does not manifest the fear of conflicting oaths that
clearly motivated the rule in perjury.
113. Wigmore cites as follows: R. v. Fanshaw, Skinn. 327 (1693) ("There being but the oath of the
prosecutor, and so oath against oath, the defendant was acquitted."); R. v. Muscot, Y.B. 10 Mod. 192 (1714)
(Parker, C.J.) ("[To convict a man of perjury, a probable, a credible witness is not enough; but it must be
a strong and clear evidence, and more numerous than the evidence given for the defendant; for else there
is only oath against oath."); and R. v. Nunez, Lee cas. t. Hardw. 265 (1736) (Hardwicke, C.J.) ("[One
witness is not sufficient] unless there were very strong circumstances; because one man's oath is as good
as another's."). See Wigmore, supra note 43, at 106 n.2.
114. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-10-105 (1975); CAL. PENAL CODE § 118(b) (West 1988); KY. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 523.060 (Michie 1990); TEX. CRIM. P. CODE ANN. § 28.18 (West 1995).
115. See An Act for Punishment of Such as Shall Procure or Commit Any Wilful Perjury, 5 Eliz., ch.
9, § VI (1563) (establishing a penalty of six months' imprisonment or a fine of £40). James Oldham reports
that a 1786 judicial proposal to make perjury capital came to naught. See 2 JAMES OLDHAM, THE
MANSFIELD MANUSCRIPTS AND THE GROWTH OF ENGLISH LAW IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY 1066
(1992); see also THE LAW COMM'N, CRIMINAL LAW: OFFENCES RELATING TO INTERFERENCE WITH THE
COURSE OF JUSTICE 100 (1979) (noting that the penalty for perjury had remained a maximum of seven
years' imprisonment since 1728).
Jury as Lie Detector
death-is-different principle presented in Part I. Even when the prosecution
could find two sworn witnesses to overcome the defendant's own oath, the
system would not put the defendant at risk of life or limb based on a jury's
very human judgment that the accusers' oaths-and not the defendant's-were
true.
B. The Act To Abolish Hostilities with Scotland
Our narrative has yet to move past the early seventeenth century, yet
already we have seen hints of real change. By allowing even unsworn defense
witnesses to take the stand, judges showed a willingness to tolerate at least the
appearance of credibility conflicts. And by advising juries, at least
occasionally, that they must judge the credibility of both sworn and unsworn
witnesses, 116 some judges signaled a willingness to abandon the cult of the
oath. We now move on to explore the system's hesitant embrace of sworn
defense witnesses in felony trials.
Our starting point is the 1607 "Act for the utter abolicion of all memory
of Hostilitie ... beweene England and Scotland,""' which set down the
form of trial for English subjects who committed crimes in Scotland before
fleeing home to England. Although the final form of the Act would deliver a
little bit less, the bill as proposed would have given all such defendants the
right to call sworn witnesses. Yet the Act To Abolish Hostilities by no means
marked a watershed in legal thinking about the power of the oath or about the
jury's proper role in settling credibility conflicts at criminal trials. The Act
permitted sworn defense witnesses only in the narrow context of cross-border
crimes and only in England's three northernmost counties. What is more, the
motivation to permit defense witnesses in such cases does not seem to have
been any high idea about proper forms of proof, but instead a frank political
urge to strike a compromise between English and Scottish trial procedures,
combined with a base misunderstanding of the latter.
I emphasize the almost accidental role this Act plays in our story as a
counterpoint to Barbara Shapiro's compelling account of the changing nature
of proof in the seventeenth century. Shapiro sees the justice system's growing
tolerance of credibility disputes in this era as part of a new scientific
epistemology that touched not just law, but many other disciplines as well."'
The legal system may have grown less averse to conflicting oaths, she says,
as lawyers and other thinkers rejected scholasticism's insistence on certainty
and grew more comfortable staking action on conclusions drawn from
116. See SHAPIRO, supra note 37. at 185.
117. 4 Jam., ch. 1,§ 1 (1607).
118. See SHAPIRO, supra note 28, at xiii-xiv. 4-20; SHAPIRO. supra note 37. at 3-6. 9-11. Barbara J.
Shapiro, "To a Moral Certainty": Theories of Knowledge and Anglo.Ainercan Junes 1600-1850. 38
HASTINGS L.J. 153, 155-58 (1986).
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conflicting evidence. Shapiro calls on the work of Matthew Hale, the leading
legal thinker of the time, whose clear endorsement of the jury's role as arbiter
of conflicting evidence has a distinctly modern flavor. If the jury has "just
cause to disbelieve what a witness swears," Hale wrote, "they are NOT bound
to give their verdict according to the ... testimony of THAT witness." Instead,
the jury may, "upon reasonable circumstances, including a blemish upon [the
witness's] credibility,... pronounce a verdict CONTRARY to such
testimonies."'19
One can quibble about how completely modem Hale's view of jury lie
detecting really was, 2 ' but there is no question that he stood well ahead of
his day. The question is whether his and others"'" advanced views on the
lie-detecting capacity of juries helped to mold changing practices in the law
courts. In this section and the next several, I will argue that they helped but
little. The early history of the jury's rise as lie detector was too conflicted and
unprincipled to support a theory that links it to a guiding epistemology. It was
conflicted, as we will see in Part III, in that long after the system authorized
sworn defense witnesses, it continued to endorse rules of evidence that aimed
to keep from the jury the sort of credibility conflicts that sworn defense
witnesses inevitably produced. And it was unprincipled in that it was, at least
in the immediate sense, accidental. Both the Act To Abolish Hostilities with
Scotland, which we take up now, and the Treason Act of 1696, which we take
up next, expanded the jury's lie-detecting role only incidentally to resolving
broader political conflicts. Although it is probably true that the ideas of Hale
and others influenced in some degree the shape of change, the immediate
impetus for change had more to do with parochial politics than with any
advancing epistemology of the sort Shapiro describes.
22
119. SHAPIRO, supra note 37, at 184 (quoting MATrHEW HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW
OF ENGLAND 164 (Charles Gray ed., 1971) (1713)).
120. Hale retained some affinity for the mechanical power of multiple oaths. In another passage
Shapiro quotes, Hale began a discussion about how jurors and others should compare the credibility of
competing witnesses by noting that something "reported by many Eyewitnesses hath greater motives of
credibility than that which is reported by few." SHAPIRO, supra note 37, at 180 (quoting MATTHEW HALE,
THE PRIMITIVE ORIGINATION OF MANKIND 129 (London, W. Godbid for W. Shrowsberry 1677)). John
Locke, whose work on evaluating witness credibility figures in Shapiro's analysis, also placed "'the number
of witnesses' first in a list of useful factors. Shapiro, supra note 118, at 161 (quoting JOHN LOCKE, AN
ESSAY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING (London, Eliz. Holt for Thomas Bassett 1690)).
121. Justice Francis North most prominently shared Hale's opinion of the jury's role in deciding
witness credibility: "'Hereby it appears there is a great Latitude for a Jury, they may say they beleev or
doe not beleev in any Case, & concerning any Witnesses."' Michael Macnair, A Fragment on Proof by
Francis North, Lord Guilford, 8 SEVENTEENTH CENTURY 143, 143 (1993) (quoting North); see also infra
notes 178-179 and accompanying text. The vigorous tract literature of the late 17th century includes other
statements of the jury's power to accept or reject sworn witnesses. See, e.g., THE ENGLISH-MANS RIGHT:
A DIALOGUE BETWEEN A BARRISTER AT LAW, AND A JURY-MAN 8 (London, Richard Fineway 1680)
("When any matter is sworn ... whether it be trie or false in point of Fact, the Jurors are proper Judges.").
Some of these tracts, of course, were more prescriptive than descriptive.
122. Shapiro does not claim that Hale's work, or that of other thinkers of his day, had much to do with
the passage of these laws. Hale came too late, of course, to have influenced the 1607 Act, and the most
significant of his legal writings appeared too late to have influenced the Treason Act. See SHAPIRO, supra
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That the Act To Abolish Hostilities with Scotland did not primarily
concern the lie-detecting function of the criminal trial jury is plain from its
title. The Act aimed to improve relations between England and Scotland in part
by proposing a hybrid of English and Scottish trial procedures for those few
cross-border crimes governed by the Act. It is almost as plain that the rationale
for permitting sworn witnesses at such trials had mainly to do with the Act's
immediate political purposes. Robert Bowyer, whose Parliamentarn Diary
provides the best legislative history of the Act, 3 recorded this earliest
surviving notation of the reasons to allow sworn witnesses:
[The committee] did resolve that the prisoner who is in such case as
afore, to be tried in England for felony etc. alleaged to be doon by
him in Scotland shalbe allowed to have witnesses swoorne herd for
his purgacion: uppon these reasons, first for that it was affirmed and
by Sir Rog[er] Aston saied that the Law of Scotland is so: Next
bicause by this lawe wee take from the accused divers advantags
which the law of England doth allow in cas of felonies ....
In other words, the committee members had made the roughest of political
trades: Because the proposed new form of trial denied defendants advantages
typically enjoyed in England but not available in Scotland,25 it would grant
them the advantage of sworn witnesses, typically enjoyed in Scotland but not
available in England. The only difficulty with this bargain, as England's
Scottish King informed the House when he objected to the proposal for sworn
witnesses, is that Scottish law permitted no such thing.'26 Although a few
members of the House quite guardedly suggested that the King was
mistaken,' 2' a paper read to the chamber on the laws of Scotland'2'
suggested that the King was right. Only then, deprived of what was perhaps
their main motive for change, did parliamentarians turn to the merits of the
proposal to permit sworn defense witnesses.
note 28, at 58. Indeed, Shapiro specifically disclaims a causal argument She is tracing, she says. a simple
concurrence between epistemological progress on the means of gathenng knowledge from witneses and
progress toward freer competition between witnesses in the courtroom. See SHAPIRO. supra note 37. at 193
123. See BOWYER, supra note 66. at 300-30. 350-63 The Journal of the House of Commons ha.
occasional useful information on the Act's passage. See I H C JOL R 378-89 (June 4-30. 1607) The
Journal of the House of Lords offers far less. The philosopher Francis Bacon seems to hase chaired the
committee that authored the bill; he reported the committee's proceedings to the House of Commons and
apparently played a continuing role in managing the bill's passage, See BOWYER. supra note 66. at 300,
312, 323-26. Bacon was soon to become solicitor general and. a decade later. was named lord chancellor
See I DICTIONARY OF NATIONAL BIOGRAPHY 800. 810. 815 (Leslie Stephen & Sidney Lee cdis. Oxford
Univ. Press 1963-1964) (1882).
124. BOWYER, supra note 66, at 309 (alterations in original) (footnote omitted)
125. See id. at 302-03.
126. See I H.C. JOUR. 379 (June 4. 1607): BOWYER. supra note 66. at 310
127. See BOWYER, supra note 66. at 311-12: id. at 316 n I (**Reason giveth us a Cause to thinke. but
greatnes of Authority standeth against us.-), id at 318 n I (*As for [the King's) reason at must be like his
coin, it must have weight.").
128. See I H.C. JOUR. 378-79 (June 4. 1607): I STEPiIEN. supra note 28. at 351 Iquoting the paper)
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In the contest on the merits, the bill's proponents proved to be decidedly
less expressive than its detractors. They noted the obvious-that defense
witnesses would help innocent defendants.'29 They made the mandatory
argument from biblical authority. 30 And while they alluded to quite modern
notions of proof, they did so in such sketchy terms that we cannot assess the
strength of their beliefs. Hence the Act itself tells us that sworn defense
witnesses are "for the better discoverie of the Truth, and for the better
informacion of the Conscience of the Jurie and Justice,"'13 ' but does not
elaborate. Elsewhere we see a quite modem but spare suggestion that the
witnesses' "credit [should be] referred to the Jurors."'' 32 In a very different
vein, however, one of the Act's supporters argued that "the life of an
Englishman [should not be put] uppon the Oath of a Scott.' 33 In this
offhand remark, we see a possible reason Parliament was content to risk
occasional conflicts of oaths in the context of this Act: If an Englishman is
tried in England for a crime committed in Scotland, we can expect that his
English jury will not be much perplexed by the choice between the oath of his
(Scottish) accuser and those of his (English) defenders. Here we have an early
case of a phenomenon we will observe later in eighteenth-century courts: The
law more readily tolerated credibility conflicts when the jury could readily
devalue one party's oath.
In contrast to the bill's rather inexpressive supporters, its detractors set out
at least three arguments founded on the system's historic aversion to credibility
conflicts and its limited view of the jury's powers as lie detector. Lord
Salisbury, in a passage quoted earlier,' 34 articulated the death-is-different
position that no justice system may take the defendant's life in the face of
conflicting oaths: "[This proposal] varie[s] from our Lawes, nay from all
lawes, for in perplexitie of Evidence where the [J]udge is to give sentence of
life or death our Law taketh away witnesses from the guilty .... ,, 35 A
second opponent advanced the argument, also noted earlier, "that Men will bee
129. See BOWYER, supra note 66, at 311 ("[O]therwise an innocent man may be condemned with out
defence .... [A]nd seeing the profes against life ought to be more strong and cleere then those for life,
I thinke wee ought to allow thes witnesses.") (remarks of Mr. Fuller).
130. See id. at 315 n.l. The reference was vague and uncited: "All Judgement is Gods, and therefore
it is fit wee make our Rule of Judgement according to his Law. But his Law doth allow witnesses to the
accused." Id.
131. Act To Abolish Hostilities with Scotland, 4 Jam., ch. I, § 6 (1607). In debate, one member
observed that in more important cases "it is more requisite to admitt all means to discover the Truth."
BOWYER, supra note 66, at 314 n. 1. He added that if civil litigants may have swom witnesses, then those
on trial for their lives certainly should. See id. Another argued that jurors "ought to long to be informed,
and to heare all that they can." Id. at 359.
132. BOWYER, supra note 66, at 309. We also see a (perhaps anachronistic) suggestion that as jurors
"Know the Partys," they are in a position to judge the credit of the witnesses. Id. at 318 n.1, 326. But
another speaker insisted that the witnesses will "allmost allwaies" be unknown to the jurors. Id. at 353.
133. Id. at 315 n.l.
134. See supra text accompanying note 66.
135. BOWYER, supra note 66, at 325.
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more prone to forswear themselves" in a capital case.'" Lord Salisbury
expressed this fear of an epidemic of perjury more colorfully: "[N]o malefactor
will stirre foote out of doares to do any villany but he will sett and prepare
witnesses for his purgacion and so in short tyme there will be ready a
standinge Crew of damned witnesses.""' We may presume that by "damned"
Salisbury did not intend a mere imprecation, but rather a literal description of
the liars' fate. Yet the quoted passage betrays little concern for the liars' souls.
Rather, Salisbury's real concern seems to have been the legitimacy of verdicts,
for in the next sentence he complained that "there wilbe continuall
calumniacion of all verdicts."'
' 3
1
The detractors' final rationale said a little more about their view of the
jury's role as lie detector: "But this Clause that giveth Evidence on both
side[s], doth either perplex the Jury, or thereby give them a colourable Excuse
whereby they may avoid the Censure of the Starr Chamber."' 39 This speaker
foresaw two possibilities. One was that the jurors would be "perplex[ed]" by
the conflict in evidence and unable to find the truth. The other was that they
would decide wrongly and yet be immune from prosecution (in the Star
Chamber) for their own perjury because, however they decided the case, they
would have had sworn evidence on their side.' 0 Hence the jurors would fail
either to see the right or to do the right.
Though more articulate, the opponents of defense witnesses proved to be
less persuasive than the proponents, for the proposal became law. Opponents
succeeded, however, in winning a critical modification: As finally passed, the
Act provided that to avoid "much and frequent perjury," the jurors shall have
the discretion "upon their oathes" to hear only those witnesses (whether
prosecution or defense) they deemed neither "unfitt" nor "unworthy."''
There are several things to observe about this remarkable provision. The first
is that it sought insofar as possible to avoid sworn credibility conflicts.
Because the jury would determine without hearing the witnesses ' 2 whether
they were worthy, those witnesses deemed likely to lie would never take the
stand. As one member put it (with reasoning Francis Bacon himself endorsed):
"The law of God is that wee admitt no false witnesse and this referring the
allowance of witnesses unto the Jury, is the way to avoide false witnesses and
136. Id. at 314 n.l; see supra text accompanying note 67
137. BOWYER, supra note 66, at 325.
138. Id. We will see in Part III that Salisbury's propositton that we should not let likely Ilars testify
is the fundamental strategy of most witness competency rules-a strategy that betrays a lack of confidence
that the jury can separate truthtellers from perjurers.
139. BOWYER, supra note 66, at 317 n. I: see also id at 318-19. 326 (quoting speakers making similar
arguments).
140. Another speaker pointed out, however, that jurors are sometimes prosecuted for perjur) in civil
cases in which there is sworn evidence on both sides. See id at 317 n I
141. 4 Jam., ch. 1, § 16 (1607).
142. As one speaker remarked: "I[HIeare you will hase the Jurors tne the truth of a testimony before
they heare it .... BOWYER, supra note 66, at 353 (remarks of Mr Fuller).
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pero]ury ... This provision worked exactly in the manner of witness
competency rules, which kept the most likely liars from testifying.
But it is an extraordinary sort of witness competency rule that gives the
jury the discretion to reject untrustworthy witnesses. The Act seems to be of
two minds about the capacity of jurors. On the one hand, it gives them the
power to reject witnesses altogether.'" On the other hand, it presumes that
jurors will be unable to reject a lie once a witness has sworn to it. How else
can we explain the argument of one speaker that the jury must first decide
"whether the witnesse produced be fit to be herd: otherwise a lewde person
may be acquited through the testimony of the like person"? 145 Why should
the jury acquit based on the word of a "lewde" defense witness, whom (it is
assumed) the jury recognizes as lewd, unless the jury is powerless before the
witness's oath? Put differently, a rule that permits a jury to reject unsworn
witnesses but that does not trust the jury to reject those same witnesses once
they are sworn both exalts the power of the oath and speaks ambivalently
about the powers of jurors. Perhaps it is not surprising that, at the insistence
of several speakers, 146 the bill was amended to specify that when exercising
their discretion to reject untrustworthy witnesses, the jurors themselves must
be on oath.
47
In the end, the Act To Abolish Hostilities seems to have been born on the
cusp of two eras, premodern and modem. Even as it pledged a premodern
fealty to the oath, it authorized, apparently for the first time, judicial conflicts
of oaths in felony cases. And even as it betrayed ambivalence about the jury's
capacity to evaluate witnesses, it gave juries a remarkable power to reject
witnesses. Our job now is to track history's course from this juncture forward.
If Shapiro is right, and epistemological advances during the course of the
seventeenth century broke down old barriers to the idea of juries mediating
between competing oaths, then we might expect to see the law welcome sworn
defense testimony more broadly.
At first glance, the law seems to have done just that. A half-century after
the events just described, during the high radicalism of the Commonwealth,
proposals to permit sworn defense witnesses in felony cases were advanced,
though they soon died. A half century after that, Parliament finally extended
143. Id. at 360 (remarks of Sir George More). Bacon alluded to the Book of Luke in support of this
reasoning: "Mhe greatest truth that eaver was, was interdicted to be testified by an unworthy witnessc for
when the Divell would have witnessed of Christ, Thou art the soon of God, he was forbidden by Christ
himselfe." Id. at 361 (footnotes omitted). On Bacon's role in managing the bill, see supra note 123.
144. Indeed, the Act requires that jurors in these cases-precisely because they had the power to reject
witnesses altogether-"be p[er]sons of better condicion and qualitie" than typical jurors. 4 Jam. I, ch. I,
§ 16.
145. BOWYER, supra note 66, at 309.
146. See id. at 353 (remarks of Mr. Fuller); id. at 355 (remarks of Mr. Yelverton); id. at 362 (remarks
of Mr. Hyde).
147. See I H.C. JOUR. 388-89 (June 30, 1607).
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sworn witnesses to all felony defendants.' Yet these facts support Shapiro's
thesis less than at first appears. The surviving tracts of the Commonwealth
years tell us little about the impulse behind those earlier, aborted
proposals, 49 but it would not be surprising if the motive was sympathy for
the accused, rather than advancing ideas about forms of proof. And as I argue
in the next section, the legislation that ultimately granted sworn witnesses to
felony defendants appears to have been the product of political conflict, not
intellectual growth. The legislators who granted defendants sworn witnesses at
the close of the seventeenth century concerned themselves not with the powers
of juries to detect lies, but with the simple balance of power in a criminal
courtroom.
C. The Treason Trials and the Treason Act of 1696
As revolutions in the law go, the Treason Act of 1696 t"' passed quietly.
In permitting accused traitors to call sworn witnesses,'' the Act seemingly
abandoned the ancient aversion to conflicts in oaths and marked the beginning
of the end of medieval trial procedure. No longer would one side in a criminal
case hold a monopoly on the power of the oath. Yet none of those who
fashioned the Act seemed to realize the momentousness of the change. Only
a few Parliamentarians did more than mention the newly proposed right to call
sworn witnesses during debate on the Treason Act."5 Instead, debate most
often centered on demands by the House of Lords for procedural reforms in
148. See I Anne, ch. 9. § 3 (1702).
149. See DONALD VEALL, THE POPULAR MOVEE,,T FOR LA Rt-J-ORM 1640-1660. at 154-55 t 1970)
The tract literature of the Commonwealth period makes appeals for srom defense %ttncmses. but in tcrms
so conclusory that it would be pointless to speculate about underling r-ationales See. e g . JOHN COOKL.
THE VINDICATION OF THE PROFESSORS & PROFESSION OF Tiu, LA\% 22 (London. Matthe.. Walbancke
1645), microformned on Thomason Tracts e 320 (17) (Umv Mtcrofilns lnt'I) (1 conceisc there ire many
defects in our Law, both in matters Criminall on the Crown side and Ca% ill As that sitnc-,sc should not
be examined upon oath for the prisoner as well as for the King. "1. SEVERAL RESPtTABLI: PERSONS
OF THE CITY OF LONDON, WESTMINsTER. SOvTHWARK. HAMBLETS. AND PLACES ADJACLN-r. THE
FUNDAMENTAL LAWES AND LIBERTIES OF ENGLAND 3-4 (n.p.. 1653). nmcrofornied on Thomason Tracts
e 705 (5) (Univ. Microfilms Int'l) (holding it to be "Our and our Childrenl'ls Right That upon all
Tryals Witnesses on both sides may be swoM"): WILLIAM SHEPPARD, EGLANDS BAt.%tE 197 (London,
J. Cottrel 1656), microformed on Thomason Tracts e 1675 (2) (Umv Microfilms Int'l) ("That a man in
question for his life, may not have Counsel to plead for him. nor %sitness to clecr him. seems hard "
150. 7 & 8 Will. 3, ch. 3.
151. As the Act stated:
[A]II and every Person and Persons whatsoever that shall be accused and indicted for High
Treason ... or for Misprision of such Treason... shall bee received and admitted to make
any Proof that hee or they can produce by lawfull Witnesse or Witnessese % ho shall then bee
upon Oath for his or their just Defence .
Id.
152. The most extensive commentary on the issue consumed barch tsmo sentences See 10 AN(IITELL
GREY'S DEBATES OF THE HOUSE OF COMMONS 289 (London. T Becket & PA Dc Hondt 1769)
[hereinafter GREY'S DEBATES) (remarks of Sir Thomas Clarges) t"lAls the La%% stands nou. \Vitncsses for
the Prisoners are on their Words, and not their Oaths. this Bill is. that the> should not estrasagantly say
what they will. I think this Bill therefore is for the King's safet '
The Yale Law Journal [Vol. 107: 575
the trials of peers.'53 And if Parliament engaged in any debate at all when
it decided six years later to extend the Treason Act's grant of swom witnesses
to all accused felons,154 nothing survives of it.' 55 Even modem historians
have all but ignored the significance of these two acts in shaping the nature of
credibility conflicts in modem criminal trials. Our major evidence treatises
allot the Treason Act only passing reference. 156 And although three scholars
have chronicled the Act's passage in some detail157 -and have duly hailed
the Act's grant of counsel to those accused of treason' 5 8 none has stopped
to consider the provision of the Act that concerns us now.
59
Yet if the historical record documenting Parliament's decision to permit
sworn credibility conflicts at major criminal trials is spare, that record is
nonetheless strikingly clear. In his early-eighteenth-century evidence treatise,
Sir Jeffrey Gilbert set out a simple, half-sentence explanation for Parliament's
decision to allow accused traitors to call swom witnesses:
By the now Law in Cases of Treason the Witnesses against the
King are admitted to their Oaths, because this [common law] Rule
[against sworn defense witnesses] was abused in the late Reigns to
derive a Credibility on the King's Witnesses as being upon Oath, tho'
contradicted by Men of better Credit upon their Words only.
60
153. See infra note 200.
154. See I Anne, ch. 9, § 3 (1702). The statute read:
[A]II and every person and persons, who shall be produced or appear as witness or witnesses
on the behalf of the prisoner, upon any trial for treason or felony, before he or she be admitted
to depose, or give any manner of evidence, shall first take an oath to depose the truth, the
whole truth, and nothing but the truth, in such manner, as the witnesses for the Queen are by
law obliged to do; and if convicted of any wilful pejury in such evidence, shall suffer all the
punishments, penalties, forfeitures, and disabilities, which by any of the laws and statutes of this
realm are and may be inflicted upon persons convicted of wilful perjury.
Id.
155. Given that the relevant passage of that legislation lies sandwiched between wholly unrelated
issues, one can suppose that Parliament gave the matter of sworn defense witnesses little thought. On the
other hand, the silence of the historical record may have been the product of accidents of historiography.
What we know of the debates surrounding the 1696 Act comes mainly from two sources: GREY'S DEBATES,
supra note 152; and THE PARLIAMENTARY DIARY OF NARCISSUS LUTTRELL (Henry Horwitz cd., 1972)
(1691-1693) [hereinafter LTrrRELL]. Neither source extends past the turn of the century.
156. A small footnote in Wigmore's enormous treatise refers to Thayer's "detailed history" of the old
rule against defense witnesses and to Stephen's "shorter account." 2 WIGMORE, supra note 44, § 575, at
685-86 n.48. The former, "detailed" version devotes one sentence to the Treason Act. See THAYER, supra
note 47, at 161 n.4.
157. See James R. Phifer, Law, Politics, and Violence: The Treason Trials Act of 1696, 12 ALBION
235 (1980); Samuel Rezneck, The Statute of 1696: A Pioneer Measure in the Reform of Judicial Procedure
in England, 2 J. MOD. HIST. 5 (1930); Alexander Shapiro, Political Theory and the Growth of Defensive
Safeguards in Criminal Procedure: The Origins of the Treason Trials Act of 1696, II LAW & HiST. REV..
215 (1993).
158. See, e.g., Rezneck, supra note 157, at 23 ("Without a doubt the most important feature of the new
procedure was the clause permitting counsel to make full defense for the accused."); Shapiro, supra note
157, at 217 (identifying the counsel clause as his "central focus").
159. See Phifer, supra note 157, at 244 (making a glancing reference to the provision for sworn
witnesses); Shapiro, supra note 157, at 217 (same); Rezneck, supra note 157, at 22 n.64 (omitting from
a "systematic summary of the contents of the statute" any mention of the provision for sworn witnesses).
160. GILBERT, supra note 70, at 159.
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That is, Gilbert said, Parliament allowed accused traitors to call sworn
witnesses because, in the rash of treason trials that marked the reigns of the
late Stuarts, the government so shamefully had employed sworn perjurers to
defeat the unsworn but truthful witnesses of the unhappy defendants. Gilbert's
authority on this point is excellent-he was the most influential evidence
scholar of his era. Moreover, he had lived through the debates on the Treason
Act and almost surely wrote the words quoted above within a few years of the
Act's passage.
16'
I have found no other contemporary commentary that so clearly declares
Parliament's motive in granting the right to call sworn witnesses in the 1696
Act. Yet even in the absence of Gilbert's weighty judgment, we could have
deduced the same conclusion from the Act's legislative history and historical
context. That the bill was first introduced in 1689 is our first clue to its
connection with the political troubles that marked the end of the Stuarts'
reigns. The Glorious Revolution of the year before had toppled the House of
Stuart and installed the rigorously Protestant William III in place of the
Catholic James 11.162 When Parliament met in 1689, it launched a series of
legal reforms designed to keep the King from ever again converting the
machinery of justice to political purposes. Parliament granted the King's
justices secure salaries and life tenure in good behavior 61  and reformed the
law of treason.
161. Gilbert lived from 1674 to 1726. Michael Macnair has argued that Gilbert's treatise. which did
not appear until 1754, was probably written in the early 1700s. Macnatr has examined the onginal
manuscript sources of the treatise and reports that they contain no case citations later than 1710. See
Macnair, supra note 68, at 252, 254. 259, 266-67 n. 107.
I think it is likely that Gilbert wrote the sentence quoted above before 1702 Indeed. it appears he
wrote some of his treatise even before passage of the 1696 Treason Act. The paragraph that precedes the
sentence quoted above begins, "In Cases of Treason or Felony no Witnesses are som against the
King .... ." GILBERT, supra note 70, at 159. That, of course. ceased to be the law in 1696 Only tn the next
paragraph--the one quoted in my text--does Gilbert acknowledge the change in the law That material
seems to have been added during the six-year interval that separated the 1696 Treason Act from the 1702
Act giving all felony defendants the right to call sworn wttnesses. The use of the word "now" tn the
opening phrase-"By the now Law in Cases of Treason"-suggests. that the paragraph was written when
the Treason Act was still fresh. And Gilbert's omission of any textual reference to the 1702 Act where such
reference would have been natural suggests that the 1702 Act was still in the future. True, the margtnal
notation alongside the material I have quoted in my text ts to the 1702 Act oniv. But it is unlikely that
Gilbert made this notation. As Macnair's work makes clear, later edttors were responsible for many of the
citations. See Macnair, supra note 68, at 266 n.107. In fact. Macnatr reports that a manuscript of this work
held at Harvard Law School bears a marginal notation only to the 1696 Act. But as "'Glbert was a fairly
sloppy writer," Macnair says, "he may have just missed the Act of 1702." Letter from Michael Macnair.
Professor, Lancaster University (July I, 1997) (on file with author).
162. See JOHN KENYON, THE POPISH PLOT 15-16 (1972) (discussing James's religton)
163. Both houses of Parliament passed such a measure tn 1692 although it was then vetoed by the
Crown. It did not become law until the Act of Settlement of 1701. See An Act for the Further Limitatton
of the Crown and Better Securing the Rights and Liberties of the Subject. 1701. 12 & 13 Will. 3. ch. 2.
§ 3; SHAPIRO, supra note 37, at 314 n.132; Joseph H. Smith. An Independent Judictar" The Colonial
Background, 124 U. PA. L. REV. 1104, 1109-10 (1976). The Act provtded that the judges could be removed
"'upon the Address of both Houses of Parliament." 12 & 13 Vill. 3. ch. 2. § 3 Although the grant of secure
tenure did not take effect until the death of Queen Anne tn 1714. she granted all judictal commtssions tn
her reign with tenure during good behavior. See Smith. supra. at 1110.
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In the last decade of the Stuarts' reigns, both sides in the political struggle
had made rich use of treason charges as weaponry, and both sides had suffered
serious losses. The quickest glance at any collection of Howell's State Trials,
which reported treason cases among others, attests to the proliferation of
treason trials in these years. Whereas the significant state trials of the
seventeen-year stretch that ended in 1678 occupy but a single volume of State
Trials, and the trials of the seven-year stretch that began in 1689 occupy
another single volume, the state trials of the intervening decade fill five full
books. Accused traitors had not been the only criminal defendants to lose their
lives for want of counsel or sworn witnesses. Yet treason trials had peculiar
power to spur reform because of the status of those charged. As Stephen said,
"What the political trials of the seventeenth century really did was to expose
men of high rank and conspicuous position to the calamities which must have
been felt by thousands of obscure criminals without attracting even a passing
notice."' 64 And indeed, the Parliamentarians who met in 1689 made repeated
reference to Algernon Sydney and William Lord Russell-two men of power
who had suffered traitors' deaths when James II took revenge on those who
had orchestrated the trials and executions of several of the King's
adherents. 65 Little wonder, then, that members of the House of Commons
who supported the Treason Act declared "[t]hat their design, in passing this
Bill, was, to prevent those abuses in Tryals for Treason ... for the future; by
means of which, during the violence of late Reigns, they had observed divers
had lost their Lives."'
166
Among those abuses, as Gilbert made clear, was the brazen perjury
perpetrated by government witnesses against accused traitors who could not
call sworn witnesses in their defense. Stephen said of the Stuart treason trials
that the system bestowed on the government's sworn witnesses a presumption
of truthfulness that did nothing so much as to encourage them in their lies. 67
164. 1 STEPHEN, supra note 28, at 402; see also Wigmore, supra note 43, at 101 (stating, with respect
to an earlier change in treason laws, that "the dominant legislator class, who might not have cared how
many a humble subject was unfairly convicted of petty thievery, were well alive to the possibilities of
treason law ... and they probably were moved by the thought of self-protection against the future").
165. See Phifer, supra note 157, at 240.
166. Charles Montagu reported to the House of Commons that he had used these words during a
conference with the Lords to describe the views of Commons. See 10 GREY's DEBATES, supra note 152,
at 229; see also id. at 173 ("This Bill was ushered in by reason of the hardship in the late times, in Tryals
for Treason .... ") (remarks of Attorney General Treby); LUTrRELL, supra note 155, at 237 ("I cannot but
take notice though some gentlemen are now against this bill, yet they complained much of the
misconstruction that was made in the last reign in cases of trials in treason. It is what you took notice of
when you presented the crown to Their Majesties and made it one of the heads of grievances against the
late King.") (remarks of Robert Harley).
167. See I STEPHEN, supra note 28, at 369, 398-416. John Kenyon quotes a striking example of liars
cloaked in the presumption of truth. At one Popish Plot treason trial, a judge commented on the unsound
testimony of two accusers: "There is some evidence that makes it a very improbable thing to be true what
Mr. Bolron has said; and yet Mr. Bolron having said it so positively, and Mowbray agreeing to it,
probabilities must give way to positive proofs." KENYON, supra note 162, at 197 (quoting from the trial
of Sir Thomas Gascoigne).
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And the most notorious liar of all was Titus Oates, 6S whose fame as a trial
witness eclipsed all others in the centuries before Court TV. Oates's notorious
perjury perhaps did more than anything else to move Parliament to grant
treason defendants the protection of sworn witnesses. That is in part because
Oates was the most prolific of treason trial witnesses. With fourteen executions
in his wake, his ultimate conviction of perjury must have caused consternation
in many quarters. And it is in part because the fortunes of Oates's adherents
and detractors rose and fell with his own. As Wigmore wrote of a different
time period, legislators were keenly aware of the dangers of treason law "if the
rapid turn of the political wheel should chance to bring them underneath.' ' ,
The story of Oates, as we will see, makes plain why those on both sides of the
political spectrum stood in fear of the next turn of the political wheel, and it
may explain why there was so little need for Parliament to debate that part of
the Treason Act that gave defendants sworn witnesses. Moreover, the story of
Oates gives us the excuse to explore how the rules constraining who could take
an oath, which until now we have studied in the abstract, played out in
practice.
Oates made a national sensation when he came forward in 1678 with his
account of what soon became known as the Popish Plot. A Jesuit community,
he said, had recruited him to join in their scheme to kill King Charles II.
Although this unlikely tale of ingenuous Jesuits trusting Oates in their
treachery never made much sense, it found a credulous antipapist public.
Parliament heard Oates testify and hailed him a hero. 70 Opposition Whigs
saw in him the means to eliminate hated enemies from the King's supposedly
Catholic coterie and even to bar the King's Catholic brother, James, from the
throne.1
7 1
At a series of Popish Plot trials that began in the late 1670s, Oates
repeated his story for successive juries. As a prosecution witness, he testified
with the imprimatur of the oath. The defendants sought to rebut his claims by
calling a great number of Jesuits to say that Oates had been with them at a
community in France throughout the spring of 1678 and therefore could not
have been in London watching them plot the King's death. As defense
witnesses, these Jesuits spoke without oaths, and in the main, their words fell
feckless against Oates's sworn testimony. It is true that, at one such trial,
Justice Scroggs advised the jury to ignore this distinction between sworn and
unsworn testimony and to weigh the testimony "according to the credibility of
the person and of the matter."'172 But at another, Scroggs responded to a
168. On Oates, see JANE LANE, TiTus OATES (1949).
169. Wigrnore, supra note 43, at 101.
170. See KENYON, supra note 162. at 81.
171. See JOHN MILLER, POPERY AND POLMCS IN ENGLAND 1660-1688. at 169-82 (1973)
172. KENYON, supra note 162. at 161 (quoting the Trial of Whitbread. Fenwick. Ga% an. Harcourt and
Turner).
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defendant's protest of innocence with a peremptory, "[H]ere is one hath sworn
it.' 173 The defendant's plaintive reply, "It is only Oates, my lord,"'74 did
not avail him, for he, like thirteen others, went to his death on Oates's
oath.1
75
The tables began to turn on Oates and his Protestant Whig sponsors early
in the next decade, when Charles II launched a counter-prosecution against
those suspected of taking part in a supposed Protestant Plot. 176 In 1681, at
one of the most famous of these revenge trials, Stephen Colledge faced a
charge of having schemed to kidnap and kill the King. 177 Justice Francis
North assured Colledge that the government's monopoly on sworn testimony
would not conclude the case against him. "Your witnesses are not upon their
oaths," he said, "but they may be witnesses, and their weight is to be left with
the Jury .... Such a modern attitude toward credibility comparisons was
characteristic of North, whom Barbara Shapiro has held up as an example of
the newly enlightened seventeenth-century attitude toward credibility
comparisons.'79
As the Colledge trial ground to its late-night conclusion, however,
enlightenment faded and North reverted to the old-time primacy of the oath.
The occasion for this change of heart was the testimony of Titus Oates, on
whom Colledge's defense relied, but whose word now had lost the potency of
the oath. "I hope my [unsworn] word," Oates told the court, "will be believed
as soon as [the government witnesses'] oaths."' 80 But when Oates dared
contradict a government witness named Dugdale, the King's serjeant, George
173. KENYON, supra note 162, at 194 (quoting from the Trial of Corker). To his credit, Scroggs was
not always so sanguine about Oates's credibility. At the trial of Wakeman, he commented that "Mr. Oates
stands with the jury, how far they will believe him." Id. at 172. At the trial of the Earl of Castlemaine, he
advised the jury, "You must weigh well with yourselves how probable or not probable what [Oates] does
swear is." Id. at 200. At the trial of Coleman, however, Justice Jones told the jury: "You must find the
prisoner guilty, or bring in [Oates and the government's other witness] perjured." Trial of Edward Coleman,
7 Howell's State Trials 1, 70 (1678), quoted in KENYON, supra note 162, at 125.
174. KENYON, supra note 162, at 194 (quoting from the Trial of Corker).
175. See I STEPHEN, supra note 28, at 392 (putting the toll from Oates's testimony at "no less than
fourteen innocent lives").
176. See MILLER, supra note 171, at 189; Shapiro, supra note 157, at 219.
177. See Trial of Stephen Colledge, 8 Howell's State Trials 549, 549-50 (1681).
178. Id. at 642. Earlier, North had admonished the first defense witness: "Look you here friend, you
are not to be sworn; but when you speak in a court of justice, you must speak as in the presence of God,
and only speak what is true." Id. at 626. North also qualified his references to the government's testimony
with a cautious "[i]f the witnesses say true." E.g., id. at 619. Justice Jones also used a cautionary "if the
witnesses are to be believed." Id. at 621.
179. See SHAPIRO, supra note 37, at 15, 185-86. Shapiro highlights in particular these words of North:
[I]t is the proper business of ... juries to try not the grammatical construction of words ... but
the credibility of persons and things; ... and God forbid that the worst Villains should have
it in their power, by positive swearing, to take away a man's life or estate.., if you believe
the witnesses find [the defendant guilty], else not.
FRANCIS ROGER NORTH, THE LtVES OF THE NoRTHs 203-04 (A. Jessop ed., London, G. Bell & Sons 1890),
quoted in SHAPIRO, supra note 37, at 186.
180. The Trial of Stephen Colledge, 8 Howell's State Trials at 642.
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Jeffreys, dismissed him: "Here is Dugdale's oath against Dr. Oates's
saying."'8' Turning to North, Colledge attacked the proposition that the
government's testimony "must needs be taken for truth" merely because it is
sworn. 82 Surely, he said, Oates's word "is not to stand for nothing, nor to
be hooted out of court, because Mr. Dugdale denies it upon his oath."'8 3 The
prosecutor, however, left the jurors in no doubt about how to balance sworn
testimony against unsworn:
[G]entlemen. ... it is strange to me, that ever you ... should perjure
three men, who positively upon their oaths deny [what] Mr. Oates
speaks of against them, I do put that upon your consciences whether
you, upon the bare affirmation of Mr. Oates, in this place, will convict
three men .... I say, whether you will do it upon the bare affirmation
of Mr. Oates, against their oaths."
North added to the prosecutor's reasoning his judicial imprimatur, reminding
the jury that "here are three men's oaths against one man's affirmation. ' "
Four years after Colledge went to his traitor's death, Oates appeared in yet
another guise-this time as a defendant charged with perjury. In 1685 the
newly crowned Catholic King James II charged that Oates had fabricated the
whole of the Popish Plot and had sent fourteen alleged plotters to wrongful
deaths. Oates now found how far he had fallen. The same Jesuit witnesses
whose unswom word had been powerless against his sworn accusations at the
original Popish Plot trials now took the stand against him under oath. They
repeated their charge that Oates had been with them in France through the
entire spring of 1678, when he claimed to have watched the plot hatch in
London. And George Jeffreys, whose power had risen as Oates's had fallen
and who now presided at his trial, spoke of Oates with utter contempt. He sent
181. Id. at 641.
182. Id. at 642.
183. Id. North at first reassured Colledge somewhat equivocally. He said that the jury -will consider
how improbable it is" that three government witnesses would have lied under oath, as Oates claimed. "and
so there are all these three men's oaths against one man's affirmation: but it must be left to the jury." Id.
at 642. A similar exchange followed shortly thereafter:
Coll[edge]: What is said upon an honest man's word in the face of a court, is certainly
to be believed as well as what is swom.
[North]: 'Tis a testimony, that is most certain, and must be left to the Jury, they must
weigh one against the other.
Id. at 643.
184. Id. at 706. A similar dynamic prevailed at other trials in which Oates testified without effect for
the defense. See, e.g., Trial of Edward Fitzharris, 8 Howell's State Trials 243. 387 (1681) (reporting the
judge's observation, in a charge to jury, that Oates's unswom evidence was "no answer" to another's oath).
185. Trial of Stephen Colledge, 8 Howell's State Trials. at 713. Though weaker than the government
witnesses' oaths, Oates's bare affirmation had at least some force as evidence. In contrast. Colledge's own
unswom denials of guilt had, according to North. no force at all. See id. at 625, 681. 712; infra note 411
and accompanying text. Although the Treason Act of 1696 granted accused traitors sworn witnesses, nearly
170 years would pass before defendants themselves could testify under oath. See ifra Section Iv.B.
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the jurors to their deliberations with the thought that "there does not remain
the least doubt, but that Oates is the blackest and most perjured villain that
ever appeared upon the face of the earth."'
86
Although Oates was convicted, 187 Jeffreys and his colleagues were
unable to pronounce the sentence they felt he deserved. The "defective" law
of perjury, a mere misdemeanor, barred them from hanging Oates,'88 so they
imposed instead a horrific course of whippings, perpetual imprisonment, and
regular exposures in the pillory.'89 Four years later, just as Parliament set out
to reform the law of treason, Oates came before the House of Lords to plead
for a relief from judgment.' 9 In one sense his petition was a mere formality.
With James in flight and a Protestant King about to take the throne, Oates had
been released from prison in December 1688-and Jeffreys now stewed in the
Tower awaiting trial.' 9' The House of Lords upheld Oates's judgment, but
asked the King to pardon him. 92 Meanwhile, Oates found much vocal
support in the lower house.' 93 Commons voted to add a clause to the Bill of
Rights to forbid cruel and unusual punishment, 94 to declare that Oates's
sentence was itself "cruel and illegal,"'' 95 and to affirm its continuing belief
in the Popish Plot.
96
To be sure, Commons was not of one mind about Oates. While some
members supported a proposal to relieve Oates from his sentence, "some
Gentlemen hissed."'197 And in 1692 and 1693, Commons took steps-never
realized-to make perjury punishable by death.' 9 But it is precisely this
ambivalence toward Oates that makes it seem so likely that Parliament had him
in mind when it included in the Treason Act a provision to permit sworn
186. Trial of Titus Oates, 10 Howell's State Trials 1079, 1226 (1685).
187. See id. at 1227; Trial of Titus Oates (Titus Oates 11), 10 Howell's State Trials 1309 (1685).
188. Thus Oates II, 10 Howell's State Trials at 1315.
189. See id. at 1316-17.
190. See TITUS OATES, To THE RIGHT HONOURABLE THE LORDS SPIRITUAL AND TEMPORAL AND TO
THE HONOURABLE THE KNIGHTS, CmZENS, AND BURGESSES IN THIS PRESENT PARLIAMENT ASSEMBLED;
THE HUMBLE PETITION OF TITUS OATES, D.D. (London, J.D. 1689); see also KENYON, supra note 162,
at 259.
191. See KENYON, supra note 162, at 259.
192. See id. at 260.
193. See 9 GREY'S DEBATES, supra note 152, at 286-94.
194. See KENYON, supra note 162, at 261. The addition of a clause forbidding cruel and unusual
punishment was a response not merely to Oates's fate, but also to that of a clergyman named Samuel
Johnson, convicted of publishing a seditious pamphlet in 1689. See id. at 261 n.*.
195. 9 GREY'S DEBATES, supra note 152, at 294.
196. See KENYON, supra note 162, at 260.
197. 9 GREY'S DEBATES, supra note 152, at 286.
198. See 10 id. at 249 & n.t; LUTTRELL., supra note 155, at 293. One tract, which complained
punningly of the "extream mischiefs ... lately brought by false OAThES," argued that perjury that leads
to the execution of an innocent is murder, and asked why "he whose hands have been unfortunately stain'd
in a single Murther, be justly Sentenced to a Halter, while he whose Tongue is Red in the blood of
Innocents, has the use of it still." THE THIRD COMMANDMENT 15-17,20 (London, Joseph Hindmarsh 1685).
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defense witnesses. Both Oates's adherents and his detractors had felt the
injustice of the old rule barring sworn defense witnesses. A quiet consensus of
support for the proposed right to call sworn witnesses perhaps coalesced
around the living memory of Oates. Such a consensus would explain why the
proposal to grant accused traitors sworn witnesses, which had been part of the
bill since its introduction in 1689,' attracted virtually no negative
commentary. True, an occasional voice denounced the bill for making treason
prosecutions more difficult. Most opposition, however, focused on the bill's
initial failure to modify trials of Lords in ways the upper house had long
desired.200 That issue managed to delay final passage for seven years. Not
until the Lancashire Plot trial of 1694 reminded the lawmakers of what they
had to fear from spurious accusations of treason did they find the needed
momentum to pass the Act.
201
But whether Parliament was thinking of Oates in particular or of the
spectacle of perjured Crown witnesses in general, there is no reason to
question Gilbert's judgment that Parliament jettisoned the old rule against
sworn defense witnesses because it "was abused in the late Reigns to derive
a Credibility on the King's Witnesses as being upon Oath, tho' contradicted
by Men of better Credit upon their Words only."2' 2 I have seen no evidence
either in Parliamentary debate or in contemporary commentary to suggest that
lawmakers had achieved a more expansive view of the capacity of juries to
resolve sworn credibility conflicts. It is true that an evolving epistemology of
the sort Barbara Shapiro describes, which could deal more comfortably with
conflicting evidence in the courtroom, might have given the Parliamentarians
courage in the change they undertook. It is also true that the Act To Abolish
Hostilities and the aborted proposals to permit sworn witnesses made during
the Commonwealth years might have been straws in the wind foretelling
change. Still, we may conclude this much with confidence: But for the
religious strife and consequent spate of treason trials of the late Stuart reigns,
and but for the sufferings that notorious perjurers such as Oates inflicted on
eminent men of both political persuasions, Parliament would not have granted
criminal defendants the right to call sworn witnesses at the end of the
199. See Phifer, supra note 157. at 244-45.
200. The Lords wanted to limit the King's power to dictate membership on the Lord High Steward's
Court, which sat in judgment at the trials of peers. See 9 GREY's DFATEs. supra note 152. at 172-76; 10
id. at 214, 217-24, 227-40; LUTrRELL, supra note 155. at 74-75. 99-100. 126-29; Phifer. siupra note 157,
at 250-51. The peers eventually had their way. See An Act for Regulating of Tryals in Cases of Treason
and Misprision of Treason, 7 & 8 Will. 3, ch. 3, § XI (1696) (providing that all the peers of Parliament
may take part in the trial of another).
201. See Phifer, supra note 157, at 252-54. Commenting on the trial. William Hayhurst complained
in a December 7. 1694, letter to Roger Kenyon. a member of Parliament. that the goverment's willing
witnesses ""will seldom fail to help a lame dog over stile.' Shapiro, supra note 157. at 248 (quoting
Hayhurst's letter).
202. GILBERT, supra note 70, at 159.
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seventeenth century or, very likely, for decades to come.0 3 What appears at
first to be a defining moment in the history of legal thought, then, turns out to
be little more than historical shrapnel, thrown off by the familiar clashes of
men of high office.
II. COPING WITH CREDIBILITY CONFLICTS
If we look past this story of political intrigue and examine the machinery
of the courts, we find other evidence that Parliament's decision to give
defendants sworn witnesses had little to do with a new-found faith in the jury's
powers of lie detection. A set of long-evolving rules of evidence helped to
ensure that, even after sworn defense witnesses began taking the stand, juries
often were spared the task of choosing between conflicting oaths. Various
witness competency rules operated directly to keep likely perjurers from
testifying. And the rule of Bethel's Case encouraged jurors who heard
apparently conflicting testimony to reconcile the witnesses' oaths so as to
avoid calling either of them a liar. Occasionally, however, despite the
protective screen of these rules, two sworn witnesses with conflicting and
irreconcilable accounts of events came face to face with a jury. When that
happened, the system still did not toss the problem of lie detection into the
jury's lap. Instead, it prescribed principles by which the jury was to distinguish
truthteller from liar.
I will begin our examination of this evidentiary web with a short survey
of competency rules and a more extended exploration of Bethel's rule. After
a brief empirical interlude to consider whether these mechanisms succeeded in
protecting the oath's apparent power to assure truth, I will take up those rules
that applied when credibility conflicts were unavoidable.
A. Witness Competency Rules and the Rule of Bethel's Case
In the 100 or 150 years before Parliament gave defendants the right to call
sworn witnesses, several broad competency rules had evolved to control who
could and who could not give sworn evidence in civil and criminal courts.
These rules barred from the witness stand all parties to the proceeding-both
plaintiff and defendant in a civil suit and all criminal defendants. The rules
excluded spouses of parties, persons with financial interest in the case,
convicted felons, irreligious persons, and various other classes of people. In
effect, this panoply of competency rules preempted the jury's lie-detecting
203. As Phifer has written, "The origins of the 1696 act are not found in the slowly changing
procedures and attitudes in the courtroom; they are found in the fears the 1680s had taught the politicians
about the dangers of using treason as a political weapon." Phifer, supra note 157, at 256. But see Rezneck,
supra note 157, at 9-13 (arguing that a slowly emerging pattern of reforms in the 17th century culminated
in the 1696 act).
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function by declaring certain witnesses to be likely liars as a matter of law.
Exactly when the rules evolved is unclear. Wigmore traced the rule barring
civil parties to the sixteenth century and that barring all other interested
persons to the mid-seventeenth century.20 4 But it seems that these dates
merely mark the earliest references Wigmore could find; the rules may well
have been older. Barbara Shapiro notes that the rules bear a close, if
simplified, resemblance to the testimonial disqualifications that prevailed in the
Roman-canon law of the Continent.
2 5
There is no doubt as to the rules' rationale. All sources agree that they
sought to keep from the witness stand anyone whose temptation or inclination
to lie was greater than average. The most famous statement of the principle is
Gilbert's. He wrote in the early eighteenth century that excluding such
witnesses would serve the truth and protect the witnesses:
Men are generally so short-sighted, as to look at their own private
Benefit which is near to them, rather than to the Good of the World
that is more remote; therefore ... the Law removes them from
Testimony, to prevent their sliding into Perjury; and it can be no
Injury to Truth, to remove those from the [hearing of the] Jury, whose
Testimony may hurt themselves, and can never induce any rational
belief
°206
Gilbert's elegant and often-quoted image of witnesses "sliding into
Perjury" has overshadowed his more important defense of the competency
rules-that by keeping likely liars from the witness stand, they protected the
presumption that all sworn evidence is truthful. Here is Gilbert's explanation
of the competency rule that barred convicted felons:
[E]very plain and honest Man affirming the Truth of any matter under
the Sanction and Solemnities of an Oath, is intitled to Faith and
Credit, so that under such Attestation the Fact is understood to be
fully proved.
But where a Man is convicted of Falshood and other Crimes
against the common Principles of Honesty and Humanity, his Oath is
of no Weight ... [and] this Presumption fails him . . ..
204. See 2 WIGMORE, supra note 44, § 575. at 679-80. Michael Macnair thinks Wigmore dates the
disqualification of parties too early and the disqualification of interested persons too late. See Michael
Richard Trench Macnair, The Law of Proof in Early Modem Equity 232-56 (1991) (unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation, University of Oxford) (on file with author). I thank John Langbein for pointing me to this
work. For an interesting analysis of both of these competency rules, see James Oldham. Trulth-Telhng in
the Eighteenth-Century- English Courtroom, 12 LAW & HisT. REv. 95. 107-17 (1994).
205. See SHAPIRO, supra note 28, at 188-90.
206. GILBERT, supra note 70, at 122.
207. Id. at 142-43; see also Macnair, supra note 204, at 250-51 (discussing the relationship between
competency rules and the presumption that swom evidence is true).
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In Gilbert's formulation, competency rules did the work of lie detecting, so the
jury did not have to. The result, in Stephen's words, was that "[i]f the court
regarded a man as 'a good' (i.e. a competent) 'witness,' the jury seem to have
believed him as a matter of course, unless he was contradicted.
' 208
Alongside this gantlet of witness competency rules, another rule of
evidence helped to protect juries from ever having to call anyone a perjurer.
The prosecution of Slingsby Bethel for assault and battery in 1681 provides the
earliest example I have seen of this rule. 209 The government had charged
Bethel, who was standing as a candidate for Parliament, with striking a servant
of the King outside the polling place.2'0 Because the charge was a
misdemeanor, Bethel had the right to call sworn witnesses. After the Crown
had called six witnesses who swore they had seen Bethel strike the other
man, Bethel called five witnesses to swear that they had been present at
the time of the alleged attack and had seen no such thing.212 Bethel, who was
represented by counsel,1 3 gave no account of events.
In his closing statement to the jurors, the King's counsel (and later chief
justice of the King's Bench), Sir John Holt, reasoned with them in this
manner:
[I]f you acquit Mr. Bethel, you must necessarily Convict Eight [sic]
Persons of Perjury: But if you do not find for Mr. Bethel, the other
Witnesses cannot be Convicted of Perjury; for how can Men swear,
(though they were there all the time) that they did not see? possibly
they may be very honest Men, and present at the time, and yet not see
Bethel strike, and so not swear to it .... I do appeal to the Court,
whether in matters of this Nature, one Witness for the Affirmative, be
not more valid than many of the Negative?
214
Seconding the prosecutor's reasoning, the presiding magistrate25 instructed
the jury that "one Affirmative was better than Forty Negative Oaths."'21 6 The
jury returned a verdict of guilty.
217
208. 1 STEPHEN, supra note 28, at 400.
209. See THE TRYAL OF SLINGSBY BETHEL ESQ., supra note 14, at 9.
210. See Preface to id. (unpaginated).
211. See id. at 3-5. The Crown's witnesses varied wildly. Mason, the alleged victim, said Bethel hit
him with a cane and fists and delivered at least 20 blows. See id. at 3. Another witness said Bethel "thrust"
Mason down the stairs. Id. at 4. Four mentioned mere "shrugs" or "pushes." Id. at 3-5. A seventh
mentioned no blow at all, just threatening words. See id. at 5.
212. See id. at 6-8.
213. See id. at 5.
214. Id. at 9.
215. The transcript identifies the person who delivered the charge as "Justice Pyrs" without
elaboration. Id. at 10. As this misdemeanor trial took place at the local court of quarter sessions, we should
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Holt stated the rationale behind the rule: Jurors should if possible avoid
calling anyone a perjurer.2 s That principle was simply a corollary of the
presumption that sworn evidence was true-a presumption expressed time and
again by courts and commentators of the sixteenth through nineteenth
-219centuries. 2  In this context, it meant that the jury should conclude that one
witness was mistaken (or inattentive) before concluding that either had lied. A
jury trying to obey this admonition almost always would have to favor
affirmative over negative evidence because, as Holt argued to the jury,
witnesses who say something happened are much less likely to be mistaken
than those who say it did not happen.
That the magistrate's breezy aphorism-"one Affirmative [is] better than
Forty Negative Oaths"-sounds so well worn suggests that Bethel's Case by
no means marked the rule's first application.2 ' But though the rule seems
to have roots in Roman-canon law,- it is difficult to find examples of the
rule in common law cases before 1696. Until passage of the Treason Act, only
misdemeanor cases presented the possibility of a sworn conflict between
prosecution and defense witnesses-and few misdemeanor cases had sufficient
celebrity to be recorded in great detail. We are fortunate to know of Bethel's
Case only because a man of distinction was so rash as to cuff an emissary of
the King. I have found one other, somewhat more obscurely phrased example
218. This simple proposition appears often in early case reports, even outside the context of testimonial
conflicts. For example, at Coleman's trial for treason. the prosecutor. Attorney General Sir William James.
told the jurors they "must find the prisoner guilty, or bnng in two persons perjured " KENYO,. supra note
162, at 125 (quoting James).
219. Wigmore cites the following 16th-, 17th-. and 18th-centur) examples Duke of Norfolk's Trial.
Jardine's Crim. Trials I 178 (1571) (stating that. when the defendant attacked the credit of a sworn
government witness, Serjeant Barham said, "He is sworn, there needeth no more proving-). Lord Ru.sell's
Trial, 9 Howell's State Trials 577, 618 (1683) (Pemberton. CJ.) ("If you cannot contradict them by
testimony, it will be taken as a proof."); and R. r Muscat. 10 Mod. 192 (1715) (Parker. CJ I ("[Al credible
and probable witness shall turn the scale in favor of either party."). See Wigmore. supra note 43. at 89 n 2.
cf. 9 HoLDswoRrH, supra note 43, at 208-09 (arguing that the rule that barred parties from impeaching
their own witnesses was a manifestation of the presumption that sworn evidence was true). I STEPIIEN.
supra note 28, at 399-400 ("[T]he opinion of the time seems to have been that if a man came and swore
to anything whatever, he ought to be believed unless he was directly contradicted The junes seem to
have thought (as they very often still think) that a direct unqualified oath by an eye- or ear-witneks
must be believed unless it is distinctly contradicted."). On 19th-century sources. see infra notes 233-236
and accompanying text.
220. In the postscript to this edition of the trial, the anonymous reporter. who was an admitted partisan
of Bethel, wrote:
Mr. Recorder not being at the Court. he who tn his absence gave Directions to the Jury.
told them, That they had Mason's positive Oath. that One Affirmative was better than Forty
Negative Oaths, and therefore they must either find Bethel Guilty. or they would make Mason
[the complainant] perjured. Which passing for Law with the Jury, they brought him in Guilty
of the Assault and Batterie.
THE TRYAL OF SLINGSBY BETHEL ESQ., supra note 14. at 12. The editor's snide remark that the pnnciple
"pass[ed] for Law with the Jury" makes me hesitate to claim that the rule was well known at this date. Still.
the ready concurrence of the magistrate with the King's counsel and the similanty of their language
suggests they were citing a principle familiar to them both. In any event, as I hope to show shortly, the
evidence that the rule would soon be commonly accepted is quite strong.
221. See MICHAEL MACNAIR, THE LAW OF PROOF IN EARLY MODERN EQLITY (forthcoming 1998)
(manuscript at 276-77, on file with author).
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of Bethel's rule in the celebrated 1684 trial of Dr. William Sacheverell for
riot.Y2 But I can cite no other early case.
223
Shortly after the turn of the eighteenth century, however, Jeffrey Gilbert
gave Bethel's rule a very prominent platform. Gilbert devoted a section of his
famous evidence treatise specifically to the problem of "contrary Proofs.
224
He began that section with a remarkably broad statement of Bethel's rule,
together with a remarkably transparent statement of its rationale:
In contrary Proofs if Men's swearing can be reconciled, such
Interpretation shall be put upon it as may make them agree, because
every body shall be supposed to swear the Truth, and no Man shall
be intended to swear a manifest Perjury; therefore that Construction
shall be taken that would make them agree, rather than such whereby
they must necessarily oppose each other.
One affirmative Witness countervails the Proof of several
Negative, because the Affirmative may swear true, and the Negative
also; for the Negatives may commonly be, that they know not of the
Matter; the affirmative swears that it is, and so the Affirmative may
be true and the Negative also ....
Echoing Holt's argument in Bethel's Case, Gilbert held that the jury should,
if possible, reconcile competing oaths. Again we see, this time in very frank
terms, the presumption that all oaths are true. And Gilbert, like the magistrate
in Bethel's Case, announced that a necessary corollary of the rule is that
affirmative evidence should trump negative.
Gilbert's great influence and his clear statement of Bethel's rule guaranteed
it lasting and distant prominence. His treatise was the dominant evidence text
of the eighteenth century.226 For a century after he wrote, the major writers
222. Chief Justice George Jeffreys charged the jury:
[Y]ou must believe all the witnesses for the king actually perjured, unless you believe their
evidence; and [as] for what others say, that they did not hear such and such things, yet all these
other people did hear, and though the witnesses for the defendants did not see, the others did
see; and you must find these men without any evidence that does appear, to be guilty of wilful
perjury, or else every person that you have had in charge ... is guilty of the riot whereof they
have been informed against.
Trial of Sacheverell, 10 Howell's State Trials 29, 95 (1684).
223. A fundamental principle of Bethel's rule, however-that the jury should try to reconcile evidence
that seems to conflict-does appear in other early cases. See, e.g., Trial of Purchase, 15 Howell's State
Trials 651, 690 (1710) (reporting the court's instruction to the jury that "[i]f the witnesses do not contradict
one another, but they may be reconciled, you need not then weigh which side you most credit"). Trial of
Damnmaree, 15 Howell's State Trials 521, 602 (1710) (reporting the court's instruction to the jury to
"consider how far [the witnesses] are to be reconciled; for if there is a way to reconcile them all, that will
be an inducement to you to believe they all speak right").
224. GILBERT, supra note 70, at 156. On the timing of publication of Gilbert's evidence treatise, see
supra note 161.
225. GILBERT, supra note 70, at 156-57 (emphasis added). Gilbert repeats the point in another context:
"IThere is that Sanction and Reverence due to an Oath, that the Testimony of one Witness naturally
obtains Credit, unless there be some Appearance of Probability to the contrary." Id. at 150.
226. See THAYER, supra note 47, at 2 n.2; Stephan Landsman, From Gilbert to Bentham: The
Reconceptualization of Evidence Theory, 36 WAYNE L. REv. 1149, 1152 (1990).
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on evidence largely elaborated on his work. '7 To judge from John Adams's
legal papers, Gilbert was the only authority on evidence that practitioners in
late-eighteenth-century Massachusetts bothered to cite. To them, Bethel's rule
was simply "[tihe Rule about positive and Negative Witnesses. ' The first
comprehensive evidence treatise after Gilbert's, that of John Morgan in 1789,
repeated Gilbert's formulation of Bethel's rule almost word for word."
Although Bethel's rule turned up missing in the respective treatises of Peake
and Phillipps in 1801 and 1814,2 o it appeared in those of Evans, Starkie, and
Rapalje in 1806, 1824, and 1887.231
227. Morgan's 1789 work lifted large chunks from Gilbert. as Morgan unabasbedly admitted See I
JOHN MORGAN, ESSAYS UPON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE at vni (Dublin, Messr E. Lynch ct al 1789) Peake's
treatise of 1804, see PEAKE, supra note 112. and Phillipps's treatise of 1815. see PItLLIPPS. supra note 112.
tracked Gilbert less closely but closely still.
228. 2 LEGAL PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS 90 n.75 (L. Kinvin Wroth & Hillcr B Zobel eds. 1965). see
also id. at 8 n.24, 60 n.5 (referencing Gilbert); Iid. at 134 n.56 (same)
229. See I MORGAN, supra note 227. at 46.
230. Peake and Phillipps did comment on affirmatie and ncgati,,e evidence in ways ihat echo strains
of Bethel's rule. Peake noted that because a negative does not admit of direct proof, the party who denies
a fact can remain silent until the adversary has offered evidence to prove it. See PE..E. supra note 112.
at 5. Similarly, Phillipps wrote, "'The Affirmative of the Issue is to be proved." PItILLIPFS. supra note 112.
at 150. The principle that it is hard to prove a negative shares a common intuition with Bethel's rule that
a person who claims something did not happen might simply have missed it They are not. however. the
same thing.
231. Evans's work appeared as an appendix to Pothier's Treatise on the Law of Obligations See
William David Evans, On the Last of Evidence. AppendLx XVI to M 1RoBt-.Rr JosEPtHt POTIiIE-. A
TREATISE ON THE LAW OF OBLIGATIONS. OR CONTRATS (William David Evans ed. London, A Strahan
1806). Evans wrote that "the preference of positive to negatie evidence" rests on a recognition that *it is
much more probable, that a person may not have observed an occurrence which actually did take place,
or having observed it, may not have recollected it. than that another should imagine circumstance- which
had no foundation in existence." Id. at 248. Later. he added that "'w Ihere the possibility of mistake on the
one side is contrasted with the imputation of perjury on the other. and there are no collateral circumstances
to fix the determination, there can be no doubt but that a casual error is to be deemed more probable than
a wilful misrepresentation." Id. at 264. Although Evans acknowledged the presumption of truthfulness on
which Bethel's rule relied, he subscribed to it "in the abstract" and seemed skeptical Id at 236-37. 262
Starkie, on the other hand, produced an enthusiastic and influential treatment of Bethel's rule, frankly
staked on the presumption of truth. See tnfra notes 233-237 and accompanying text
Rapalje restated the rule, but perhaps did not endorse it. See SMwvARr RAPAu. A TRiAT1SI, O, THIE
LAW OF WITNESSES § 193, at 319 (Albany. Banks & Bros. 1887) ("Another general rule for vweighing
testimony is that the testimony of one witness who speaks positively and affirmatively to a fact is entitled
to more consideration than that of several equally credible witnesses who testify negatively only "). id §
195, at 324 (suggesting that the jury should reach the question of "which of the witnesses art the more
worthy of belief' only if the "testimony of different witnesses cannot be harmonized") Rapalje said at the
outset'of his work that he meant merely to review the cases as they stand, not to say how the law should
be. See id. at iii.
In the third volume of his important treatise, published in 1853. Simon Greenleaf remarked that "it
has been judicially said, that ... the positive testimony of one credible witness to a fact is entitled to more
weight than that of several others who testify negatively." 3 SIMON GRtNLEAF. A TREATISE ON TItE LAw
OF EVIDENCE § 375, at 380 (Boston, Little. Brown & Co. 1853) But this text appears in a section of the
work devoted to proceedings in equity. Greenleaf does not appear to extend the rule to jury trials
Bethel's rule found one last 19th-century restatement in Jones's 1896 treatise. desoted to evidence
in civil actions. See BURR W. JONES. THE LAW OF EVIDENCE IN CIt.IL CASES § 901. at 1981 (San
Francisco, Bancroft-Whitney Co. 1896) ("[Tihe positive testimony of a single witness is entitled to more
weight than that of several witnesses, equally credible, who testify negatively "1 Jones's qualification
that the rule "should never come in conflict with the general rule that the i:eight of the testimony should
be left to thejury," id., typified, as we will see. Bethel's rule in its late-19th-centur) decline. see ifra notes
275-278 and accompanying text.
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I have not succeeded in tracing the passage of Bethel's rule to America.
Adams's papers are the earliest American reference I have found. It is likely
the rule was swept in with the rest of the English common law, which had
governed in the colonies and which all but two of the young states embraced
in whole or part in the years after the Revolution.232 In any event,
nineteenth-century American judges applied Bethel's rule liberally. When they
invoked it, the authority they most often cited was Thomas Starkie's A
Practical Treatise on the Law of Evidence.233 Like Gilbert, Starkie explicitly
embraced the presumption underlying Bethel's rule that all sworn evidence is
true, a presumption that remained current in the nineteenth century.234 A
witness's credibility stands "upon experience of human veracity," Starkie
wrote, "from which the law presumes that a disinterested witness who delivers
his testimony under the sanction of an oath, and under the peril of the temporal
inflictions due to perjury, will speak the truth. '235 Starkie then offered this
elaborate statement of Bethel's rule and its rationale:
In cases of conflicting evidence the first step in the process of
inquiry must naturally and obviously be to ascertain whether the
apparent inconsistencies and incongruities which it presents, may not
without violence be reconciled ....
• * * [H]ere it is to be observed, that there is an important
distinction between positive and negative testimony.
... If one witness were positively to swear that he saw or heard
a fact, and another were merely to swear that he was present, but did
not see or hear it, and the witnesses were equally faith-worthy, the
general principle would in ordinary cases, create a preponderance in
favour of the affirmative; for it would usually happen that a witness
who swore positively, minutely, and circumstantially, to a fact which
232. See ELIZABETH GASPAR BROWN, BRITISH STATUTES IN AMERICAN LAW 1776-1836, at 21-26
(1964). The two exceptions were Rhode Island and Connecticut, which did not embrace English common
law until 1798 and 1818, respectively. See id. at 24 & n.4.
233. THOMAS STARKIE, A PRACTICAL TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE (Boston, Wells & Lilly
1826). Cases explicitly relying on Starkie include Harris v. Bell, 27 Ala. 520, 522 (1855); Matthews v.
Poythress, 4 Ga. 287, 295-96 (1848); and Hepburn v. Citizens' Bank, 2 La. Ann. 1007, 1008-09 (1847).
Many cases repeated Starkie's justification of the rule nearly word for word, but without citation. See, e.g.,
Johnson v. Scribner, 6 Conn. 185, 188 (1826); Delk v. State, 40 Tenn. (3 Head) 79, 81 (1859).
234. An 1882 edition of Best's treatise stated flatly: "All testimony given in a court of justice is
presumed to be true until the contrary appears .... [T]he law will not presume irreligion .... and
consequently will not presume intentional false swearing." W.M. BEST, THE PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF
EVIDENCE 628 (Jersey City, Frederick D. Linn & Co. Ist American from 6th London ed. 1882) (1849). An
Oregon statute on the books in 1863 said, "A witness is presumed to speak the truth." OR. CODE CIV. P.
§ 673 (1863). The statute then specified that this presumption was rebuttable and noted that "where the trial
is by the jury, they are the exclusive judges of [the witness's] credibility." Id. Writing toward the end of
the century, Stephen remarked without approval that "juries do attach extraordinary importance to the dead
weight of an oath." I STEPHEN, supra note 28, at 401. In State v. Jones, 77 N.C. 520 (1877), the North
Carolina Supreme Court held that a trial judge was inaccurate to tell a jury that "it is a rule of law, a
presumption that men testify truly and not falsely." Id. at 521 (emphasis in original). The court said that
"[a] Judge may properly instruct the jury, that the law presumes, and that they should presume, that a
witness speaks the truth, unless there be some reason for thinking otherwise." Id.
235. 1 STARKIE, supra note 233, § LVI, at *455.
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was untrue, would be guilty of perjury, but it would by no means
follow that a witness who swore negatively would be perjured,
although the affirmative were true; the falsity of the testimony might
be attributed to inattention, mistake, or defect of memory .... It
follows, therefore ... that in such cases, unless the contrary
manifestly appear, the presumption in favour of human veracity shall
operate to support the affirmative.
21
The popularity of Starkie's treatment of the rule owed something to the
example he next presented:
If, for instance, two persons should remain in the same room for the
same period of time, and one of them should swear that during that
time he heard a clock in the room strike the hour, and the other
should swear that he did not hear the clock strike, it is very possible
that the fact might be true, and yet each might swear truly."
Starkie's conclusion that "the presumption in favour of human veracity shall
operate to support the affirmative" proved unexpectedly helpful to the
well-paid lawyers of later decades who sought to defend their railroad clients
against scores of claimants who swore they did not hear the train that injured
them sound its bell.
2 38
Partly because of the huge number of claims against railroads, most of the
many nineteenth-century citations to Bethel's rule appear in civil cases.2"9
The rule's latter-day vitality influenced criminal cases as well, however, and
trial judges in particular seem to have adhered to it. An Illinois trial judge
advised a jury in 1857 that "'[i]f the jury believe, from the evidence, that
Higgins [and others] are truthful witnesses, and that they swear positively to
the fact that the defendant struck Higgins, such positive evidence should
receive more consideration than any negative evidence there may be in the
case.""'2  In a Georgia prosecution of 1853, a defense witness swore he had
236. Id. §§ LXXXI-II, at *515-18; see also ud § LXII. at "475 n q. id § LXXXIII. at *519. id §§
LXXXIX-XC, at *530-31.
237. Id. at *517.
238. Railroad cases include Horn v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad. 54 F 301. 305 (6th Cir 1893).
Chicago & Alton Railroad v Robinson, 106 Ill. 142, 145-46 (1883). Chicago & Rock Island Railroad v
Still, 19 111. 499, 509 (1858); Missouri Pacific Railway v. Pierce. 39 Kan. 391. 395 (1888). Van Patten v
Schenectady Street Railway, 80 Hun. 494, 496 (N.Y. 1894): Culhane v. News York Central & Hudson
Railroad, 60 N.Y. 133, 137 (1875); and Unas it Pennsylvanta Railroad. 152 Pa- 326. 328 t1893)
239. See sources cited supra note 238. Non-rairoad cases include Abbe Rood. I F Cab 7. 8-9
(C.C.D. Mich. 1854) (No. 6) (assertion of authority to execute promissor) notes). Kentds % Kenneds. 2
Ala. 571, 616 (1841) (statement of deceased): Johnson v. Scribner. 6 Conn 185. 188-89 (1826) (alleged
slander); Matthews ii Poythress, 4 Ga. 287. 295-96 (1848) (rc..eipt of considerationi. Hepburn v Cut, ens
Bank, 2 La. Ann. 1007, 1008-09 (1847) (bank deposit): Sanger % Vail. 13 Ho%% Pr (n % ) 500. 500 (N Y
Sup. Ct. 1856) (exception at trial); and Frantz %, Lenhart. 56 Pa. 365. 367 (1867) (batter))
240. Coughlin v. People, 18 11. 266. 267 (1857) (quoting the rial judge's instructions) The Illinois
Supreme Court reversed the conviction for reasons I will discuss shorl) See infra te.t accompan) ing note
271.
19971
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been at the scene of an alleged rape at the time the complainant swore the
crime took place and yet he had not seen either the complainant or her alleged
attacker.24t The trial judge told the jury, in terms reminiscent of Bethel's
Case, "[t]hat if one witness of equal knowledge and credibility swears
positively to a fact, and fifty swear negatively, that they did not see or know
the fact, the one witness swearing positively, and not contradicted, is to be
believed in preference to the fifty. '242 In upholding the charge, the Georgia
Supreme Court reasoned that "[a] mistake of an hour in this regard [as to who
was where and when] would create no contradiction in the evidence, nor tend
in the least to impeach the veracity of either of the witnesses.,
243
There are many signs that Bethel's rule held its vitality deep into the
nineteenth century and in some places well into the twentieth. In 1873, the
United States Supreme Court approved a trial judge's instruction that the jury
should prefer affirmative to negative evidence because the person "who
testifies to a negative may have forgotten." 2' "We are of the opinion," said
the Court, "that the charge was a sound exposition of a recognized rule of
evidence of frequent application .... 245 In 1897, a federal appeals court
approved a charge under the rule in a criminal case.246 And in 1905, the
North Carolina Supreme Court restated the rule together with its original
rationale. 47 Georgia and Louisiana adopted the rule by statute-Georgia in
1895248 and Louisiana in 1926 249-and it remains on the books in both
statesY °0 In 1900, West Publishing Company produced the Century Edition
of the American Digest, a precursor to modem case digests. In chapter XIV of
the materials on evidence, titled "Weight and Sufficiency," the first heading
241. See Johnson v. State, 14 Ga. 55, 63 (1853).
242. Id. at 62.
243. Id. at 63; accord Cobb v. State, 27 Ga. 648, 685-86, 699 (1859).
244. Stitt v. Huidekopers, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 384, 394 (1873).
245. Id.
246. See Rhodes v. United States, 79 F. 740, 743-44 (8th Cir. 1897).
247. See State v. Murray, 51 S.E. 775, 775 (N.C. 1905). The court approved the following charge to
the jury:
The reason the law gives greater weight to positive testimony than to negative testimony is
because the witnesses who swore to positive testimony swore to what is a fact, an existing fact,
or else they deliberately swore to a falsehood, while those who swore to negative testimony may
be telling the truth, and yet the fact may exist which they did not see.
Id.
248. See An Act To Improve, Adopt and Make of Force the Code of Laws Prepared Under the
Direction and by Authority of the General Assembly, To Provide for the Printing and Publication of the
Same, and for Making Indices Thereto, and for Other Purposes, No. 189, 1895 Ga. Acts 98 (codified at
GA. CODE ANN. § 24-4-7 (1995) (original version at GA. CODE §§ 985, 5165 (1895))) ("The existence of
a fact testified to by one positive witness is to be believed, rather than that such fact did not exist because
many other witnesses who had the same opportunity of observation swear that they did not see or know
of its having existed .... ).
249. See Act of Nov. 2, 1926, No. 2, 1928 La. Acts 3 (codified at LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:440
(West 1981)) ("Positive testimony on a given point must be given greater weight than negative testimony
on the same point.").
250. Georgia has not eliminated the rule, although case construction long ago greatly limited its
application-a point I will discuss below. See infra notes 276-277 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 107: 575
Jury as Lie Detector
after that labeled "In General" is called "Positive and Negative
Testimony."25' Five double-columned pages of case squibs follow, many
dated in the 1890s. 252 One section heading reads, "Positive testimony of one
against negative testimony of several."' "
The Encyclopaedia of Evidence of 1906 likewise devotes a seven-page
chapter to the topic, "Positive and Negative Evidence."2'- This late work
includes a corollary to Bethel's rule that carries the rule's strained logic to a
surprising conclusion: "Negative testimony ... must, in order to have any
weight as evidence, tend to contradict positive testimony of the other
party."' 255 The treatise writers evidently reasoned that since the first principle
of Bethel's rule was to reconcile competing oaths whenever possible, there was
no point even in admitting negative testimony unless it was irreconcilable with
the affirmative testimony.2 6 As late as 1920, the Missouri Supreme Court
relied on this treatise in holding that a trial judge rightly refused to let an
accused murderer call twelve local druggists to say that they had not sold the
defendant strychnine.
5 7
I go on at some length about the apparent ubiquity and longevity of
Bethel's rule in part because of Wigmore's response to the Missouri case last
cited. The Missouri court, he said, "allow[ed] itself to be entrapped by an
anonymous treatise. ' ' 5' That is not quite right, as the court did cite the
treatise, if with a slightly misleading abbreviation: "Cyc. of Ev."259 It is hard
to believe that Wigmore had not heard of this treatise, which was printed in
his day (but which, to be fair, was not on the shelves of his law school's
library260). His next sentence, remarking on the court's borrowed assertion
that "[n]egative evidence is admissible only if it tends to contradict positive
evidence introduced by the other party," sounds somewhat disingenuous:
"[Wihere this preposterous fallacy started is not worth investigation."
26'
"[F]rom some source not traceable," he protested, "there lingers in the judicial
mind, in many quarters, an antiquated notion that negative impressions are not
so probative as affirmative impressions; and a charge to the jury often
251. 20 CENTURY EDITION OF THE AMERICAN DiGEsT § 2432, at 3574 (1900).
252. See id. §§ 2432-35, at 3574-83.
253. Id. § 2435, at 3582.
254. 9 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF EvIDENCE 864-70 (Edgar W. Camp & John F. Crowe cds. 1906).
255. Id. at 865-66.
256. A Connecticut court remarked in 1826 that negative evidence of the son treated by Bethel's rule
was "no evidence in effect." Johnson v. Scribner, 6 Conn. 185, 189 (1826). Gilbert himself seems to have
endorsed this extension of Bethel's rule. In a somewhat different context, he wrote that once the affirmative
of an issue has been made out, the defendant "can only prove a Proposition inconsistent with the Charge.
[as] that he was at another Place at the Time when the Fact is supposed to be done, or the like." GILBERT.
supra note 70, at 148.
257. See State v. Smith, 222 S.W. 455, 459 (Mo. 1920).
258. 2 WIGMORE, supra note 44, § 664. at 780 n.I.
259. Smith, 222 S.W. at 459.
260. I am grateful to the staff of the Northwestern Law School library for this information
261. 2 WIGMORE, supra note 44. § 664. at 780 n.1.
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embodies that notion, where the witnesses differ. ' 26 2 Wigmore later claimed
ignorance not only of the source of this well-footed rule, but also of any
rationale: "Modern psychology sneers at the law's crude assumption that the
complexities of human perception can be handled by some rules of thumb
about negative testimony or the like. 263
As I hope I have shown, it is really not so hard to pin down the source
and the point of Bethel's rule. It is true that Bethel's Case itself is reasonably
obscure. But Wigmore certainly knew well the treatises of Gilbert and
Starkie,2 64 who discussed the rule prominently and explained its rationale.
Moreover, even as Wigmore denied knowing any possible rationale for the
rule, he cited cases that explained the point of the rule as avoiding attributions
of perjury.2 65 It seems at least plausible that Wigmore chose to ignore these
sources because he preferred to dismiss the rule as "a discredit to the science
of law, [which] should be discarded. '' 266 After all, the rule derived its power
from a presumption that all oaths were truthful and from a lack of faith in the
jury's power to choose between sworn witnesses. Wigmore preferred to insist
that "the rule of law ... has really nothing to say" about conflicts of
oaths. 267 Such conflicts simply "go to the jury for determination.."268 He
declined to acknowledge that the old law of evidence did not trust the jury that
far.
It is true that, by Wigmore's day, Bethel's rule had lost most of its vitality.
The reader may already have noted two shifts in emphasis in the various
statements of the rule quoted above. The first concerned the rule's essential
precondition that one witness might be mistaken. Gilbert had noted that the
rule does not work if "Affirmative and Negative oppose each other in
contradictory Propositions. ' 269 That is, if the jury could not call someone
mistaken, it would have to call someone a liar. The earlier cases, including
Bethel's Case itself, seem to have interpreted this requirement loosely. Only
in legal fiction could all five of Bethel's witnesses have been mistaken when
they denied seeing the blows that the government's witnesses said they had
seen. By allowing the possibility of mistake (or misperception) where none
was likely, courts gave the rule broader application.
262. Id. at 781. In a footnote, Wigmore adds: "A rule-of-thumb for measuring testimonial weight has
here grown up in some jurisdictions: 'Where two witnesses, unimpeached, contradict each other, the
presumption is in favor of the witness who swears affirmatively .... ' Id. at 781 n.2.
263. Id. at 782.
264. For references to Gilbert's treatise, see, for example, 1 id. § 136, at 570; 2 id. § 519, at 609; id.
§ 576, at 686; 3 id. § 826, at 255 n.1; id. § 994, at 632; id. § 1006, at 670 n.1; and id. § 1017, at 686. For
references to Starkie's treatise, see, for example, 6 id. § 1831, at 330; 7 id. § 1917, at 2; id. § 1982, at 150
n.8; id. § 1992, at 179 n.3; id. § 2094, at 469; and 8 id. § 2190, at 60 n.25.
265. See, e.g., Matthews v. Poythress, 4 Ga. 287, 295 (1848), cited in 2 WIGMORE, supra note 44, §
664, at 780 n.l.
266. 2 WIGMORE, supra note 44, § 644, at 782 n.2.
267. Id. at 781 n.2.
268. Id.
269. GILBERT, supra note 70, at 157.
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In the nineteenth century, however, courts seemed to be more inclined to
confine the rule to its purported rationale. If one witness swore to having seen
something and another swore to having watched carefully and not seen it,
courts generally concluded that this was a conflict between two affirmative
witnesses and hence outside the rule. In the 1857 case from Illinois mentioned
earlier,27 ° for example, the trial court delivered an instruction echoing that
of Bethel's Case. The state's supreme court reversed the defendant's
conviction. It reasoned that if the defendant's witnesses, who denied seeing the
event in question, were as "likely to know and remember the facts" as the
government's witnesses, then "[t]heir testimony was as positive, as to the fact
in controversy. '27' Likewise, the Georgia statute that codifies Bethel's rule
provides that "[t]his rule shall not apply when two parties have equal facilities
for seeing or hearing a thing and one swears that it occurred while the other
swears that it did not. '272 There were, to be sure, counterexamples to this
countertrend. In 1873, the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that Bethel's rule
should have applied even though the "negative" witness swore she was "very
sure" the event in question had not happened, and she was in a position to
know. 273 On the whole, however, nineteenth-century courts were growing
less inclined to call witnesses who denied events "negative" witnesses.2'
These courts also grew more likely to impose a condition on the rule that
undermined its fundamental rationale. This was the second shift in the
270. See supra note 240 and accompanying text.
271. Coughlin v. People, 18 III. 266. 267-68 (1857); accord Cornell %, Hyatt. 6 F Cas 569. 572
(C.C.D.C. 1856) (No. 3237): Harris v. Bell. 27 Ala. 520. 521-22 (1855). Atlanta & WPR R % Johnson.
66 Ga. 259, 271-72 (1881); Kansas City. F.S. & G R.R. % Lane. 33 Kan 702. 706-07 (1885). State v
Chevallier, 36 La. 81, 83-84 (1884); Bradley v. Mutual Benefit Life Ins. Co. 45 N Y 422. 429 (1871).
Reeves v. Poindexter, 53 N.C. (8 Jones) 308. 309-11 (1860).
272. GA. CODE ANN. § 24-4-7 (1995): see also RAPAUE. supra note 231. § 193. at 320 (staling that
where two witnesses listen equally closely and one swears to hearing a statement and one denies it was
said, "[t]his is a direct contradiction, and the rule does not apply"). I STARKIE. supra note 233, § LXXXII.
at *518 ("The application of this principle supposes that the positise can be reconciled with the negative
without violence and constraint.").
273. Ralph v. Chicago & N.W. Ry.. 32 Wis. 177. 179. 181-82 (1873) The court staked its decision
on the classic rationale of the rule: The affirmative witness "'either did las he saidj. or he has probably
committed perjury." Id. at 181. In the case of the negative witness. "there is much more room for failure
of recollection." Id. at 182. The Wisconsin court, however, soon followed the general trend See Shekey
v. Eldredge, 37 N.W. 820 (Wis. 1888).
274. Courts often tortured the language to insist that witnesses who claimed an event did not occur.
but asserted this with enough assuredness, were "positive" or even "affirmative" witnesses Acknowledging
"confusion" on this point, the Wisconsin Supreme Court offered the following clarification in 1909
For instance, testimony that the bell in the elevator did not ring. contrary to the esidence that
it did ring, is negative in form but is an affirmation of fact that the bell did not ring It is as
affirmative as the evidence that the bell did ring. One affirms the bell rang. the other that it did
not.
Anderson v. Horlick's Malted Milk Co., 137 Wis. 569, 574 (1909). see also, e g. Williams v State, 23 Ga-
App. 542, 54243 (1919); Heywood v. State, 12 Ga. App. 643. 643 (1913); Frizell v Cole. 42 III 362. 363-
65 (1866); 9 ENCYCLOPDIA OF EVIDENCE, supra note 254. at 865 ("Posmse Evidence of a
Negative.-Direct testimony that an event did not occur, or that a matter is not so is positive, and not
negative." (citing cases)); RAPAUE, supra note 231. § 193. at 321 ("Sometimes testimony negative in fact
is held to be affirmative within the rule .... ).
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application of Bethel's rule: Many nineteenth- and twentieth-century courts
held that affirmative evidence would trump negative only "[w]here witnesses
are equally credible. ' 75 In a line of cases beginning in 1896,276 the
Georgia Supreme Court robbed that state's statutory formulation of Bethel's
rule of most of its power by specifically reassigning the task of lie detection
to the jury:
It is error to charge without qualification that positive evidence is
stronger than negative .... In weighing evidence, its character as to
being positive or negative is one element for consideration, but it is
not the only one. Credibility is also essentially involved. The section
of the code does not mean that the jury is bound to believe the
positive evidence of one whose credibility is little or nothing, or who
may have been successfully impeached or shown to be a perjurer, in
preference to the evidence of many honest, upright witnesses of
unquestionable credibility who had equal opportunity of observation,
though their testimony may be negative .... [T]he jury [is to]
consider not only what a witness swears, but also what credit is to be
given to him as a witness.
277
The rationale of Bethel's rule-to spare juries having to call someone a
liar-could not survive court decisions that said the rule applies only after the
jury has weighed witness credibility. Although it is possible to cite dozens of
twentieth-century applications of Bethel's rule,27 8 it is safe to say that by the
end of the nineteenth century the rule had lost its soul. Courts no longer
understood its original bond with the principle that all sworn evidence should
be presumed truthful.
Even as Bethel's rule disintegrated, however, its motivating principle that
sworn evidence should be presumed truthful showed remarkable staying power.
We see the resilience of the old presumption in the very long survival of a
little-known rule that juries may not disbelieve the sworn testimony of a
disinterested witness who has been neither contradicted nor impeached. This
rule has a substantial history. In his 1789 evidence treatise, Morgan attributed
to Lord Camden the notion that every witness "who is free from all interest in
275. 9 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF EVIDENCE, supra note 254, at 867; see also Draper v. Baker, 61 Wis. 450,
454-55 (1884); RAPAuE, supra note 231, § 193, at 319-20; cf. Pence v. Chicago, R.I. & Pac. Ry., 79 Iowa
389, 399 (1890) (saying that the jury must consider the witnesses' "comparative credibility").
276. The first case was apparently Humphries v. State, 100 Ga. 260, 263 (1896). See also Warrick v.
State, 125 Ga. 133, 141-42 (1906); Southern Ry. v. O'Bryan, 115 Ga. 659, 660 (1902); Atlanta Consol.
St. Ry. v. Bigham, 105 Ga. 498, 498 (1898).
277. Warrick, 125 Ga. at 141.42; accord Estill v. Estill, 149 Ga. 384, 384 (1919). The Georgia Court
of Appeals went so far as to say that the rule, as set forth in the statute, "is so inaptly stated .. . that to
instruct the jury in the language there given is ordinarily error." Phillips v. State, 57 S.E. 1079, 1079 (Ga.
Ct. App. 1907).
278. See, e.g., McAllister v. Tucker, 88 So. 2d 526, 530 (Fla. 1956); Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v.
Hodges, 84 S.E.2d 711, 712 (Ga. 1954); McIntosh v. Union Pac. R.R., 22 N.W.2d 179, 183 (Neb. 1946);
Williams v. City of Pittsburgh, 37 A.2d 540, 542 (Pa. 1944).
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the fact he comes to attest . . . deserves credit; nay, he is always believed,
unless some other objection, besides character, is raised against his
testimony."279
In 1826, Starkie noted that "[ijn ordinary cases, where a witness stands
wholly unimpeached by any extrinsic circumstances, credit ought to be given
to his testimony, unless it be so grossly improbable as to satisfy the jury that
he is not to be trusted." 2 0 Improbable things often happen, Starkie continued,
so "mere" (not gross) "improbability can rarely supply a sufficient ground for
disbelieving direct and unexceptionable witnesses of the fact where there was
no room for mistake.""' In the middle of the nineteenth century, Best wrote
that testimony under oath, and perhaps even statements without an oath, "ought
to be heard and believed until some special reasons appear for doubt or
disbelief.' ,2 2 And in 1887 Rapalje made it clear that the rule is really a
limitation on the jury's discretion as judge of credibility:
(A]n instruction by the court that [the jury] may disbelieve any
testimony which, under all the circumstances of the case, is not
credible, is too comprehensive, for the jury cannot be allowed to
determine for themselves that other circumstances, not within legal
contemplation, tending to impeach the witness, show that his evidence
is impeached, and therefore entirely disregard it.-83
A great many American courts of the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries applied or approved the rule.? Even more remarkably, as we will
279. 1 MORGAN, supra note 227. at 254.
280. I STARKIE. supra note 233, § LXII, at *472-74; see also RAPAUE. supra note 231. § 190. at 317
("If the statements of... a witness are grossly improbable, the jury may disregard his testimony even
though uncontradicted and unimpeached.").
281. 1 STARKIE, supra note 233, § LXII, at *477; see also id. § LXXXIX. at 1530.
282. BEST, supra note 112, § 118, at *147-48.
283. RAPAUE, supra note 231, § 191, at 317-18; see also id. § 180. at 306 (noting that a jury should
not reject a witness arbitrarily). Rapalje earlier had suggested his skepticism about the rule:
And whether binding on the jury or not, the fact remains that many so-called rules for weighing
testimony have been laid down by the courts, some of them engrafted with so many
"exceptions" that but little of the original principle remains. Thus, it has been held to be a
general rule that every presumption is in favor of the credibility of an unimpeached (or
unsuccessfully impeached) witness; but it is said the jury should not be instructed as a rule of
law to indulge in this presumption; they are to judge of the propriety of so doing in the
particular case.
Id. § 191, at 317.
284. A New York appellate court explained the rule in terms of the same desire to avoid attributions
of perjury that lay behind Bethel's rule:
[The testimony of these two witnesses] is true, or they both committed willful and corrupt
perjury. I think the jury ... were bound to give credit to their testimony. It was not
contradicted .... They were not impeached, or in any way discredited. The positive testimony
of an unimpeached. uncontradicted, witness cannot be discredited, or disregarded arbitrarily or
capriciously by court or jury.
Seibert v. Erie Ry., 49 Barb. 583. 586 (N.Y. App. Div. 1867); accord Lankford v. Holton. 187 Ga. 94.
102-03 (1938); Evans v. George, 80 III. 51. 53 (1875), Second Nat'l Bank v. Donald. 58 NW. 269, 269
(Minn. 1894); Lomer v. Meeker, 25 N.Y. 361, 363 (1862); In re Miller's WVill. 49 Or. 452. 462 (1907):
Engmann v. Estate of Immel, 18 N.W. 182, 182-83 (Wis. 1884): see also Quock Ting v. United States, 140
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see in Part V, the rule seems to retain some force today.2"
B. Empirical Interlude: Criminal Trials in an Eighteenth-Century Court
Before advancing toward the present, however, I need to answer those who
might say that this framework of evidence rules, which exalted the power of
the oath and protected juries from the task of resolving competing oaths,
floated irrelevantly above the actual goings on in criminal courtrooms. So far,
with the exception of Bethel's Case itself and one other case from the same
decade, most of my evidence of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century practice
has taken the form of commentary by contemporary treatise writers. What if,
in actual practice, juries routinely played the role of lie detector?
One answer is that such evidence of actual practice would not ruin our
story. During the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, a system that had
staked its claim to legitimacy in the power of the oath to guarantee truth was
slowly giving way to a system that would ground its legitimacy in the lie-
detecting powers of the jury. During the long transitional period, contrivances
like competency rules and Bethel's rule supported the apparent power of the
oath to guarantee truth by helping to guard against witness perjury and direct
conflicts of oaths, even as the system shifted lie-detecting responsibility to the
jury by permitting defense witnesses to testify under oath. If actual judges in
actual trials were willy-nilly confronting juries with stark conflicts of oaths and
if juries were happily deciding them, the existence of the rules I have been
discussing would still betray the system's perceived need, at least in formal
expressions of principle, to preserve the oath as a centerpiece of its claim to
legitimacy.
But there is no reason to conclude that the system conducted its day-to-day
operations inconsistently with its rules. The treatise writers quoted above did
not, in the main, view themselves as law makers but as law reporters. That is
especially true of Gilbert, who set out the theory of both competency rules and
Bethel's rule so powerfully and influentially.2 6 And analysis of the work of
London's main criminal court during the eighteenth century confirms that the
system operated in greater or lesser degree as its rules might suggest. Case
reports of London's Old Bailey show that the power of the oath was palpable
and dominant, if not absolute. Moreover, case reports from the end of the
century disclose what theory might predict: emerging signs that the jury's
formal designation as the system's lie detector was at hand.
U.S. 417, 420 (1891) (stating the rule in more qualified terms); Davis v. Hardy, 8 Gco. 4, Hil., 6 K.B.
(Barnwall & Cresswell) 225, 231 (1827) (Abbott, CJ.).
285. See infra notes 586-589 and accompanying text.
286. See John H. Langbein, Historical Foundations of the Law of Evidence: A View from the Ryder
Sources, 96 COLuM. L. REV. 1168, 1173 (1996) ("Gilbert's book was essentially an abridgment--a
law-finder that collected precedents.").
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The Old Bailey Sessions Paper,27 is the best record we have of the
operations of an ordinary eighteenth-century trial court, yet it falls far short of
perfect.' 8 In the early years of the century, when the Sessions Paper served
mainly for popular consumption, it tended toward tabloid reporting, lingering
longer than necessary on the sensational and the sexual. By the late eighteenth
century, it had taken on both public funding and a public role, often serving
as the basis for pardon applications?28 The Sessions Paper's greatly
increased detail in these later years, 29° though useful in many ways,
complicates comparisons between early- and late-eighteenth-century practice.
For example, if we see more defense witnesses toward the end of the century,
we cannot be sure whether the difference is real or merely a function of the
far greater space given each case. Moreover, the unofficial status of the
Sessions Paper early in the century left the reporter free to comment on the
merits of the case and the contestants. The late-century "official" reports9'
sadly omit these quirky but useful asides. The greatest disappointment of the
Sessions Paper is the reporter's apparent disinterest in the sort of procedural
niceties that concern us now. Both early in the century and late, the reporter
left out the arguments of counsel and most instructions of the court. Evidence
rulings fared as badly. As we proceed, I will point out where these gaps in the
tape must leave our conclusions uncertain. For now it is safe to assume, as
John Langbein has written, that what the Sessions Paper reports probably did
happen, but what it omits to mention might have happened too.?
Despite such shortcomings, the Sessions Paper tells us a good deal with
clarity and gives us the basis for inferring a good deal more. My analysis here
will focus on the case reports of 1715 and 1780. By 1715, something less than
a generation had elapsed since Parliament's decision to permit sworn defense
witnesses.293 The court business of that year may therefore tell us something
287. THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE SESSIONS OF THE PEACE. AND OYER AND TER2MuNER, FOR THE CIT
OF LONDON, & COUNTY OF MIDDLESEX [hereinafter OBSP]. Following Simon Devereaux, I wtill call these
reports by the contemporary shorthand: "the Sessions Paper." See Simon Devereaux, The City and the
Sessions Paper: "Public Justice" in London, 1770.1800. 35 J. BRIT. STUD. 466. 467 n.2 (1996). For an
analysis of the usefulness and limitations of the Sessions Paper for historians of criminal procedure, see
Langbein, supra note 88, at 267-72.
Although not the first legal historian to exploit the Sessions Paper, John Langbein seems to have
sparked its current celebrity. See id. at 267 n.16; see also Malcolm M. Feeley & Charles Lester. Legal
Complexity and the Transformation of the Criminal Process, n SUBJEKTIVIERUNG DES JUSTIZEL.,EN
BEWEISVERFAHRENS 337, 338 (Andrd Gouron ed., 1994); Stephan Landsman, The Rise of the Contentous
Spirit: Adversary Procedure in Eighteenth Century England 75 CORNELL L. REv. 497, 509 (1990).
288. See Langbein, supra note 88, at 269-72.
289. See Devereaux, supra note 287, at 468-83.
290. The Sessions Paper of 1715 reported 500-odd cases in just 48 pages of dense newsprint. By 1780
the print had grown larger, but that hardly explains the bigger page count: Some 600 cases filled 794 pages.
291. 1 use the terms "reporter" and "reports" largely for lack of anything better. I do not mean to
imply that the Sessions Paper, especially in the early 18th century, took the earnest and official form of
a modem case report.
292. See Langbein, supra note 83, at 21-26.
293. See supra note 154 and accompanying text.
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about how the system was coping with the new problem of sworn credibility
conflicts. The Sessions Paper itself largely dictated my choice of the year 1780
for a late-century comparison. That year was one of just a few during the last
quarter of the century in which the Sessions Paper recorded almost every case
in some detail.2' My analysis below draws from all 418 cases decided by
jury in 1715 and 255 cases-or every other one--decided by jury in 1780.295
In both 1715 and 1780, we see clear signs of the great weight of the oath.
Let us consider first the very little force carried by the defendant's unsworn
word.296 In 1715, a defendant who staked his claim of innocence primarily
on his own unsworn denial of guilt had only a marginally greater chance of
acquittal 297 than a defendant who simply sat silent, saying nothing by way
of denial or justification (26% versus 23%).298 In 1780 the defendant's claim
of innocence arguably hurt his cause: Those few who sat quietly had a
substantially better chance of acquittal than those who rested on their word
(42% versus 32% percent).299 Langbein quotes two Sessions Paper cases
294. Except between 1779 and 1787 and perhaps after 1792, the late-century Sessions Paper reported
most cases that ended in acquittal in summary fashion only-reciting the indictment and the result, but
omitting the evidence. One reason is that the late-century reports served as the basis for pardon
applications, and for that purpose there was of course no need to record the facts behind acquittals.
Moreover, city officials worried that publicizing acquittals would encourage crime. See Devereaux, supra
note 287, at 481, 484-86, 491-93 & n.89, 497 n.103. Former mayor John Wilkes and his democratic
disciples are perhaps responsible for restoring reports of acquittals between 1779 and 1787, They apparently
believed that publicizing acquittals would reassure the public of even-handed justice. See id. at 484,491-93.
295. 1 have counted cases in a somewhat idiosyncratic way to serve my purposes here. If, in a case
involving codefendants, the evidence against one defendant varied greatly from that against another, I
counted the case against each defendant separately. So my total case counts might slightly exceed someone
else's. On the other hand, as this study concerns jury decisionmaking, I have chosen to ignore the rather
frequent cases in which the court directed a verdict of not guilty as well as the quite rare cases in which
the defendant pled guilty. My case counts therefore exclude these cases. The brevity of some of the 1715
case reports often makes it difficult to tell whether the jury found the defendant not guilty or the judge
directed this verdict. Absent good reason to think the jury decided the case, I have excluded it.
296. The Sessions Paper makes clear that the defendant's word was always unswom. While the crime
victim and other witnesses always "swore" to the defendant's misdeeds, the defendant merely "said" such
and such in his defense.
297. Throughout my discussions of the Sessions Paper, I use the expressions "acquittal" and "not
guilty" to mean the defendant was fully absolved of guilt. I use the expressions "conviction" and "guilty"
to refer to any level of conviction, even one less than that charged in the indictment. In 1715, the jury
returned a lesser verdict in 45% of those cases ending in conviction. By 1780, for reasons I cannot explain,
the proportion had fallen to 23%. For 1715, 1 can find no interesting correlation between the jury's
inclination to reduce the level of the conviction and other criteria reflecting, for example, the strength of
the case. Across all categories the proportion of cases in which the jury returned lesser verdicts never fell
below 40% or rose above 53%. In 1780, however, the jury was decidedly more likely to reduce the level
of the conviction in the weakest factual cases. I will report these findings after taking up the distinction
between circumstantial and direct cases. See infra notes 320-324 and accompanying text.
298. Both of these comparison groups include some cases in which the defendant called character
witnesses. I have excluded cases in which the defendant called fact witnesses because I want to measure
the impact of the defendant's unswor account of events. I should emphasize here what I noted earlier:
Where the reports fail to mention something, we should be cautious in concluding that it did not happen.
Especially in these early years, the Sessions Paper often reported so few details of a case that we cannot
know for certain whether a defendant did or did not speak-or for that matter, whether she did or did not
call witnesses. I am assuming throughout this analysis that silence means something did not happen,
although that assumption is almost certainly often wrong.
299. 1 have calculated these figures in the manner explained above. See supra notes 295,297-298. The
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from the late seventeenth century in which the judge focused the jury's
attention on the distinction between sworn and unsworn evidence. In one "the
Court told the Jury, the Witnesses' Oaths were to outweigh [the defendant's]
bare Allegations, and left the Matter to them for the Value."" In the other,
the reporter wrote that "against the Positive Oaths of two Witnesses, [the
defendant's] bare word the Court thought not a sufficient Counter-proof;
however they left it to the Jury."'"
The reporter's commentary from the 1715 reports conveys in a subtle way
the devalued status of defendants' unsworn statements. In fourteen cases the
reporter noted that the defendant's statement was either "not believ'd" (ten
times),3"2  not "credible" (twice), 3  or downright "false" (twice). ' Yet
only once in all the cases from 1715 did the reporter use any similar term to
describe the testimony of a sworn prosecution witness 3°5 (or for that matter
a sworn defense witness3°). I am not suggesting that the reporter or the jury
always believed sworn testimony to be true. Indeed, the reporter often seemed
to be winking at his readers about the quality of prosecution testimony: The
prosecution was "looking a little odly";
7 it "appear'd very ridiculous";31
it was "very base and vexatious"'  or "unjust, 30 or "improbable" 3t' or
acquittal rate across all cases was greater in 1780 than in 1715 35% versus 27%. Half of this increase was
due to the cases arising from the Lord George Gordon nots. which I will discuss below. See mrfra notes
333-344 and accompanying text.
300. Langbein, supra note 88, at 286 (discussing the case of Mary Reed).
301. Id. at 285-86.
302. E.g., John Booze, OBSP, Feb. 23-25. 1715. at 3 ("In his Defence he said but haing no
Witness, that was not believ'd, and he was found Guilty .... "). In some of these cases the locution was
slightly different. See. e.g., Ralph Walker. OBSP. July 13-16. 1715. at 3 ("He said in his Defence
which not being believ'd, he was found Guilty .... *'); John Arnold. OBSP June 2-4. 1715. at 4 ("He
said ... but the Jury did not believe that, and he was found Guilty .... "-).
303. Again, the locution varied. See Edward Dalton. OBSP. July 13-16. 1715. at I-2 ("The Pnsoner
in his Defence pretended he did not know [his accomplice] . . Iblut the Jury not crediting that Story.
found him Guilty .... ); Richard Shepard, OBSP. Apr. 27-30. 1715. at 5 (stating that the defendant's
testimony "not being credible, he was found Guilty").
304. Thomas West, OBSP, Dec. 7-10. 1715, at 2 ("The Prisoner denied the Fact. and said which
being swom to be false, the Jury found him guilty ...."); Daniel Blunt. OBSP. Oct. 12-15, 1715. at 3
("The Prisoner said he took it from the Ground; but that appearing to be false, he was found Guilty. )
305. See Thomas Cummins, OBSP. June 2-4. 1715. at 6 ("[The alleged robbery victiml appear'd to
be a very lewd Woman, and had no Credit with the Jury. whereupon the Prisoner was acquitted -)
306. In three cases (not counted above), the reporter's ambiguous language permits the inference that
he was commenting on the credibility of a defense witness, though I think the better reading is that he was
referring to the defendant. See Thomas Smout. OBSP Dec. 7-10. 1715. at 2 ("The Prisoner denied the Fact.
and call'd the other two Soldiers to his Reputation, who gave him a quite contrary Character. but that not
being credited, the Jury found him guilty."); William Frasier & Ann Todd. OBSP. Sept. 7-9. 1715. at 2
("[The defendants] made a very incredible Defence; and the Witnesses call'd to speak in their Behalf
confronting their own Evidence, the Jury found Todd Guilty of Felony; but Frasier ssas acquitted ').
R_ R., OBSP, Jan. 14-17, 1715, at 5 ("In his Defence he endeavour'd to prose he la) at another Place
the Night before the Robbery was committed, and did not rise till 8 of the Clock that Morning. but that
was not believ'd, and he was found Guilty .... ).
307. Mary Wadsworth, OBSP, July 13-16. 1715. at 5.
308. Robert Evans & William Thompson. OBSP. Feb. 23-25, 1715. at 5
309. Mary Barter, OBSP, July 13-16, 1715. at 5.
310. Elizabeth Newell, OBSP, Oct. 12-15. 1715. at 2.
311. Elizabeth Vincent, OBSP, Feb. 23-25. 1715. at 2.
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"trifling"; 312 or a prosecution witness was "a very litigious troublesome
Man.,,3 t3 But with the one exception just noted, the reporter was never so
brazen as to call a sworn witness a liar, though he was quite willing to say so
of the unsworn defendant.3 t4
Perhaps this respect for the oath was feigned, even sarcastic-and perhaps
it appeared so to contemporaries-but it may have reflected the system's
struggle to cling to the trappings of the old order as a new order loomed. In
any event, things perhaps had changed by 1780. Although the 1780 reports
contain almost no reporter commentary, in the one instance of it I saw, the
reporter made the kind of attack on a prosecution witness's credibility that
never took place in 1715: The witness's testimony, he wrote, "was so
prevaricatory and contradictory in itself; and many parts of it being [proved
false] by the testimony of a gentleman of character, the prisoner was acquitted,
and [the witness] was committed to take his trial for wilful and corrupt
perjury.:
315
The reporter's-and jury's--disdain for unsworn statements extended past
those of the defendant. When children who were deemed too young to
understand the oath spoke without being sworn, the reporter made it plain that
their word carried little weight. Hence in one case from 1715: "The Girl said
he threw her upon the Bed ... but she not understanding the meaning of an
Oath, what she said was not taken as Evidence, and he was acquitted."
3 1 6
And in another: "[B]ut there was no Proof of the Prisoner's doing it, but only
312. Edward Macmans, OBSP, June 2-4, 1715, at 5.
313. Edward Gilman, OBSP, Apr. 27-30, 1715, at 6. In all, I counted nine such indirect comments on
the credibility of prosecution witnesses. The remaining two are Rebecca David & Mary David, OBSP, Sept.
7-9, 1715, at 1, in which the reporter referred to "some malicious Grudges" between some of the
prosecution witnesses and the defendants; and William Forest, OBSP, June 2-4, 1715, at I, in which the
reporter referred to the "bad Reputation" of a prosecution witness.
In addition there were nine indirect (though generally more pointed) comments on the credibility of
the defendant and one on the credibility of defense witnesses. See, e.g., John Simpson, OBSP, Dec. 7-10,
1715, at 4 ("The Prisoner said ... but this Defence not being of any Weight with the Jury, he was found
Guilty."); Mary Kutter, OBSP, Oct. 12-15, 1715, at 3 ("The Prisoner said in her Defence ... but that was
impossible, it being prov'd [otherwise] .... ); Sarah Fairclough, OBSP, Oct. 12-15, 1715, at I ("In her
Defence she said ... but that being absurd, and the contrary plainly prov'd, she was found Guilty.");
Thomas Silver, OBSP, Apr. 11-13, 1715, at 5 ("In his Defence he said ... but that was prov'd altogether
groundless, and he was found Guilty .... ). The case involving defense witnesses was Benjamin Payne,
OBSP, Oct. 12-15, 1715, at 2, in which the reporter noted that the witnesses had an "indifferent reputation"
and were motivated by a bribe.
314. Another indication of the small weight accorded a defendant's unswom denial in the face of a
sworn accusation is how far some defendants went to contrive a claim of innocence that did not contradict
prosecution testimony. Two cases from 1715, both charging burglary, provide good examples. In the case
of Thomas Jones, OBSP, Feb. 23-25, 1715, at 2-3, the victim testified that he caught the defendant with
his hand on the window sill, apparently on his way in. The defendant "said in his Defence, that he was
coming by, and saw the Window open, upon which he went to give Notice to the People, and so put his
Hand in, and several Persons appearing to his Reputation, he was acquitted." Id. In the case of Isaac Colt,
OBSP, Apr. 27-30, 1715, at 6, the homeowner said he saw the defendant jump out of his window. The
defendant "did not deny his being in the House, but said his Fellow prentice threw his Hat in, and he went
to fetch it, whereupon he was acquitted." Id.
315. Emanuel Jacobs, OBSP, Dec. 6, 1780 (No. 66), at 50.
316. Daniel Bonnely, OBSP, July 13-16, 1715, at 4.
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the Child's Word; which not being sufficient to satisfy the Jury, she was
acquitted. '3' 7 Langbein reports a case from 1678 in which the jury refused
to convict an alleged child rapist until the judge permitted the complainant and
her young friend to be sworn. 3 s By 1780, the court simply excluded
statements by witnesses too young to appreciate the oath-and by Quakers,
who refused to swear an oath. If the witness's testimony was essential to the
prosecution, the court simply directed a verdict of not guilty." 9
The best way to gauge the power of the oath, however, is not to measure
disdain for unsworn evidence, but rather to assess the respect accorded sworn
testimony. Here we must distinguish between circumstantial and direct
evidence. In circumstantial cases, no witness swears to having seen the
defendant commit the crime. Hence the jury may acquit the defendant, not
because it disbelieves her accusers, but because it does not think that the facts
sworn to by the prosecution's witnesses, even if true, prove the defendant's
guilt.320 But when a case presents direct evidence of guilt, a jury's verdict of
not guilty must normally mean that the jury disbelieves a sworn prosecution
witness. During both 1715 and 1780, the Sessions Paper reveals a decided
preference for direct over circumstantial evidence and a decided disinclination
by juries to reject direct evidence of guilt. The first indication of this
preference is that the Sessions Paper, like other contemporary sources, called
direct testimony "positive" evidence. The word carried a double meaning that
reinforced the value of direct evidence: Eyewitness evidence was "positive"
evidence, and an eyewitness who was certain of her identification of the
defendant was "positive" of it.321 Over and over again, the reporter of the
317. Mary Fadding, OBSP, Feb. 23-25, 1715, at 4
318. See Langbein, supra note 88, at 291-93 (discussing the case of Stephen Arrowsmith).
319. See, e.g., William Bailey & Patrick Madan, OBSP, Dec. 6. 1780 (Nos. 51-52). at 41 (refusing
a child wimess); Abraham Danford & William Newton, OBSP Sept. 13. 1780 (No. 504), at 704 (refusing
the testimony of a Quaker); Mary Madan, OBSP, Feb. 23. 1780 (No. 92). at 129 (directing a verdict of not
guilty after refusing a child witness); John Nixon. OBSP, Jan. 12, 1780 (No. 72). at 95 (refusing two child
witnesses). In his 1802 evidence treatise, Leonard MacNally traced the I 8th-century evolution of the rule
that child witnesses may not give unswom statements. See I LEONARD MACNALLY. THE RULES OF
EVIDENCE ON PLEAS OF THE CROWN 151-54 (London, J. Butterworth 1802).
As I will point out shortly in another context, see infra notes 327-328 and accompanying text. the
testimony of rape victims met with systemic suspicion. It is certainly possible that. in cases of child sexual
abuse, the court expressed its usual distrust of rape victims in terms of the child's perceived incapacity to
swear. It is also true, though, that child witnesses were sometimes rejected in other kinds of crimes. and
sometimes their absence resulted in directed verdicts of not guilty. Three cases cited immediately above
are in point: John Nixon was accused of burglary; Mary Madan of theft, and William Bailey and Pamck
Madan of theft from a dwelling house.
320. Most of the circumstantial cases reported in the Sessions Paper concerned theft. In the typical
case, witnesses would swear that the defendant had been in a positon to steal the goods and/or that the
defendant later was seen with the goods.
321. A third use of the word--that evidence was "positive" rather than *'negative"-- was mostly a later
aberration. Calling Bethel's rule the problem of "positive" (rather than "affirmative-) versus "negative"
evidence seems to have been rare before the 19th century. See supra notes 214-216. 225 and accompanying
text.
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Old Bailey Sessions Paper emphasized the peculiar value of "positive," or
direct, evidence.32
The numbers seem to bear out the reporter's instincts. In 1715 a defendant
who faced a case of pure circumstantial evidence was more than twice as
likely to be acquitted than a defendant who confronted a sworn eyewitness
(37% versus 16%). 323 By 1780, the chance of acquittal in both categories had
grown larger (50% versus 26%), but the disparity between them remained
almost as great.324 These numbers still understate the deference paid to
eyewitness evidence. In my 418-case sample from 1715, there were 129 cases
that presented direct evidence of guilt. Of these, twenty-one ended in acquittal.
Five of these twenty-one cases turned on the testimony of an accomplice.325
As the testimony of accomplices was officially disfavored (the uncorroborated
testimony of an accomplice seems to have been insufficient to convict),326
322. Hence in 1717, at the trial of George Marshall for pickpocketing, the victim said that "the
Prisoner cut her Pocket; that she feeling some body have hold of it, catch'd hold of the Prisoner, there
being no other Person there." George Marshall, OBSP, Oct. 16-17, 1717, at I. The reporter then noted,
"The Prisoner denied the Fact, and said there were other Persons there besides himself; however this did
not avail him. The Evidences being positive, the Jury found him Guilty of the Indictment." Id. (emphasis
added); see also, e.g., Mary Sutron, OBSP, Apr. 8-1, 1719, at 5 ("The Prisoner denied the Fact, but the
Evidence being very full and positive, the Jury found her Guilty .... ").
Conversely, in a case from 1715, the reporter was careful to note that the evidence had been merely
"presumptuous"-a variant of "presumptive," the term usually used to denote circumstantial evidence: "The
Fact was prov'd very presumptuous on the Prisoner, but the Evidence not being positive; some Persons
whom she call'd to her Reputation, giving her a good Character, and that she got an honest Livelihood,
she was acquitted." Jane Thomas, OBSP, Oct. 12-15, 1715, at 2 (emphasis added).
323. By a "pure circumstantial case," I mean one in which there was no evidence of a confession by
the defendant. Adding the defendant's confession to a circumstantial case made a considerable difference.
In 1715, it reduced the likelihood of acquittal from 37% to 5%. In 1780, it reduced the likelihood from
50% to 20%. That defendants who confessed were so much more likely to be acquitted in 1780 than in
1715 is probably due to increased institutional suspicion focused on the manner of obtaining confessions.
In 1780, the court refused to admit evidence of confessions obtained by threat or promise of favor. See,
e.g., Thomas Collins et al., OBSP, Oct. 18, 1780 (Nos. 609-1I), at 791 (excluding any statement of the
defendant made after a promise of reward); William Goodchild, OBSP, June 28, 1780 (No. 409), at 602
(similar); Edward Gandy, OBSP, Apr. 5, 1780 (No. 198), at 260 (apparently directing a verdict of not guilty
because there was no evidence except the defendant's confession, "which had been improperly obtained");
see also Langbein, supra note 83, at 103-05 (discussing the development of the "confession rule," which
excluded evidence of confessions given under threats or promises).
324. Another index, perhaps, of the greater certainty provided by positive evidence is that judges in
direct evidence cases were a good deal more likely to impose a death sentence in the event of a conviction
than were judges in pure circumstantial cases. They did so in 31% of direct-evidence cases versus 21% of
pure circumstantial cases in 1715 and in 36% of direct-evidence cases versus 17% of pure circumstantial
cases in 1780. Juries were less consistent in responding to this distinction. In 1715, juries reduced the level
of the conviction in 43% of direct evidence cases and 40% of pure circumstantial cases-a tiny difference
and in the opposite direction from what one might expect. In 1780, the jury responded more as we might
expect, returning a lesser verdict in 33% of pure circumstantial cases but in only 17% of direct evidence
cases.
325. See Thomas Salter & Elizabeth Salter, OBSP, Dec. 7-10, 1715, at 5; William Forest, OBSP, June
2-4, 1715, at I; John Tent, OBSP, Feb. 23-25, 1715, at 2; Henry Hill, OBSP, Jan. 14-15, 1715, at 2; Evan
Roberts, OBSP, Jan. 14-15, 1715, at 2.
326. Langbein writes that the rule requiring corroboration of an accomplice's testimony was well-
established by the middle of the 18th century. See Langbein, supra note 83, at 98-103. The Sessions Paper
of 1714 and 1715 suggests the rule was already in place, though the language leaves room for a different
interpretation: that juries were merely reluctant to convict on an accomplice's uncorroborated testimony.
See, e.g., Matthew Cornwall, OBSP, Apr. 27-30, 1715, at 3 ("[B]ut there being no other Evidence against
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the jury that decided these cases did not buck the general presumption in favor
of sworn evidence. Three other cases rested on the testimony of a rape
victim,32 7 and just as the system formally devalued the testimony of criminal
accomplices, so it did the testimony of rape victims.321 One case relied on
the testimony of an unswom child, -9 yet another disfavored form of
evidence. In six of the remaining twelve cases, the facts permitted the jury to
judge the prosecution's witnesses truthful and yet maintain doubts about the
defendant's guilt.330 That leaves only six of the 129 direct-evidence cases
the Prisoner... than the bare Oath of [the accomplice], he was acquitted . .."). Henry Hill. OBSP, Jan.
14-17, 1715, at 2 ("But there being no Witness against him but [the accomplicel. and having a great many
People to his Reputation, he was acquitted."): William Hoskins. OBSP. Dec 8-14. 1714. at 4 ("But there
being no other Evidence but [the accomplice). to prove the Prisoner I[was] concem'd [in the cnme), he was
acquitted."). But see, e.g., James Lewis, OBSP, July 13-16. 1715. at 5 (reporting a conviction based on
accomplice testimony without mentioning corroboration). By late in the century, the Sessions Paper made
clear that corroboration was required and that lack of corroboration would entitle the defendant to a directed
verdict. See, e.g., James Whitehouse et al., OBSP. May 18-21. 23. 1774 (Nos. 396-99). at 219 ("Court. As
there is no evidence against Piner besides the accomplice. I shall not put him upon his defence "). William
Rice et al., OBSP, Apr. 13-16, 18-20, 1774 (Nos. 262-64). at 167 ("Court. As there is no evidence against
Perrier but that of the accomplice, I shall not call upon htm for his defence "').
In England the accomplice corroboration rule died in 1788 as a result of Rei v Atwood & Robbmns.
168 Eng. Rep. 334 (1788), which held that as an accomplice is a competent witness. it is for the jury "to
say whether they think [his testimony] sufficiently credible to guide their decision on the case 168 Eng.
Rep. at 335 (emphasis added); see also Langbein. supra note 83. at 102-03 (discussing the significance of
Arwood & Robbins). In the United States, as we will see in Part V. the rule has prosed to have greater
staying power. See infra notes 590-595 and accompanying text. The rule has obsious relesance to this
study, as it is one more intrusion on the jury's lie-detecting discretion In a sense. the requirement of
corroboration operates as a less absolute competency rule.
327. See William Willis, OBSP, Dec. 7-10. 1715. at 5: M_ K_ OBSP. Oct 12-15. 1715. at 5:
William Cash, OBSP, July 13-16, 1715, at 5.
328. The Session3 Paper provides other evidence of the diminished status of rape complainants as
witnesses. As I will discuss below when I return to the issue of Bethel's rule, the Sessions Paper of 1715
reports only two instances in which the defendant put forth negative testimony in the face of affirmative
prosecution testimony-and both of these are questionable examples. See infra note 341 and accompanying
text. In other years of the same period, however, I found two clear examples, and both concerned rape See
Isaac Seaman, OBSP, May 14-16, 1719, at 7 (reporting that "the Pnsoner's Sister-m-Law deposed that
she heard nothing..." and that another witness specifically denied an event to which the victim had
testified); Richard Nevill, OBSP, Apr. 11-13, 1716, at 5 (stating that the prisoner "brought several Persons
to prove there was no Noise"). One can surmise that some rape defendants thought the usual rule-that
negative evidence is powerless in the face of swom affirmative evidence--dd not apply when the
affirmative evidence is that of a rape complainant. See J.M. BEATniE. CRItME AND THE COURTS IN
ENGLAND 1660-1800, at 124-32 (1986) (discussing the institutional obstacles and suspicions encountered
by rape victims).
329. See Mary Fadding, OBSP, Feb. 23-25. 1715, at 4.
330. In three of these cases the defendant conceded the objective facts, but denied the crime- See
Thomas Cooke, OBSP, Dec. 7-10, 1715. at 2 (reporting that the defendant, who was accuscd of embezzling
from his employer, admitted he made unauthorized charges against the employer's account, but said he did
so to cover the employer's own debts); Isaac Colt. OBSP. Apr. 27-30. 1715. at 6. discusseJ supra note 314.
Thomas Jones, OBSP, Feb. 23-25, 1715, at 2-3. discussed supra at note 314. In a fourth case. the objective
facts apparently were not disputed, but proved insufficient to convict. See Hcnr) White. OBSP. Dec 7-10.
1715, at 3 (noting in a murder case that "it not being believed that that One Blow occasaon'd his Death.
the Jury acquitted the Prisoner"). The fifth and sixth cases presented questions of identit). and the jury may
have believed the prosecution's witnesses were honestly mistaken See Richard Robinson. OBSP, Apr 27-
30, 1715, at 4 ("[N]or could the Prosecutor be positive [the defendant) was the Person who took it.
whereupon he was acquitted."); William Downer. OBSP. Feb. 23-25. 1715. at 4 (reporting that the
defendant, who was seized on the street after a shopkeeper cned thief. "'deny'd he was ever in the Shop.
but [said] he was going by that way, and [was) taken by Mistake. and the Person who took him [testified
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from 1715 in which the records permit us to conclude that the jury acquitted
the defendant because it rejected the sworn testimony of a prosecution witness
whom the system otherwise deemed credible.33'
The Sessions Paper of 1780 tells a more complicated story. In that year,
a somewhat smaller sample of 116 direct-evidence cases yields fully seventeen
in which the jury appears to have rejected as untruthful the sworn evidence of
a prosecution witness who was neither an accomplice nor a rape victim.332
Whether this large number means that juries had grown more willing to reject
sworn testimony depends in part on the significance of this additional fact: Of
these seventeen anomalous cases, eleven arose out of the Lord George Gordon
riots that shook London in early June 1780.3 33 The depredations of the
that the defendant] did not run, but was walking a very gentle pace, and [that although the defendant was]
immediately search'd, nothing was found upon him").
331. In two of these, the jury apparently chose to credit the defendant's unswom denial over the
prosecution's sworn accusation. The two cases bear a certain similarity, in that the alleged victim had been
in the company of the defendants and they were perhaps drinking together before the crime. In the case
of Eleanor Turner & Elizabeth Wells, OBSP, July 13-16, 1715, at 4, the victim claimed that the two
defendants, together with two unidentified men, robbed him. One of the defendants said in her defense:
[The victim] was in drink, and came into her House with a Woman of her acquaintance,
where she left them together, and went out; and when she came in again found them in Bed,
at which being much surpriz'd, she made them get up, and he went away without complaining
of any loss.
Id. In the case of James Ayres, OBSP, Sept. 7-9, 1715, at 4, the victim testified that he and the defendant
had been "going the same Way together.., and they drank together" before the defendant robbed him.
The defendant admitted to having been with the victim, but denied the robbery. I have noted often in
reading the Sessions Paper that, as these cases suggest, juries seem to have devalued prosecution testimony
when the witness had been drinking at the time of the events. The defense that the victim was seeking or
having sex at the time of the crime was often made and sometimes successful.
In two other cases, the jury apparently chose to believe the testimony of the defendant's witnesses
over direct testimony by a prosecution witness. See Elizabeth Mossly, OBSP, Oct. 12-15, 1715, at 2
(reporting in a perjury prosecution that witnesses disputed what the defendant said in her allegedly perjured
testimony); John Overloin, OBSP, Apr. 27-30, 1715, at 4 (reporting that the defendant presented a witness
who said that the defendant was elsewhere at the time of the crime). The latter case might also have been
one of mistaken identity.
In the final two cases, the reporter's comments leave the strong impression that there was something
amiss with the prosecution witnesses' credibility. See Edward Gilman, OBSP, Apr. 27-30, 1715, at 6
(noting that the only eyewitness to the crime was "a very litigious troublesome Man"); John Tisden, OBSP,
Apr. 27-30, 1715, at 4 ("[The prosecutor's] Evidence being very imperfect, the Prisoner was acquitted."),
332. Thirty of the 116 direct-evidence cases ended in acquittal. Three of these relied on the testimony
of an accomplice or rape victim. See Christopher Morris et al., OBSP, Oct. 18, 1780 (Nos. 603-05), at 778.
George Weaver, OBSP, Sept. 13, 1780 (No. 519), at 717; William Bennett et al., OBSP, Apr. 5, 1780 (Nos.
163-65), at 208-09. Ten presented the possibility of mistaken identity. See Charles Allen & Josiah Lareher,
OBSP, Oct. 18, 1780 (Nos. 594-95), at 771; Robert Downing & William Wood, OBSP, Sept. 13, 1780
(Nos. 510-11), at 710; William Harding, OBSP, Sept. 13, 1780 (No. 448), at 648; James Watts, OBSP, June
28, 1780 (No. 379), at 544; James Coulsell, OBSP, June 28, 1780 (No. 356), at 502; Richard Wilson,
OBSP, June 28, 1780 (No. 342), at 476; Frances Lawley, OBSP, June 28, 1780 (No. 340), at 472; Levy
Abrahams, OBSP, May 10, 1780 (No. 287), at 342; George Cook, OBSP, May 10, 1780 (No. 259), at 322;
Thomas Phillips, OBSP, May 10, 1780 (No. 226), at 288.
333. Of the six remaining cases, one can be explained by the near worthlessness of the goods stolen.
See Thomas Cullen, OBSP, Jan. 12, 1780, at 81 (proving the theft of goods valued at nine pence or less).
In a second, the complainant alleged that two women, apparently prostitutes, had stolen his watch-the kind
of claim to which juries were typically unsympathetic, if not necessarily disbelieving. See Lucy Hambleton
& Martha Raymond, OBSP, May 10, 1780 (Nos. 281-82), at 338. A third case involved an alleged theft
by two journeymen textile workers. See Thomas Richardson & William Dowdey, OBSP, May 10, 1780
(Nos. 278-79), at 337. Understanding this case requires a better grasp of the industries of the day than I
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anti-Catholic mob, which burned or raided three prisons and destroyed the
homes of many prominent citizens, generated a huge traffic of
cases334_-accounting for thirty-five of the 255 cases I sampled from 1780.
An extraordinary acquittal rate of 57% does not quite capture the suspicion
with which juries greeted these prosecutions. At first, still in the shadow of the
riots, juries stood ready to convict. Nine of the first eleven cases ended in
guilty verdicts, and in eight of these the court sentenced the defendants to
die.3 35 Juries then acquitted in three-quarters of the remaining twenty-four
cases.
Although it is likely that juries grew disaffected with these prosecutions
as death sentences mounted and the riots receded from memory, such a change
of heart cannot entirely explain the great number of acquittals. And indeed, the
riot trials themselves were different from typical trials of the day. An unusual
number of defendants had counsel, and those counsel had an unusually potent
line of cross-examination-the fifty-pound reward the King had offered to
anybody who won the conviction of a rioter." 6 It is not that such substantial
rewards were new. Since 1692, the government had paid forty pounds for the
capture and prosecution of a highway robber." 7 and in the years after,
high-profile scandals had alerted everyone to the possibility of perjury by
professional thief-takers.33 In several cases from 1780 not related to the
riots, defendants had insinuated that the promise of reward motivated
prosecution testimony.33 9 But the riot cases presented a new twist on the
familiar prospect of prosecutions grounded in greed. The crimes were public,
so any one of dozens of people could plausibly claim to have witnessed them.
Yet the person we would most expect to lodge charges and claim a
have. In the last three cases, the jury seems to have chosen to disbelieve ssom prosecution testimony See
Isaac Abrahams. OBSP, Dec. 6, 1780 (No. 49). at 40; John Bailey. OBSP. Sept 13. 1780 (No 440). at
644; Thomas Mabet, OBSP, Jan. 12, 1780 (No. 53). at 77.
334. According to one source, there were 192 convictions and 25 executions- See 8 DICTIOARY OF
NATIONAL BIOGRAPHY, supra note 123, at 197-98. Gordon. who was president of the Protestant
Association, was tried for high treason in February 1781. He was acquitted for want of evidence that he
had incited the mob. One measure of the magnitude of the riots is that 300 noters ,,ere killed w'hen the
army came to take control. See id.
335. In the end, the sentences of several of these defendants were "respited dunng his Majesty's
pleasure." OBSP, June 28, 1780, at 640.
336. See, e.g., Thomas Downs, OBSP June 28, 1780 (No. 407). at 598-99
337. See An Act for Encouraging the Apprehending of Highwaymen. 4 W & M.. ch 8 (1692)
Despite the usual rule against testimony by persons with a financial interest in the case. the promise of a
reward did not exclude prosecution witnesses in criminal cases. See R v Neuland. I Lcach 311, 314 n a
(K.B. 1784) (citing this holding in a Gordon riots case).
338. See Langbein, supra note 83, at 106-14.
339. See Abraham Danford & William Newton. OBSP. Sept 13. 1780 (No 504). at 704. Thomas
Carter & Mary Evans, OBSP. May 10, 1780 (Nos. 267-68). at 332. Christopher Burrows & John Burden.
OBSP, Feb. 23, 1780 (Nos. 123-24), at 167; John Benfield & Willinam Turley. OBSP. Jan 12. 1780 (Nos
80-81), at 107; see also J.M. Beattie, Scales of Justice: Defense Counsel and the Eighsh Criminal Trial
in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries. 9 LAw & HIST REv. 221. 23944 (1991) (prescnting c.aimples
of noted defense counsel William Garrow's interrogation of A itnesses about, among other things, their
hopes of reward).
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reward-the owner of the home torn down-was often not present, having fled
from the mob. As a result, random onlookers frequently brought charges,
heightening the potential for financial opportunism. Defense counsel pursued
as well another line of attack on the truthfulness of prosecution witnesses. The
riot cases provide the only examples I have seen in the Sessions Paper of
counsel calling witnesses to testify about a prosecution witness's bad character
for credibility. In these cases, we see the spectacle of a defense witness
testifying, "Upon my oath, I would not believe him upon his oath." 0
The riot cases also stand out in the frequency with which defense
witnesses denied seeing or hearing facts to which prosecution witnesses had
testified. By the principle of Bethel's rule, such negative evidence should have
been powerless in the face of affirmative prosecution testimony. And indeed,
in 1715 negative evidence was extremely rare: It appeared in only two of 418
cases, and both of these are questionable examples. 34t Yet in 1780, my
255-case sample turned up nine such cases. It is true that in four of these the
jury convicted the defendant-so for all we know, the jury heeded the
admonition of Bethel's rule and valued affirmative evidence over negative.342
340. Henry John Maskall, OBSP, June 28, 1780 (No. 301), at 399; see also George Simpson, OBSP,
June 28, 1780 (No. 405), at 593 (similarly discrediting a witness); Stephen Titcombe, OBSP, June 28, 1780
(No. 319), at 434 (similar). The form of question-inquiring whether one witness would believe another
under oath-was not new, see 7 WIGMORE, supra note 44, § 1982, at 148, 150 nn.7-8, but to judge from
the Sessions Paper, it was quite rare.
341. In one, a murder case, a defense witness swore that "he did not see any Wound given." Richard
Marriot et al., OBSP, June 2-4, 1715, at 4. But as the prosecution had proved the wounding through
circumstantial evidence (no prosecution witness testified to seeing the wound inflicted), the defendant's
negative evidence did not actually oppose affirmative prosecution evidence.
In the second case, which charged seditious words, two prosecution witnesses swore they heard the
defendant's drunken barroom bawl, "God damn King George, he has no Right to the Crown." William
Wide, OBSP, Feb. 23-25, 1715, at 1. Against this evidence, the defendant called "several Witnesses who
swore, That they had known, and convers'd with [the defendant] a great while, and never heard him say
any Thing against the Government." Id. Far from violating Bethel's rule, the defendant in this case seems
to have steered clear of it: He produced no witness to deny the specific speech alleged by the prosecution.
In two other cases of seditious words from 1715, the defendants called witnesses who were present
at the scene, yet those witnesses conspicuously failed to deny that the defendants had spoken the offending
words. In the first, a prosecution witness "positively swor[e]" to the defendant's outburst against King
George, spoken in a crowded tavern. Lewis Amand de la Cour, OBSP, Feb. 23-25, 1715, at 5. Although
one of the defendant's witnesses said that "while he was there, the Prisoner as readily as the rest, drank
the King's Health by the Name of King George," none of his witnesses denied hearing the seditious words.
Id. In the second case, a prosecution witness swore that the defendant "drew his Bayonet with great
Passion," crying "G-d d-n King G-----e." Thomas Smout, OBSP, Dec. 7-10, 1715, at 2. The defendant
called two soldiers who were with him at the time of the events, who testified to his character but said
nothing of the facts.
The failure of the defendants' witnesses in these cases to say the accused never spoke ill of the King
suggests that Bethels rule may have exerted a quiet negative force: As affirmative evidence trumped
negative, once the prosecution had made out an affirmative case, defendants did not bother to offer negative
evidence.
342. See Charles West et al., OBSP, Sept. 13, 1780 (Nos. 499-501), at 697-98 (reporting a
counterfeiting case in which witnesses denied the existence of a passageway to a hidden chamber); John
Harris, OBSP, Sept. 13, 1780 (No. 464), at 669 (reporting a theft case in which a witness denied seeing
the defendant throw a watch over a wall); Thomas Price et al., OBSP, June 28, 1780 (Nos. 420-22), at 623
(reporting a riot case in which a witness denied seeing the defendant at the scene); James Purse, OBSP,
May 10, 1780 (No. 289), at 352-53 (reporting a rape case in which witnesses denied hearing a rape or
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In the five remaining cases, however, the jury acquitted, and all of these were
riot cases. 34 Although we can only guess at what motivated these juries to
acquit, it is hard to escape the conclusion that they chose to credit the negative
evidence of the defendants' witnesses because they disbelieved the affirmative
allegations of the prosecution's witnesses. That is, they made exactly the sort
of attribution of perjury that Bethel's rule attempted to avoid. In any event, the
phenomenon does not seem to have spread beyond the riot cases: In the
exceedingly common cases of theft that accounted for most of the rest of the
court's docket, we see but a single, unsuccessful attempt to oppose affirmative
evidence with negative."" Perhaps, then, the riot cases must stand as isolated
harbingers of change.
The Sessions Paper of 1780 reveals one other sign of change-a sign not
limited to the riot cases. In 1715, only 7% of case reports mentioned defense
witnesses other than character witnesses or the defendant herself. By 1780, that
number had more than doubled to 18%. We may read this increase as evidence
of a greater willingness of defendants to challenge sworn evidence and of
juries to take such challenges seriously-but we should not exaggerate the
change. For one thing, the difference may merely reflect the increasing detail
of the Sessions Paper's case reports rather than any real difference in the
courtroom. Moreover, without the riot cases, the increase in defense witnesses
would have been halved-to 13%. That number is more in line with Malcolm
Feeley and Charles Lester's much larger survey of the Sessions Paper, which
found that the proportion of defendants who called witnesses to dispute the
government's evidence hovered at around 10% for another full century."
seeing blood). In the Charles West case, the witnesses were encouraged to say that they had spectfically
looked for a secret passageway that they now said did not exist-so their testimony took an almost positive
form: "I can say positively there was not" such a passageway. one said. Charles Vest ct al,, OBSP. Sept.
13, 1780 (Nos. 499-501), at 697.
Unfortunately, as the reporter has given us neither lawyers' arguments nor judge's charge, %%c cannot
know if either cited Bethel's rule.
343. In all of them the negative evidence took the form of an assertion that the witness did not see
the defendant at the riot or did not see him misbehaving. See Luke Hand. OBSP. June 28. 1780 (No. 424).
at 629-31; John Barrett, OBSP, June 28, 1780 (No. 392). at 564; David Wilson. OBSP. June 28. 1780 (No.
384), at 554; James Coulsell, OBSP June 28, 1780 (No. 356). at 504; Henry John Maskall. OBSP. June
28, 1780 (No. 301), at 393-98.
344. See John Harris, OBSP, Sept. 13. 1780 (No. 464). at 669.
345. See Feeley & Lester, supra note 287, at 361. 363. My figures give uneven support to another
conclusion of Feeley and Lester. They argue that the rial process of the 18th century "was in fact more
of a sentence hearing than a guilt-determining process." Id. at 361. That is. the point of tral was not to
discover the fact of the defendant's guilt, but to decide what punishment the defendant deserved. See id.;
see also Langbein, supra note 83, at 41, 55 (stating that the main function of many 18th-century cnminal
trials was to make sentencing decisions). Because facts were not much at issue, trials were quite short: Until
the mid-19th century, the average judge at the Old Bailey presided over at least two and as many as almost
five jury trials in a day. See Feeley & Lester, supra note 287. at 351-52. And instead of relying on fact
witnesses, defendants often called witnesses to speak to their good character. Feeley and .ester's figures
indeed show that mid- and late-I 8th-century defendants called character witnesses in over 30% of all cases.
See id. at 363.
My findings are more ambiguous. In 1715. only 1I% of defendants called character witnesss. Those
S1I%, however, profited for their efforts: Defendants who called character witnesses (but not fact witnesses)
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And even if we take the larger number, it means that in only 18% of cases was
the defendant in any position to turn the trial into a credibility contest between
sworn witnesses. Yet we should not minimize the change either. More defense
witnesses meant the potential for more sworn credibility conflicts-the thing
the system had strived so long to prevent.
346
C. Alibis and the Problem of Unavoidable Conflicts
So far, I have discussed the ways in which the criminal justice system
attempted to avoid the spectacle of conflicting oaths at trial. The early rule
forbidding sworn defense witnesses and later rules forbidding testimony by
persons with strong incentives to lie pursued this goal in a direct, even brutish
fashion. Bethel's rule sought to avoid credibility conflicts more subtly, in effect
encouraging juries to presume that one witness was mistaken before concluding
that either witness had lied. The related rule that juries may not disbelieve the
uncontradicted, unimpeached testimony of a disinterested witness expressed in
its most straightforward form the system's commitment to the presumption that
all sworn testimony was true.
But all sworn evidence was not true, and the system had to confront this
reality rather often. In this section I will examine the problem of alibis. Alibi
defenses insured that once the system permitted sworn defense witnesses it
could never altogether avoid the spectacle of head-to-head credibility conflicts.
The system's apparent embarrassment at the problem of alibis and its
sometimes stilted and formulaic way of resolving alibi claims and other
credibility conflicts reinforce the image of a justice system deeply
uncomfortable with the idea of juries' choosing between competing oaths.
Bethel's rule, as I noted earlier, had the power to avoid credibility conflicts
only when the witness who testified negatively might plausibly have been
were almost twice as likely to be acquitted than the average defendant (53% versus 27%). Although by
1780 the proportion of defendants who called character witnesses had increased to 34%, juries apparently
had ceased to listen. Defendants who called character witnesses (but not fact witnesses) were acquitted 39%
of the time, barely exceeding the average for all defendants of 35%.
In both 1715 and 1780, defendants who calledfact witnesses substantially increased their chances of
acquittal as against the average defendant: 57% versus 27% in 1715 and 54% versus 35% in 1780.
346. One other, more ambiguous development in 1780 is worth noting. In 20 of the 255 cases
sampled, the defendant asked the court to sequester the prosecution's witnesses. The point of sequestration
is to keep one witness from hearing another testify, thereby frustrating attempts to coordinate stories and
enabling opposing counsel to expose inconsistencies. The 1715 Sessions Paper mentions no such request.
It is true that the tactic of sequestering witnesses has been known at least since Fortescue mentioned it in
his 15th-century treatise, see FORTESCtJE, supra note 52, at 61 (describing the sequestration procedure in
civil cases), and Wigmore cited several 16th-, 17th-, and 18th-century sequestration requests, see 6
WIGMORE, supra note 44, § 1837, at 349 n.10. It is also true that sequestration is often a tactic not to
expose liars, but simply to keep witnesses whose memories of the criminal's face are fading from
reinforcing one another. See, e.g., Thomas Williams, OBSP, Apr. 5, 1780 (No. 173). at 220 (reporting a
sequestration request by a defendant who presented a claim of mistaken identity). Still, it is hard not to spy
in so substantial a change a creeping modernity. By 1780, many lawyers and defendants apparently had
embraced one very important tool to facilitate jury lie detecting.
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mistaken. The testimony of Bethel's witnesses that they never saw him strike
the King's servant is just the kind of negative evidence to which the rule was
best suited-for the witnesses may have been looking elsewhere at the moment
of the crime. In contrast, a defense alibi witness who swears that the defendant
was with her at the time of the crime cannot easily be mistaken. As Thomas
Starkie made clear, Bethel's rule was powerless to avoid the conflict of oaths
raised by an alibi defense:
[Tlhis principle [of Bethel's rule] is inapplicable where a negative
depends on the establishment of an opposite positive fact. Thus an
alibi negatives the actual commission of a crime by the prisoner, but
the evidence is of as direct and positive a nature as that which tends
to prove his presence and actual commission of the crime."
7
An alibi defense confronts a jury squarely with what Bethel's rule strived to
avoid--the task of choosing between competing oaths.
James Fitzjames Stephen, who understood better than many historians the
system's aversion to conflicting oaths, saw the difficulty alibis posed. He
reported that in Scotland, which seems to have borrowed elements of both
Roman law and common law, Sir George Mackenzie had suggested in the late
seventeenth century that judges review proposed alibi defenses ahead of trial
and simply bar prosecution of any defendant whose alibi is clearly
proved--"for to admit contrary Probations, were to open a Door to
Pejury.' 34 Here we see shades of the Act To Abolish Hostilities of
1607,349 which sought to avoid conflicts of oaths by allowing the jury to
screen witnesses before they were sworn. Mackenzie's "strange rule," Stephen
said, survived in Scotland until 1735. 3s In England, however, no such
procedure removed alibi cases from the courts. Although it is possible that
magistrates refused to issue charges whenever defendants came forward with
convincing alibis, an increasing number of alibi cases found their way into the
347. 1 STARKIE, supra note 233, § LXXXII, at *518-19. In his Commentares on the Law of Scotland.
David Hume quoted an unidentified author who spelled out the difference between disallowed negative
evidence and an affirmative alibi:
A defence contrary to the [accusation] may be sustained. if it resolve in a positive
proposition. A [defendant] indicted for committing a crime at a certain place, cannot be allowed
to bring witnesses to prove in general that proposition, that he was not there. But if he limit his
proposition by offering to prove, that at the time [alleged]. he was alibi, though that proposition
is contary to the [accusation], every day's practice allows it relevant to be proven.
2 HuME, supra note 102, at 74 n.L. This proposition seems inconsistent with Mackenzie's rule, discussed
just below in the text. It is possible that this passage was contemporary with Hume, who wrote in 1790.
whereas Mackenzie wrote in the late 17th century.
348. MACKENZIE, supra note 66, at 241-42, discussed in I STEPHEN, supra note 28. at 353.
349. 4 Jam., ch. I (1607); see supra Section Il.B.
350. 1 STEPHEN, supra note 28, at 353. Stephen appears to be relying here upon Hume. who wrote
that Mackenzie's rule "had really been observed in some instances- and suggested that no prosecutor
admitted the propriety of conflicting oaths until 1735. 2 HuME. supra note 102, at 75. 77.
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courtroom. In seven of the 418 cases I studied from 1715 and in twenty-six of
the 255 cases I studied from 1780, the defendant presented alibi defenses. 5 '
The important question, for our purposes, is how the system advised juries
to resolve the credibility conflicts posed by alibi defenses. Gilbert undertook
to explain how juries should resolve competing oaths in his early-eighteenth-
century evidence treatise. His first rule was that the jury should, if possible,
reconcile the two oaths by preferring affirmative evidence over negative-this
was the principle of Bethel's rule. 352 "[B]ut where the Affirmative and
Negative oppose each other in contradictory Propositions," as in the case of
alibi, then Gilbert proposed other rules for resolution of the conflict. 353 The
first of these reads, "If there be two Witnesses against two, and no
Preponderating as to their Number, they are to be weighed as to their
Credit. ' 354 Gilbert perhaps thought it needless to say that if one side had a
greater number of witnesses, that side should prevail.
The notion that numerology can help settle credibility conflicts is now
quite dead,355 but it survived well into the nineteenth century. Best's treatise
of 1849 presented the problem of alibis in this intriguing light:
In many cases ... the tribunal is compelled to decide on the relative
credit of witnesses who swear in direct contradiction of each other.
Where, for instance, a murder or larceny is proved by one or two
witnesses, and an alibi or other defence wholly irreconcilable with
their evidence, and inconsistent with any hypothesis of mistake, is
351. Not all of these cases involved direct conflicts of oaths. In some, the defendant's own unswom
statement included a claim of alibi, but was unsupported by sworn witnesses. In others, the prosecution's
case was purely circumstantial and included no sworn testimony that the defendant was at the crime scene.
352. GILBERT, supra note 70, at 157.
353. Id.
354. Id.
355. In the Fifth Circuit, jurors are told bluntly, "[D]o not make any decisions simply because there
were more witnesses on one side than on the other." FIFTH CIRCUIT CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 1.09
(1990). Other jurisdictions have similar rules. See, e.g., CALIFORNIA JURY INSTRUCTIONS, CRIMINAL § 2.22
(West 1993) ("You are not bound to decide an issue of fact in accordance with the testimony of a number
of witnesses, which does not convince you, as against the testimony of a lesser number or other evidence,
which appeals to your mind with more convincing force."); People v. Pugh, 436 N.E.2d 737, 743-44 (III.
App. Ct. 1982) (disapproving of a judge's instruction that in "deciding whether any fact has been proved,
it is proper to consider the number of witnesses testifying on one side or the other" even though the judge
also said that "the number of witnesses alone is not conclusive if the testimony of the lesser number is
more convincing"); People v. Bender, 335 N.W.2d 85, 87 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983) ("Under Michigan law,
the number of witnesses which a party produces at trial is quite irrelevant in determining where the truth
lies.").
One can find only very few, somewhat half-hearted appeals to the numerology principle. See, e.g.,
White v. State, 410 So. 2d 135, 137 (Ala. Crim. App. 1981) (approving the trial judge's refusal to instruct
that "the weight of the evidence is not necessarily determined by the number of witnesses testifying on
either side," and commenting that "disparity in the number of witnesses is a circumstance not to be
overlooked"); State v. Coburn, 165 A.2d 349, 354 (Vt. 1960) ("[T]he truth is not established by the relative
strength in the number of witnesses on one side against the other. The jury is at liberty to accept the word
of the minority .... [But if] the jury should regard the witnesses to be worthy of belief, the numerical
strength might control."). An occasional instruction advises the jury to consider whether witness testimony
is corroborated by the testimony of other witnesses--arguably creating a preference for the greater number.
See, e.g., State v. May, 121 N.W.2d 564, 564 (Neb. 1963).
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proved by a like number called by the accused, the verdict of the jury
virtually, although not formally, determines that one set of witnesses
or the other has committed perjury.356
Best was not attempting here to prescribe how a jury should resolve alibi
cases. He was making the modem observation that juries do in fact engage in
lie detecting. He suggested they do so, however, only as a last resort-only
when "compelled." The jury's first step is to try to reconcile an alibi defense
with the accusation, perhaps by attributing the conflict to someone's
"mistake"---an application of Bethel's rule. The second step is to appeal to
numerology and count each side's witnesses. Only if the stories are
"irreconcilable," "inconsistent with any hypothesis of mistake," and "proved
by a like number" will a jury be "compelled to decide on the relative credit of
witnesses"-and perhaps to "determine[] that one set of witnesses or the other
has committed perjury."
Although I have been focusing until now on alibi defenses, the treatises
did not restrict numerological principles to that context. Almost every major
treatise suggested that whenever jurors faced the task of choosing between
conflicting oaths, they should tend to give more credit to the side that
produced the greater number of witnesses. That is true not only of the
eighteenth-century treatises-Gilbert3. and Morgan 3" 8-but also of the
nineteenth-century treatises-Evans,35 9  Starkie, '6 Best, 6  and Rapalje.
As late as 1887, Rapalje wrote that if a more modem comparison of witness
credibility fails to settle a conflict in oaths, then "the testimony of the greater
number ... must prevail. 362 We see numerology in case law as well. In
356. BEsT, supra note 12, § 397, at *436.
357. Gilbert suggested that numerology should be the second rule of decision, after Bethel's rle.
whenever a jury faced conflicting oaths. See supra text accompanying notes 352-354. If two witnesses
agree, he wrote, "'there must be two perjured, or it must be true what these Witnesses alledge." GILBERT.
supra note 70, at 153.
358. Morgan's treatment of the issue follows Gilbert almost verbatim. Compare I MORGAN, supra note
227, at 296, with GILBERT. supra note 70, at 157.
359. See Evans, supra note 231, at 262 ("Other circumstances being equal, the preponderance of
numbers is certainly entitled to the advantage, and sometimes this preponderance will be sufficiently great
to counterballance an apparent superiority in other circumstances on the opposite side . . .. ). Consistent
with his modem views, however, Evans made clear that -consideration of number is held subordinate to
that of ... individual veracity." Id.
360. See I STARKIE, supra note 233, § LII, at *79 ("[1lt is for the jury afterwards to judge of the credit
due to the witnesses, considering their numbers, their opportunities for observing the facts .. .. )- id. § LV.
at *454-55 ("The credit due to the testimony of witnesses depends upon Ist. their honesty: 2dly. their
ability; 3dly, their number, and the consistency of their testimony ... "'); id. § LVIllI. at *465 (-Where
direct testimony is opposed by conflicting evidence, or by ordinary expenence. or by the probabilities
supplied by the circumstances of the case, the consideration of the number of witnesses becomes most
material."); id. § LXXXIV, at *522 ("[W]here the credit of conflicting witnesses is doubtful, as far as
regards their number, their integrity, their means of knowledge, and the consistency and probability of their
testimony, a comparison of their statements with each other and with undisputed or established facts is the
great test of credibility.").
361. See supra text accompanying note 356.
362. RAPAUE, supra note 231, § 194, at 323.
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1851, a Texas trial court advised the jury that when witnesses are of equal
credit, "the jury are authorized to allow the greater number of witnesses to
preponderate" 363-an instruction to which a three-judge special court of the
state supreme court gave its "entire assent. ' '364 The Arkansas Supreme Court
stated a similar principle in 1859.365 It is true that stark references to the rule
of numbers grow harder to find as the years go by, but the important thing is
how late in our story we continue to find them.366
We may add numerology to that list of rules and principles-which now
includes competency rules, Bethel's rule, the rule that juries must accept the
sworn testimony of an unimpeached and uncontradicted witness, and the
presumption that sworn testimony is true-that disclose the system's
continuing reluctance to let the jury play the role of lie detector. Before we
move on in Part IV to examine the nineteenth-century demise of many of these
rules, let me add one more to the list. The rule of falsus in uno, falsus in
omnibus held that a witness who lied about any material fact must be
disbelieved as to all facts. As Thomas Starkie argued in his 1824 evidence
treatise, the rule created an exception to the usual presumption that sworn
evidence was true: "The presumption that the witness will declare the truth
ceases as soon as it manifestly appears that he is capable of perjury. Faith in
a witness's testimony cannot be partial or fractional ....
363. Coles v. Perry, 7 Tex. 109, 140 (1851) (quoting the trial judge's instruction).
364. Id.
365. See Vaughan v. Parr, 20 Ark. 600, 607 (1859) (holding in a nonjury case that when no witness
is impeached and all had an equal opportunity to gain information, "the testimony of the greater number
must prevail").
366. It is not hard to find 20th-century examples, though they tend to be weaker formulations of the
rule. See, e.g., Davies v. Philadelphia Rapid Transit Co., 77 A. 450, 451 (Pa. 1910) ("In a conflict of
evidence, mere number is not in itself controlling, but it certainly is entitled to great consideration, and
should control unless there be special reason to credit the evidence of the smaller number."). In 1918 a
California civil trial court advised the jury: "[Y]ou are ... to bear in mind the number of witnesses
testifying for or against any issue of fact in determining where the preponderance of proof lies." Hanton
v. Pacific Elec. Ry., 174 P. 61, 63 (Cal. 1918) (quoting the trial judge's instructions). The court then added:
"By a preponderance of the evidence is not necessarily meant a greater number of witnesses, and if the
plaintiff has proven his case by such evidence as constitutes and produces conviction in the mind of the
jury, then he has proven his case by a preponderance of the evidence." Id. (quoting the trial judge's
instructions) (emphasis omitted). In approving this instruction, the California Supreme Court emphasized
the trial judge's permissive, nonexclusive statement of the numerology principle. See id. I thank Dan
Klerman for this reference.
Wigmore found it "surprising" how late the principle of numerology, long a fixture of Roman-canon
law, persisted in English common law courts:
[A]s a popular notion and instinctive mental attitude it was still in almost full force in the
1500s .... The vital force of this quantitative view of a witness' testimony is seen pressing
to the surface in abundant casual instances down into the 1700's; and it is only here and there
that a protest is raised against its fallacy... Only by a slow and comparatively recent
development came the rational notion of analyzing and valuing testimony other than by
numbers. Even to-day, among juries in some places, there is no doubt a mere counting of oaths
or witnesses.
Wigmore, supra note 43, at 89-90. As Wigmore sought to minimize the role played by numerology in
English common law courts, see id. at 94, 97-98, he called no attention to the principle's survival in 19th-
century treatises and case law.
367. I STARKIE, supra note 233, § LXXXVII, at *524.
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In its original form, the rule offalsus in uno was mandatory. 'The notion,"
Wigmore wrote, "was that the testimony of one detected in a lie was wholly
worthless and must of necessity be rejected."1 6' The rule, therefore, served
as one more mechanical guide by which the system withheld lie-detecting
powers from the jury. Like the rule that the greater number of witnesses should
prevail, that of falsus in uno came into play only in those situations, such as
alibi defenses, that were resistant to Bethel's rule. Starkie maintained that
juries should deal with apparent conflicts of oaths in this now-familiar manner:
Where the testimony of direct witnesses is apparently at variance,
it is to be considered in the first place whether they be not in reality
reconcileable, especially where there is no extrinsic reason for
suspecting error or fraud. But if their statements upon examination be
found to be irreconcilable, it becomes an important duty to distinguish
between the misconceptions of an innocent witness, which may not
affect his general testimony, and wilful and corrupt misrepresentations
which destroy his credit altogether.
369
That is, if the jury cannot reconcile two oaths, as recommended by Bethel's
rule, it should apply one of the mechanical lie-detecting rules supplied by the
system-in this case, the rule of falsus in uno.
By the early nineteenth century, English judges were telling juries that they
might-but need not-disbelieve the entire testimony of a witness who had
lied about a material fact. 37 0 In America, the mandatory form of the rule died
more slowly. Despite attacks by treatise writers and some courts on the rule's
wooden conception of human credibility, 7  and despite modem-sounding
arguments that it impermissibly invaded the jury's prerogative to judge
credibility,372 many courts continued to instruct juries that they must adhere
368. 3 WIGMORE, supra note 44, § 1009, at 675. Wigmore traced the rule offalsus in uno to the Stuart
treason trials of the late 17th century. See id. § 1008. at 675 n 1: see also. e g. Trial of Hampden. 9
Howell's State Trials 1053, 1101 (1684) ("Falso in uno. falsus in onmbus. If ve can proe that %%hat he
hath said of my lord of Essex is false, he is not to be beieved against the defendant."). Trial of Langhom.
7 Howell's State Trials 417, 478 (1679) ("If I can prove any one point (in answer to that which he hath
given evidence) not to be true, then I conceive, my lord. he ought to be set aside."): Trial of Coleman. 7
Howell's State Trials I, 71 (1678), quoted in KENYON. supra note 162. at 125 ("[Ilt would much ennervatc
any man's testimony, to the whole, if he could be proved false in any one thing"). Although \Vigmore did
not find earlier expressions of the rule, its repeated appearance in the trials of this era suggests it had earlier
roots. Barbara Shapiro notes that Michael Dalton's early-17th-century manual for justices of the peace
advised magistrates that when examining accused felons, they should diseredit the whole of the accused's
story if any part proved false. See SHAPIRO, supra note 28, at 156. 279 n.16.
369. 1 STARKIE, supra note 233, § LXXXI, at *515.
370. See 3 WIGMORE, supra note 44, § 1010. at 676.
371. See, e.g., Parsons v. Huff, 41 Me. 410. 412 (1856) (Appleton. J) (It is obvious, therefore, that
of the testimony of the same witness part may be true and reliable and part false and mendacious. A rule
of law, which requires a jury to infer from one false assertion, that all facts uttered by the witness are false
statements, is manifestly erroneous."); 3 GREENLEAF. supra note 231, § 378. at 382 (arguing that because
cross-examination may pressure witnesses into making mistakes. it would be "'unjust" to apply the rule to
witnesses testifying orally).
372. See, e.g., Knowles v. People. 15 Mich. 408. 412 (1867) ("[Wlhen testimony is once before the
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to the rule.373 The Supreme Court endorsed a mandatory form of the rule as
late as 1822, as did some state courts well into the twentieth century.375
IV. THE RISE OF DEFENDANT TESTIMONY
In earlier pages, I have now and then glanced ahead of our story to the
events of the nineteenth century. Bethel's rule, as I noted, survived into the
nineteenth century but did not long outlive it, and the same may be said of the
rules of numerology andfalsus in uno. But even before the nineteenth century
opened, there had been hints of a broader change to come. Cracks had begun
to show in the complex of competency rules that had served to keep the most
probably perjurious witnesses from taking the stand. In a much-quoted passage
from 1786, Lord Mansfield remarked that "of late years the Courts have
endeavoured, as far as possible, consistent with [the old] authorities, to let the
objection go to the credit, rather than to the competency, of a witness. 376
That is, some courts had begun to construe competency rules narrowly,
permitting challenged witnesses to testify and letting the jury judge their
credibility. By the first years of the nineteenth century, Leonard MacNally
could begin a general treatise on evidence in criminal cases with the bold
claim that a jury could reject the testimony even of a sworn, positive witness
if the jury was suspicious of the witness's "excess of warmth" or his
"solicitous reserve" or even his "affectation of candor. '377
But Mansfield's dictum and MacNally's rhetoric came a few decades
ahead of their time. Although there had been some common law erosion of
rules that once had protected juries from the task of lie detecting, the old
jury, the weight and credibility of every portion of it is for them, and not for the court, to determine.");
State v. Williams, 47 N.C. (2 Jones) 257, 269 (1855) (Pearson, J.) (holding that any attempt to regulate a
juror's judgment of a witness's credibility "is impracticable, worse than useless, inconsistent and repugnant
to the nature of a trial by jury"); Mead v. McGraw, 19 Ohio St. 55, 62 (1869) (stating that "the passing
upon the credibility of witnesses is exclusively within the province of the jury"); RAPAuIE, supra note 23 1,
§ 192, at 318-19 (arguing that the "true rule" is that the jury "are authorized" to reject the whole of the
witness's testimony, but "the question of credibility remains wholly with the jury").
373. See 3 WIGMORE, supra note 44, § 1009, at 675 & n.2 and cases cited therein. In New York,
confusion persisted about whether the mandatory or permissive form of the rule governed until the late 19th
century. See id. § 1010, at 678 n.2.
374. The Santissima Trinidad, 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) 283, 339 (1822) (holding that when a witness tells
a "deliberate falsehood ... Courts of justice.., are bound ... to apply the maxim falsus in uno, falsus
in omnibus").
375. See, e.g., Pass v. State, 182 S.E.2d 779, 788 (Ga. 1971) (citing the trial judge's charge that, "if
a witness shall swear wilfully and knowingly falsely, his or her testimony shall be disregarded entirely
unless corroborated by circumstances or other unimpeached evidence"). This case dealt with a variant of
the mandatory form of the rule in which the jury is told that if the witness has lied about one fact, the jury
must disbelieve the witness as to all other facts unless those facts are corroborated, in which case the jury
may give them credit. See 3 WIGMORE, supra note 44, § 1011, at 678 & n.I.
376. Walton v. Shelly, I Term. Rep. 296, 300 (K.B. 1786), quoted in, e.g., 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note
89, at *369 n.*; MACNALLY, supra note 319, at 124; see also Oldham, supra note 204, at III & n.81
(citing a general 18th-century trend, led by Mansfield, toward letting a witness's interest go to credibility
rather than competency).
377. MAcNALLY, supra note 319, at 2-3.
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competency rules survived the turn of the century in almost undiminished
force. Criminal defendants, civil parties, interested persons, felons, spouses,
and nonbelievers remained ineligible to testify in every jurisdiction,
Mansfield's manifesto of change notwithstanding. The only clear step toward
the vast transformation that lay ahead was an emerging tolerance of witnesses
of different faiths. Early in the seventeenth century, Lord Coke had insisted
that only Christians could be trusted with the oath.3 " By the end of the
eighteenth century, courts had ruled that the only essential theology for a
witness was a belief in divine retribution for falsehoods told under oath. 79
As early as 1696, English law permitted Quakers, who would not swear, to
testify by affirmation in civil cases.380
This liberality toward non-Christian and Quaker witnesses may have been
a symptom more of religious tolerance than of any diminished regard for the
value of the oath. We still can see at the beginning of the nineteenth century
the old, highly formalized attitudes that, on the one hand, presumed sworn
evidence to be truthful and, on the other, protected that presumption by
attempting to keep potential liars from taking the oath. Hence Starkie, like
Gilbert, staked the logic of Bethel's rule on "'the presumption in favour of
human veracity." 38' And in language much like that of Gilbert a century
earlier, Starkie and others justified the panoply of competency rules in terms
of their power to protect the oath by preventing probable perjurers from
defiling it. An interested person may not take the oath, Starkie said, because
human nature "is too weak to be generally restrained by religious or moralinterests. Nor may a felon,
obligations, when tempted ... by temporal interests.
"for it cannot reasonably be expected that such a person would regard the
obligation of an oath. 383 Nor may a nonbeliever, for "that obligation to
speak the truth is wanting which the law has appointed ... as an indispensable
security.
' 31
By resorting to this contrivance of competency rules to protect the oath's
role as a guarantor of truth, the system betrayed its persistent doubt about the
378. See EDWARD COKE, THE FIRST PART OF THE INSTITr ES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND. OR. A
COMMENTARY UPON LITTLETON 6b (London, J. & W.T. Clarke 19th cd. 1832) (1628).
379. The pathbreaking case was Omichund v. Barker. YB. 18 Geo. 2. Hil. I (Ch 1744). prmtnied
in REPORTS OF ADJUDGED CASES IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS DURING THE TIME LORD CHIEF
JUSTICE WILLES PRESIDED IN THAT COURT- TOGETHER wmi SOME FEW CASES OF THE SAME PERIOD
DETERMINED IN THE HOUSE OF LORDS, COURT OF CHANCERY, AND EXcHEQUER CHAMIIER (Dumford) 538
(London, John Exshaw 1800) [hereinafter DURNFORDI. Justicc Wills's opinion was often quoted'
"[N]othing but the belief of a God and that he will reward and punish us according to our deserts is
necessary to qualify a man to take the oath." Id.. reprinied in DURNFORD. supra. at 545
380. See An Act That the Solemn Affirmation and Declaration of the People Called Quakers. Shall
Be Accepted Instead of an Oath in the Usual Form, 7 & 8 Will. 3. ch 34 (1696). Quakers could not gtve
evidence by affirmation in criminal cases until 1828. See An Act for Amending the Law of Evtdcncc in
Certain Cases, 9 Geo. 4, ch. 32 (1828).
381. I STARKIE, supra note 233. § LXXXII. at "517
382. Id. § LVIII, at *83.
383. Id.
384. Id. § LVI, at *82.
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jury's capacity to spy out and disregard a perjured witness. Greenleaf
admonished in his 1842 treatise, "If no means were employed totally to
exclude any contaminating influences from the fountains of justice," the jury
would "constantly" give "the testimony of a witness, unworthy of credit ....
as much consideration as that of one, worthy of the fullest confidence.""3 5
And yet this cardhouse of competency rules collapsed. One by one, first in the
civil context and then in the criminal, both in England and in America, the
rules came down. Although I will speculate below on some forces that might
have sped the rules' demise, I cannot pretend to have found the moving force
behind each step in this progress toward modernity. Instead I will focus on the
last, most dramatic, and (in the criminal context) by far most important step:
the downfall of the rule that forbade criminal defendants to testify under oath.
Maine led the common law world when it gave accused felons the right
to the oath in 1864. Many states quickly followed, almost all of them
Northern. Seeking an explanation for this North-first movement to permit
defendant testimony will require us first to explore another North-first
phenomenon, for it turns out that competency rules barring civil parties from
testifying also came down in the North before the South. I will argue that in
both cases the North acted first because of the distorting influence of a related
but quite different issue-the right of nonwhites to give evidence in Southern
courts.
The relationship between Southern laws that barred nonwhites from the
witness stand and the Southern lag in permitting civil parties to testify was, as
we will see, quite direct. But tracing the link between the South's racial
exclusion laws and the North's lead in letting criminal defendants testify will
take us out of the courtroom and into the political maelstrom. We will begin
in the U.S. Senate in 1862, when Charles Sumner first launched his attack on
the South's racial exclusion laws.386 Sumner and his followers did not in the
main attack the racist underpinnings of the South's laws. Instead they framed
their objections in the same general language that legal reformers had brought
to bear against the whole structure of witness competency rules. They argued
that all competency rules withhold useful evidence from the jury and thereby
hinder the search for truth. The consequence of relying on such arguments was
ironic, if not entirely unpredictable: Suddenly, any surviving Northern
competency rule left the North vulnerable to Southern countercharges of
hypocrisy. The bar against sworn testimony by criminal defendants, therefore,
suddenly had to go.
385. 1 SIMON GREENLEAF, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 326, at 375 (Boston. Charles
C. Little & James Brown 1842).
386. See infra Subsection IV.D.I.
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A. The Downfall of Witness Competency Rules in Civil Cases
A generation before the American Civil War made its unexpected
appearance in our story, the old system of competency rules had begun to
crumble, especially in their application to civil cases. In England, Lord
Denman's Act of 1843387 abolished the exclusion of both felons and
interested persons; the County Courts Bill388 of 1846 permitted civil parties
to testify in the county courts, which had jurisdiction over minor civil actions;
Lord Brougham's Act of 1851389 abolished the exclusion of civil parties in
all courts; an act of 1853 abolished the exclusion of spouses in civil
actions;390 and an act of 1869 abolished the exclusion of atheists in all
cases.39 1 In the United States change was, by the nature of the land,
piecemeal and uneven, but unmistakable nonetheless. Michigan became the
first state to permit interested witnesses to testify in 1846392 and Connecticut
the first to admit civil parties in 1848."' Other states followed, with changes
in almost all cases coming in the form of legislative action.
It is not easy to isolate the driving force behind the liberalization of
competency rules in civil cases, though three explanations stand out. The first
of these points to the influence of Jeremy Bentham's Rationale of Judicial
Evidence, first published in English in 1827.3 In five turgid39  volumes,
Bentham made it relentlessly, repetitively clear that the oath provides no
guarantee of truthful testimony,' 9' that we must rely on the jury to separate
wheat evidence from chaff,397 and that the more evidence we place before
387. An Act for Improving the Law of Evidence. 6 & 7 Vict . ch 85. § 1 (1843) Although this was
the earliest general assault on the principle of competency rules in Great Britain. earlier laws had made
limited inroads. See, e.g., An Act for the Further Amendment of the Law,. and the Better Advancement of
Justice, 3 & 4 Will. 4, ch. 42, §§ 26-27 (1833) (limiting the grounds on which a person may be disqualified
by reason of interest); An Act To Render Persons Convicted of Petty Larceny Competent Witnesses. 31
Geo. 3, ch. 35 (1791) (declaring that no person shall be incompetent as a witness by reason of a petty
larceny conviction).
388. An Act for the More Easy Recovery of Small Debts and Demands in England. 9 & 10 Vict-. ch
95, § 83 (1846).
389. An Act To Amend the Law of Evidence, 14 & 15 Vict., ch. 99. § 2 (1851)
390. See An Act To Amend an Act of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Victoria. Chapter 99. 16 & 17
Vict., ch. 83, §§ 1-2 (1853).
391. See An Act for the Further Amendment of the Law of Evidence. 32 & 33 Vict. ch 68. § 4
(1869).
392. See Joel N. Bodansky, The Abolition of the Parts- Witess Disqualification An Historical Survev.
70 Ky. L.J. 91, 93 (1981-1982).
393. See CONN. REv. STAT. tit. 1, ch. X. § 141 (1849).
394. See I JEREMY BENT-TANi. RATtONALE OF JUDICIAL EvIDCE (John S. Mill ed. London. Hunt
& Clarke 1827). Bentham wrote his Rationale between 1802 and 1812 A truncated version appeared in
French in 1823. John Stuart Mill, editor of the 1827 English edition, also %%rote parts of that text. See id.
at x-xii; A.D.E. Lewis, The Background to Bentham on Evidence. 2 UTiLTAs 195. 204-09. 213. 216 (1990)
395. An early reviewer wrote of the Rationale: "'A book more disgustingly affected and so nearly
unintelligible it is not possible to imagine."' Paul A. Palmer, Benthamtrisn ins England and America. 35 AMI
POL. Sci. REv. 855, 859 (1941) (quoting Thomas Cooper's 1830 review)
396. See, e.g.. I BEN'THAM, supra note 394. at 366.
397. See, e.g., 5 id. at 13-17.
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the jury, the more likely the jury is to arrive at the truth.398 Historians have
disputed the extent of Bentham's influence. Holdsworth attributed the passage
of Lord Denman's Act to the force of Bentham's reasoning.399 A more recent
study has traced the downfall of competency rules to the work of Bentham and
a handful of his disciples on both sides of the Atlantic.4° One of those
disciples, John Appleton of Maine, said plainly that he had "only endeavored
to apply the reasoning and principles of Bentham.' ' 0° Yet Barbara Shapiro
argues that Bentham squandered his influence in bitter attacks on the legal
profession and in his nihilistic vision of the rules of evidence and that he had
little impact on the course of law reform.402 And Christopher Allen says
flatly that Bentham "played little or no part" in bringing down competency
rules based on religious beliefs. 3 For all its vivid bombast, Bentham's
Rationale is long and impenetrable. Judging from the indifference shown it by
other major evidence scholars of the century,40 we perhaps can conclude that
Bentham's influence, although real, was less than it appears.
The second and third possible explanations for the downfall of competency
rules in civil cases rely less on the influence of a maverick thinker, but each
has other shortcomings. It would be attractive to think that competency rules
were a victim of the progressive "lawyerization" of the courtroom. John
Langbein's pathbreaking work has shown the increasing involvement of
prosecution and defense lawyers in English criminal courts in the eighteenth
century. 45 With lawyers, of course, came cross-examination, that greatest of
tools for the ascertainment of truth. Perhaps competency rules began to fall
398. Most of Bentham's treatment of the wrongfulness of excluding evidence from the jury may be
found in 4 id. at 477-514; and 5 id. at 1-59, 78-107, 125-45, 207-20, 350-415, 463-81.
399. See 9 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 43, at 193.
400. See Bodansky, supra note 392, at 94 (noting the influence of Lords Denman and Brougham in
Britain and Edward Livingston and John Appleton in the United States).
401. JOHN APPLETON, THE RULES OF EVIDENCE at iv (Philadelphia, T. & J.W. Johnson 1860).
402. See SHAPIRO, supra note 28, at 36. Rejecting another of Bentham's proposed reforms, Joseph
Story wrote in 1837, "'we have not yet become votaries to the notions of Jeremy Bentham."' MICHAEL
STEPHEN HINDUS, PRISON AND PLANTATION 189 (1980) (quoting Story).
403. See C.J.W. Allen, Bentham and the Abolition of Incompetency from Defect of Religious Principle,
16 LEGAL HIST. 172, 185 (1995). Seeking to explain why Bentham's influence on American political
thought "was so slight," Paul Palmer noted that "such of Bentham's writings as were known in this country
by about 1860 were not in themselves capable of arousing and sustaining widespread interest in utilitarian
doctrine." Palmer, supra note 395, at 855, 859.
404. Best's 1849 treatise, for example, professes a decided ambivalence toward Bentham's ideas.
Although Best admitted he made "[liarge use" of the Rationale, he immediately added that it "embodies
several essentially mistaken views relative to the nature of judicial evidence." Preface to BEST, supra note
112 (unpaginated). Best cited Bentham's disdain for the oath, see id. § 57, at *54, but approved the lesson
of history that the oath "has in every age been found to supply the strongest hold on the consciences of
men," id. § 55, at *51. Best did, however, largely follow Bentham's condemnation of witness competency
rules. See id. § 60, at *60-61. And Thayer credited Bentham with great influence. See James Bradley
Thayer, A Chapter of Legal History in Massachusetts, 9 HARV. L. REV. I, 1-2. 12 (1895-1896).
405. See Langbein, supra note 88, passim; cf Michael Jonathan Millender, The Transformation of the
American Criminal Trial, 1790-1875, at 36 (1996) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Princeton University)
(on file with author) ("In America, as in England, the pervasive use of lawyers in criminal trials was an
eighteenth-century phenomenon.").
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from favor as skilled cross-examination by counsel equipped juries to make
more searching evaluations of witness credibility. This argument, however,
must confront two disagreeable facts. First, competency rules dissolved more
quickly in the civil context-there was considerably more resistance to change
on the criminal side. Second, there is little reason to think that
cross-examination by lawyers was a new phenomenon on the civil side of
eighteenth-century courthouses.' So although advancing lawyerization may
supply part of the explanation for the new nineteenth-century disaffection with
competency rules, it is unlikely to supply the whole answer.
The last of the seemingly plausible causes of the rules' demise looks to
prevailing political philosophies in the society at large. The American
experience, examined alone, might support the hypothesis that the Jacksonian
triumph of the common citizen of the 1820s and 1830s forced an enlargement
of the jury's power in the 1840s and 1850s." Competency rules that
withheld from the jury the task of assessing certain witnesses' credibility
perhaps fell from political favor. But this explanation cannot account for the
downfall of competency rules in England-and at least in the civil context,
Parliament tended to be one step ahead of all but the most progressive
American states. As we will see shortly, although American states took the
lead in eliminating the incompetency of criminal defendants, the pattern of
state enactments gives no support to the Jacksonian hypothesis.
Where then will we find an explanation for the death of competency rules
in civil cases in the 1840s and 1850s? I will set out some thoughts in more
detail in Part V. For now, perhaps it is enough to suggest that the abolition of
civil competency rules in the nineteenth century simply may have been one
small event within a broad, long-term transformation of the nature of
factfinding in jury trials. That transformation embraced two countervailing
currents of change. On the one hand, the system increasingly lost confidence
in the power of the oath to assure the legitimacy of verdicts. On the other, the
system invested ever greater confidence in the jury's capacity to resolve factual
disputes. Given these trends, the contours and causes of which I will explore
later, it was perhaps inevitable that competency rules would meet their doom.
Competency rules were the product of an age that mistrusted the jury's power
406. See Langbein, supra note 286, at 1201 ("The presence of opposing counsel was a novelty in
criminal cases in the second half of the eighteenth century. but it was routine in civil cases.-) Tom Gallants
advises me that his ongoing work "suggests that the lawyerizatton of the criminal trial did have effects on
the conduct of civil litigation, as lawyers who began their careers in the rough-and-tumble arena of the Old
Bailey (e.g., William Garrow) began to develop civil practices." Letter from Thomas Gallants. Professor.
Ohio State University College of Law (Sept. 2. 1997).
407. Alexis de Tocqueville, an adroit observer of Jacksonian America. remarked that "itlihe system
of the jury, as it is understood in America, appears to me to be as direct and as extreme a consequence of
the sovereignty of the people as universal suffrage." ALEXIS DE ToCQUEVIL.E, DE.tOCRACY Ili AMERICA
362 (Henry Reeve trans., New York, The Century Co. 1898) (1835); see also MARVIN MEYERS. T I1E
JACKSONIAN PERSUASION: POLITICS AND BELIEF 24-41 (1957) (endorsing Tocqueville as "a key to
Jacksonian America").
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to spot the truth and trusted instead the truth-assuring powers of the oath. In
barring liars from access to the oath, the rules served to preserve the illusion
that the oath guaranteed truth. By the nineteenth century, the tension between
the broader historical trends and the anachronistic survival of the rules simply
had grown too great. Only a triggering event-perhaps Bentham's Rationale,
perhaps some other force not yet identified-was needed to bring the rules
crashing down.
B. The Downfall of the Prohibition Against Defendant Testimony in
Criminal Cases
Whatever may have triggered the downfall of competency rules in civil
cases, it had little impact on the competency rule that most concerns us in this
study of lie detection in criminal cases: the rule that barred criminal defendants
in both felony and misdemeanor cases from testifying under oath. In England,
that rule did not come down in all cases until 1898,408 forty-seven years after
civil parties gained the right to give evidence. In America the gap between the
first state to let civil parties testify (Connecticut in 1848) 409 and the first to
let all criminal defendants testify (Maine in 1864)410 was smaller but still
clear. Bringing about the downfall of the defendant testimony bar required a
different triggering event-one more momentous than Bentham's writing and,
as we will see, more peculiarly American.
The rule prohibiting defendant testimony stood in tension with the broad
historical trends away from reliance on the powers of the oath and toward
greater jury autonomy in factfinding. There are two fairly obvious explanations
for the rule's staying power in the face of this historical transformation. First,
the old competency rules had served to keep likely liars from the witness
stand-and the most likely liars of all were criminal defendants, who had by
far the strongest motivation to lie. Hence Justice North, at Stephen Colledge's
1681 treason trial, made it clear that what Colledge said held no weight: "Why
if yours or any other man's word in your case should go for truth, no man that
stands at a bar, could be convicted: For every man will say he is an honest
man . .. ."" When late-nineteenth-century legislators considered the
408. See An Act To Amend the Law of Evidence, 61 & 62 Vict., ch. 36 (1898).
409. See infra Table 2.
410. See infra Table 1.
411. Trial of Stephen Colledge, 8 Howell's State Trials 549, 681 (1681). Lest Colledge had missed
the point, North said it two more times. See id. at 625 ("[N]othing you say is to be believed upon your own
allegation: for then no man would ever be guilty, if his own purgation by words were to be believed.");
id. at 681 ("1 must tell you, all the course of justice were destroyed, and no justice against malefactors were
to be had if the word of him that is accused should pass for proof to acquit him."). North instructed the
jury in similar terms:
[Y]ou are not to consider any thing of the facts the prisoner speaks of, that are not proved. .
for common justice is concerned in it, and no justice can be done at that rate, if the prisoner's
own affirmations or purgation should be taken. No man ever can be accused but he will be
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abolition of the defendant testimony rule, even moderate observers predicted
"perjury on every occasion,"'4 12 a "fearful and overpowering temptation to
perjury," '413  a "habitual spectacle of this wholesale perjury,"' 4  "perjury
upon a gigantic scale."
'' 15
Second, the task of resolving a conflict of oaths promised to be far more
difficult in criminal than in civil cases. Once civil parties were permitted to
testify, it was inevitable that civil juries would face conflicting oaths. A
Massachusetts lawyer observed in 1861 that such conflicts put great demands
on the jury's power to detect lies:
[A]s an eminent Massachusetts judge lately remarked in a charge to
a jury, the admission of parties imposes new and grave trusts upon
jurymen, and makes their position more difficult and responsible than
before. They are now called upon to decide between conflicting
testimony which is equally of the highest class, and to determine
between statements often totally irreconcilable,-either of which, if
uncontradicted, would be decisive of the point at issue; and this, we
hardly need say, requires the exercise of more than average judicial
faculties.416
ready to say he is innocent .... And therefore these things must not skeigh %%ith you further
than as was said, argues upon the proofs you have had
Id. at 712. Justice Jones concurred. See id. at 681 ("Would you hac the jut) to belese you upon your
word?").
412. JAMES FITZAMES STEPHEN. A GENERAL VIEW 01; THl CRIMINAL LA% Oi E,ttiA\ 202
(London and Cambridge, MacMilan 1863). quoted in Alschuler. supra note 71. at 2662 Stephen later
reversed himself and supported defendant testimony laws See I ST' tPHt1,. supra note 28. at 442. 444.45
413. Seth Ames, Testinnony of Persons Accused of Crone. I AM L RE\ 443. 446 (18671 Ames. a
justice of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court. predicted "'such an accumulation of false and %orthle.-s
testimony in the criminal courts" that jurors "will habitually disbehese all testimony coming Irom any
defendants." Id. at 450.
414. Bodansky, supra note 392, at 109 n.74 (quoting Parliatienitary debates)
415. Id. at 110 (quoting Parliamentary debates) A great many commentators made similar points See.
e.g., id. at 108-10 (quoting various British commentators) Departures front rie Comimon La% Rule as to
Testimony by Husband and lWife, 3 CRIM. L. MAG. 155. 162 (1882). Robert Popper. Hstorv Lind
Development of the Accused's Right To Testi.S, 1962 WASH U L Q 454. 459 n 29 (quoting BIstOtP.
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 1187, at 705-06 (1880)). After more than a centur) of experience s% ath defendant
testimony, at least one commentator would conclude that these early doomsayers src right See H Richard
Uviller, Credence, Character. and the Rules of Evidence Seeing Through the Liar's Tale. 42 DL KE Li
776, 813 (1993) ("All guilty defendants who choose to testify will lie on the stand about anything that
might improve their chances and about which they imagine the) can be persuasise "'*
416. [George S. Hillard]. Review of John Appleton. The Rules of E\idence Stated and Discussed. 92
N. AM. L. REv. 515, 524 (1861). Forsyth argued similarly:
The late change in the law, whereby parties in an action are made admissible %%itnessc-
for themselves, has. I think, increased the importance as %%ell as the difficulty of the office of
the jury.
I am by no means disposed to deny that the admission of parties to gie eidence in a
cause in their own behalf will facilitate the ends of justice. by promoting the discoscry of truth.
but without doubt the temptation to perjury is thereby increased, and the task of the jur, %%ill
be often rendered more difficult and delicate . All this %%ill impose upon the jury the task
of deciding more frequently than heretofore betveen opposite and conflicting statements, and
require more than usual caution and intelligence on their part
FORSYTH, supra note 48, at 380-82.
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But as great as these new demands on the lie-detecting powers of civil juries
may have been, they did not approach in difficulty the task that lay ahead for
criminal juries if defendants won the right to take the oath. Because the civil
standard of proof was a mere preponderance of the evidence, civil juries often
could resolve credibility conflicts by deciding merely which witness was the
more truthful.
The criminal standard of proof raised greater difficulties. If a defendant
were permitted to proclaim his innocence under oath, the jury could not
convict without first determining that the defendant's story was a lie beyond
a reasonable doubt.41 7 It is true that ever since the Treason Act of 1696,418
juries occasionally had faced conflicts of oaths in serious criminal cases. In the
absence of the defendant's testimony, however, direct conflicts must have been
rare. Earlier, I reported findings that in trials at the Old Bailey in the
eighteenth century fewer than 20% of cases involved sworn defense witnesses
who testified to factual matters (as opposed to the defendant's character).
41 9
Kalven and Zeisel found in the 1950s that when the defendant did not take the
stand, only 5% of criminal cases presented the possibility of conflicting
eyewitness testimony.420 There is no reason to think things were different in
this regard in the nineteenth century. Moreover, when conflicts did occur in the
years before defendants took the stand, Bethel's rule might have served to
spare the jury the task of deciding which witness had lied. But Bethel's rule
could not erase the direct conflict between a crime victim's sworn accusation
and a defendant's sworn denial.
In any event, there was little sign in the early nineteenth century that the
legal system was ready to put criminal juries to the task of resolving sworn
credibility conflicts. The clearest indication that the system was not ready to
do so was the stubborn defense by most commentators of the two-witness rule
in perjury.42' Starkie's treatment of the problem highlights the threat that
417. Barbara Shapiro has argued that the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard of proof in criminal
cases was an innovation of the late 18th century and was not commonly applied until the 19th century. See
SHAPIRO, supra note 28, at 21-25; Shapiro, supra note 118, at 170-75. By the time of Starkie's 1824
treatise, the modem distinction between the criminal and civil standards of proof was well-recognized. See
I STARKIE, supra note 233, § LII, at *450-51.
418. 7 & 8 Will. 3, ch. 3; see supra Section II.C.
419. See supra note 345 and accompanying text.
420. See KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 15, at 139.
421. See, e.g., I MORGAN, supra note 227, at 29 ("[O]ne witness is not allowed to convict a man
indicted for perjury, because then there is only one oath against another."); PEAKE, supra note 112, at 9
("inhere would be oath against oath, and both being equally entitled to credit the jury could not conclude
that the defendant had sworn false."); PHILLIPPS, supra note 112. at 107 ("[T]he evidence of one witness
is not sufficient ... because then there would only be one oath against another."). I speak somewhat
loosely of the "two-witness rule" in perjury. Many commentators noted that one witness plus some form
of corroboration would be sufficient to defeat the defendant's oath. See I GREENLEAF, supra note 385, §
257, at 293-95; PHILLIPPS, supra note 112, at 108.
Not all commentators agreed that a conflict of oaths in a perjury case must inevitably produce
stalemate. Best wrote that "[a]ll oaths are not of equal value; for the credibility of the statement of a
witness depends quite as much on his deportment and the probability of his story as on the fact of its being
deposed on oath." BEST, supra note 112, § 397, at *435. Evans insisted that the factfinder must consider
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sworn defendant testimony must have posed in the eyes of contemporaries. In
two successive passages of his treatise, Starkie made the following two points.
First, he rejected Montesquieu's defense of the Continental rule requiring two
witnesses in every case:
It has been alleged that two witnesses are essential to convict a
man of a crime, for if there be but one, it is no more than the
assertion of one man against that of another.
It is not easy to comprehend how the mere denial of guilt, by an
accused person, whose life may depend upon the credit attached to
that denial, is to be placed in competition with the testimony of a
witness examined upon oath. According to this species of logic, if six
men were to commit a crime, it would require the testimony of at
least seven witnesses to convict them upon their joint trial.-
Then, in a footnote to this text, Starkie defended the two-witness rule in
perjury prosecutions "upon grounds of strict principle, for there the oath of one
witness is opposed to the oath of another witness.' "2 3
On one page Starkie said it would be absurd to require two witnesses to
rebut the defendant's unsworn statement. On the next page he held it a matter
of "strict principle" to require two witnesses to rebut the defendant's oath. The
difference, of course, was the sheer formalistic power of the oath. To grant this
power to the defendant in every case would, one may presume, have produced
Starkie's Continental nightmare: Whenever six defendants swore to their
innocence, the government would have to present seven witnesses to convict
them.
Whether for these reasons or for others, the triggering event that brought
down competency rules in civil cases left the defendant testimony rule
standing. In England, as I said, the defendant testimony rule did not fall until
1898.424 Not until 1864 did Maine become the first common law jurisdiction
to permit defendants to testify under oath at serious criminal trials.42 But
who had the stronger "motives for falsehood"--the defendant when he gase his oath, or the person who
made the accusation of perjury. See Evans, supra note 23 1. at 280.
422. 1 STARKIE, supra note 233, § LVIII. at *464 (footnotes omitted).
423. Id. at *464-65 n.q; see also id. § XIX. at 1399 ("So in the case of perury tuo witnesses are
essential, for otherwise there would be nothing more than the oath of one man against that of another, upon
which the Jury could not safely convict." (footnote omitted)).
424. See supra text accompanying note 408.
425. There was one brief exception: In 1848, as part of the same law that made civil parties
competent, Connecticut granted competency to criminal defendants. See An Act for the Regulation of Civil
Actions (adopted 1848) (codified at CONN. REv. STAT. tit. I. ch. X. § 141 (1849)). The legislature withdrew
the grant in 1849, however, apparently by a unanimous vote. Even in 1867. when the Connecticut
legislature debated the bill that eventually extended competency to defendants permanently, legislators
remembered the 1848 Act as a terrible mistake. See Accused Parties Testfvng for Themselves. HARTFORD
DAILY TMFs, June 28, 1867, at 2 (reporting the remarks in a House debate of Mr. Graves. who said that
the defendant testimony law "was passed in 1848. and tt worked so disastrously, that in 1849. after a single
year's trial, there came up such a voice for its repeal, that the Legislature unanimously repealed it")
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after Maine acted, a rapid rush of states followed: By 1870, twelve states had
passed legislation to permit defendants to testify under oath; by the end of
1880, all but seventeen states and territories had done so.
426
One might argue that we need not look very hard to find the force that
triggered this American stampede to permit defendant testimony. An obvious
explanation is at hand in the work of John Appleton, a self-avowed acolyte of
Bentham and long-time advocate of laws permitting defendant testimony.
427
In 1864, as chief justice of the Maine Supreme Judicial Court, Appleton had
the clout he needed to bring about a change he had sought for some thirty
years. To explain why so many states where Appleton held no particular
influence followed so quickly along, one could argue that Appleton and Maine
merely led the way toward an idea whose time clearly had come.
But this appealingly simple explanation confronts several stubbornly
incompatible pieces of evidence. The first is that the legal commentary of the
day gives no hint that the time in fact had come for this particular idea.
Appleton began advocating an end to the ban on defendant testimony in
1835.428 In the thirty years that passed before the Maine legislature answered
his plea, only one other American commentator stepped forward in support:
Irving Browne,429 editor of the Albany Law Journal, who seemed unaware
of Appleton's work.43' Legal commentators were not, it is true, lined up
against Appleton-rather, the issue of defendant testimony attracted almost no
In 1859, Maine granted criminal defendants the right to testify in certain misdemeanor cases. See infra
note 506 and accompanying text.
426. See Ferguson v. Georgia, 365 U.S. 570, 577 n.6 (1961) (listing the dates when states permitted
criminal defendants to testify); see also infra Table 1.
427. See John Appleton, The Admission of the Accomplice and of the Party to the Record in Criminal
Procedure, 14 AM. JURIST & L. MAG. 317 (1835); John Appleton, Admission of Parties in Criminal
Procedure, 13 AM. JURIST & L. MAG. 50 (1835).
428. See sources cited supra note 427.
429. Even Browne did not explicitly advocate that criminal defendants be permitted to testify until
1866, two years after passage of Maine's law. See B., Testimony of Parties in Criminal Prosecutions, 14
AM. L. REG. (U. PA. L. REV.) 129 (1866) [hereinafter B., Testimony of Parties]; cf. DAVID M. GOLD, TII
SHAPING OF NINETEENTH-CENTURY LAW: JOHN APPLETON AND RESPONSIBLE INDIVIDUALISM 187 n. It
(1990) (identifying "B." as Browne). But in an 1857 article, Browne lent general support to the principles
Appleton advocated and hinted that criminal defendants, like civil parties, should have the right to testify.
See B., Of the Disqualification of Parties as Witnesses, 5 AM. L. REG. (U. PA. L. REv.) 257, 267-68 (1857)
[hereinafter B., Of the Disqualification] (looking forward to the time "when all men, in the possession of
their reasoning faculties, understanding the nature and believing in the sanction of an oath, shall be
permitted to speak that which they do know").
Reviewing Appleton's treatise on evidence in 1861, Massachusetts lawyer George S. Hillard made
clear his support for the abolition of the exclusion of civil parties, but left it unclear whether he also
approved of Appleton's advocacy against the exclusion of criminal defendants. See Hillard, supra note 416,
at 522-24.
430. Browne wrote that Bentham was the only opponent to the rule barring civil parties, see B., Of
the Disqualification, supra note 429, at 258, although Appleton had long advocated the downfall of that
rule as well, see John Appleton, Admission of Parties in Courts of Equity, 10 AM. JURIST & L. MAO. 5
(1833); John Appleton, Incompetency of Parties as Witnesses at Common Law, 8 AM. JURIST & L. MAG.
5 (1832). In a later work, Browne acknowledged and praised Appleton's arguments. See B., Testimony of
Parties, supra note 429, at 138-39.
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legal commentary at all.43' In 1867, after Maine and several other states had
passed laws permitting defendant testimony, Seth Ames, a justice of the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, complained that the new law in that
state had passed with "very little discussion and with no great amount of
inquiry., 432 The law cannot, Ames said, "be said to have been called for by
any generally acknowledged necessity, or to be intended for the purpose of
reforming any practical abuse or defect that had been a matter of general
complaint."433 It was "not called for by the profession, not petitioned for by
anybody., '434 And following New York's passage of a similar law in 1869,
that state's highest court remarked that "[tihe act is not regarded with much
favor by the bench, bar or the people."
4
-"
A second reason to doubt the theory that Appleton inspired the demise of
the rule against defendant testimony is the unlikelihood that Appleton could
have inspired any legal transformation at all. His articles on evidence from the
1820s and 1830s, which spun out Bentham's ideas and advocated an end to
most competency rules, seem to have sparked no intellectual discussion. The
1860 "treatise" that gathered together those essays almost without modification
seems to have prompted only one critical notice.' " Lacking Bentham's
originality and sheer brilliance, the treatise matched Bentham's verbosity and
capacity for repetition. Yet some scholars seeking to explain the course of
events have magnified Appleton's persuasive powers. 4" One remarked on
Appleton's "fluency 4 38 and then reprinted this example of his prose:
"Innocence of the accused, then, being a presumption of law-the
accusation in the outset being prestuned untrue, the accuser's
statements false, whether intentionally so or not is immaterial-the
question would naturally arise, whether both, and if not both, which
of the two, should be heard as a witness. "t4 9
By far the most substantial reason to doubt the Appletonian theory is that
theory's inability to explain the very striking split between North and South
431. I have found nothing in American legal literature beyond Appleton's %ork specifically addressing
the testimony of defendants in criminal cases before 1866. other than an 1858 repnnting of an English law
journal article. See Evidence of Parties in Criminal Questions. 21 MXof\TtLY L. REP 193 t1858) (reprinting
an article from London Law Magazine and Law Review).
432. Ames, supra note 413, at 443.
433. Id.
434. Id. at 450; see also Millender, supra note 405, at 355 ("The arguments of the reformers, their
judicial defenders, and their earliest admirers ... fail to show why legislatures adopted the reform with
such alacrity despite the absence of complaints by judges. prosecutors, or defense law yers in the preceding
decades.").
435. Connors v. People, 50 N.Y. 240, 243 (1872).
436. See Hillard, supra note 416.
437. See, e.g., Millender, supra note 405, at 277 (-Owing in no small part to Appleton's influence,
competency rules ... fell in a wave of legislative reform that began in the 1840s ")
438. Popper, supra note 415, at 454.
439. Id. at 461 (quoting APPLErON. supra note 401, at 123).
19971
The Yale Law Journal [Vol. 107: 575
in the pattern of states that acted to let criminal defendants testify. In the
1860s, a dozen states took that step, all of them by legislation:
TABLE 1. STATUTES PERM11IING SWORN TESTIMONY
BY CRIMINAL DEFENDANTS4 0
With the striking exception of South Carolina, not a single Southern or border
state falls in this list. If we look another decade down the road, the pattern
becomes even more pronounced. By the end of 1880, all but seventeen states
and territories had passed defendant testimony laws, and of the outliers, all but
four were ex-Confederate or border states.44' Not a single additional member
of the old Confederacy had followed the trend."2
440. The information listed here comes from Ferguson v. Georgia, 365 U.S. 570, 577 n.6 (1961).
441. The four exceptions were Alaska, Michigan, Oklahoma, and Pennsylvania. Alaska, Michigan, and
Oklahoma passed defendant testimony laws in 1899, 1881, and 1890, respectively. See id. at 577 n.6. In
Pennsylvania, accused misdemeanants had been made competent in 1872. See An Act To Extend the
Competency of Persons To Be Witnesses in Certain Criminal Cases, 1872 Pa. Laws 34. Over the next
several years, the legislature progressively broadened the privilege. See An Act Supplementary to an Act,
Entitled "An Act To Extend the Competency of Persons To Be Witnesses in Certain Criminal Cases," 1874
Pa. Laws 294; An Act To Permit Defendants To Testify in Criminal Cases, 1877 Pa. Laws 45 (generally
granting defendants the right to testify but withholding it in certain cases); An Act To Permit Persons
Charged with the Crime of Receiving or Buying Stolen Goods or Chattels, Knowing the Same to Have
Been Stolen, to Testify in Their Own Behalf, No. 158, 1879 Pa. Laws 149; An Act To Permit Defendants
To Testify in All Criminal Cases, 1885 Pa. Laws 23 (removing all restrictions on defendant testimony).
442. In 1870, Florida gave criminal defendants "the right of making a statement to the jury. under
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This striking geographical tilt prompts an obvious question: Was there
something peculiar about North and South that led one of these regions but not
the other to open the way to sworn testimony by criminal defendants? In
seeking to unwind this mystery, we should begin by asking whether the same
North-South bias prevailed in the earlier movement to permit civil parties to
testify. A quick glance at a sample of thirty-two states suggests that, although
the time lag between North and South in this case was somewhat shorter, the
bias was just as pronounced:
TABLE 2. STATUTES PERMITTING TESTIMONY BY CIVIL PARTIESU
3
STATE DATE STATE DATE
Connecticut 1848 Florida 1866
Vermont 1852 Virginia 1866
Ohio 1853 North Carolina 1866
Maine 1856 South Carolina 1866
Rhode Island 1857 Georgia 1866
Mississippi 1857 Missouri 1866
New York 1857 Alabama 1867
Massachusetts 1857 Illinois 1867
New Hampshire 1857 Louisiana 1867
Kansas 1858 West Virginia 1868
New Jersey 1859 Tennessee 1868
Michigan 1861 Pennsylvania 1869
Indiana 1861 Texas 1871
Oregon 1862 Kentucky 1872
California 1863 Arkansas 1874
Maryland 1864 Delaware 1881
was not to be examined or cross-examined or to be deemed a witness. See Hawkins v. State, 29 Fla. 554.
556-57 (1892). An 1866 Florida law had granted a similar right "when in the opinion of the court the ends
of justice shall so require." An Act Concerning Testimony. ch. 1472. 1865 Fla. Laws 35 (adopted Jan. 16.
1866). Not until 1895 did the accused win the right to be "sworn as a witness" and to be "subject to
examination as other witnesses." An Act To Amend Section 2908 of Revised Statutes of Florida Relating
to Sworn Statement of Accused, ch. 4400. 1895 Fla. Laws 162.
443. For citations to the relevant statutory provisions, see infra Appendix A.
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Among the sixteen states listed in the left-hand column, which lifted their bar
against the testimony of civil parties rather early, the only Confederate state
is Mississippi, and the only border state is Maryland. The sixteen states listed
in the right-hand column, which followed along somewhat later, include the
remaining ten Confederate states and the remaining four border
states-Missouri, West Virginia, Kentucky, and Delaware.
Legal historians have noted this unmistakable North-South split,44 but
only Wigmore attempted an explanation. He argued that competency rules
were the product of an older, more emotional culture, in which the "belief that
a partisan would likely falsify, or at least distort unconsciously the truth, was
then much closer than now to the facts of life."445 Although the "influence
of scientific research and of industrial invention and organization [have] made
for a more rational and less emotional life," he wrote, "we may see with our
own eyes that [in the South] the emotional element ... [still]
predominates." 446 It is hard to know what to make of this explanation.
Wigmore offered no evidence beyond his own impressions that the South was
more emotional and less rational than the North, nor did he clarify the
connection between emotionalism and witness competency rules.
In any event, it is exceedingly unlikely that an explanation based on
general reformist tendencies in the North versus the South will avail in this
case. That is because the pattern of change on another question touching the
conduct of jury trials showed a strong South-first bias very much unlike the
pattern of defendant testimony laws. In 1795, North Carolina became the first
state to forbid trial judges to comment on the weight of the evidence when
charging a jury; Tennessee acted next in 1796, then Alabama (1807),
Mississippi (1807), Maryland (1811), and Arkansas (1836)."4 By 1864,
every member of the Confederacy had barred judicial comment, as had three
border states and twelve states of the Midwest or West.4 8 But in the entire
Northeast, only Massachusetts had followed the trend.449  If, then,
generalizations about North and South will not explain the patterns that now
444. See, e.g., 2 WIGMORE, supra note 44, § 579, at 701-02; Bodansky, supra note 392, at 93 n.8.
445. 2 WIGMORE, supra note 44, § 576, at 690.
446. Id. at 691.
447. See Kenneth A. Krasity, The Role of the Judge in Jury Trials: The Elimination of Judicial
Evaluation of Fact in American State Courts from 1795 to 1913, 62 U. Dar. MERCY L. REv. 595, 622-27
(1985); Edson R. Sunderland, The Inefficiency of the American Jury, 13 MICH. L. REV. 302, 307 (1914).
448. See Krasity, supra note 447, at 622-27. Laws baring judges from commenting on the evidence
were not, I think, closely related in any causal way to the fall of the bar against testimony by civil parties
or criminal defendants. These changes, although interestingly correlated in a negative way, occupied two
largely separate historical eras. As each of the changes tended to put greater factfinding autonomy in the
hands of jurors, it would take some effort and ingenuity to provide a unified theory that could explain a
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concern us, we must look elsewhere. If we are to find the reason the South
came late in dropping the bar against civil parties and the North came early in
allowing testimony by criminal defendants, we must seek out an explanation
peculiar to that time and place and in all likelihood linked to the conflict that
then raged.
C. The Link to African Americans' Right To Testify: Civil Parties
We should begin by examining those laws that abolished the old bar
against civil parties, as this was the earlier movement. The most striking thing
about Table 2, which dates the enactment of those laws, is not the pattern of
states in the left-hand column. It should not much surprise us that the first
American state to abolish the old competency rule did so in 1848. As I noted
earlier, England had begun to dismantle its bar against civil parties with the
County Courts Bill of 1846 and completed the process with Lord Brougham's
Act of 185 1.450 That Connecticut and Vermont should have been the first to
act also seems unremarkable. Whether these two New England states were
responding to the English lead, or whether they and England were responding
to the same sorts of impulses that brought down most civil competency rules
in this era (a process I explored above) need not concern us now.
What is striking about Table 2 is the pattern in the right-hand column. The
general reticence of the Southern states to permit civil parties to testify ended
suddenly in 1866. I believe that both the initial reticence and the later sudden
conversion of the Southern states trace to their old attachment to a wholly
different and seemingly unconnected competency rule-that barring testimony
by nonwhite persons. The following table, which lists all those states that at
one time had racial exclusion laws, 5 ' explores the relationship between the
abolition of those laws452 and the end of competency rules barring civil
parties. Note that not all states with racial exclusion laws were Southern:
450. See supra notes 388-389 and accompanying text.
451. Racial exclusion laws took different forms. Some barred testimony by all nonu hites. some only
testimony by African Americans and those of mixed black-white blood. Some barred all testimony by the
specified class, while some permitted such testimony when not offered against whites
Louisiana did not have a racial exclusion law per se. but rather proided that nonwhite status could
be used to impeach a witness. See LA. CIV. CODE. ANN. art. 2261 (1857) ("Thc cireumstances of the
witness being ... a free colored person, is not a sufficient cause to consider the witness as incompetent.
but may, according to the circumstances, diminish the extent of his credibility.") An act of March 13. 1867.
at once eliminated this provision of Louisiana's code and made civil parties competent, with the same
proviso that status as a party "may diminish the extent of [the witness's) credibility." An Act To Amend
and Re-Enact Article Twenty-Two Hundred and Sixty-One of the Civil Code of the State of Louisiana. No.
70, § 1, 1867 La. Acts 141, 143.
452. Just as racial exclusion laws took many forms, so did the laws that repealed those exclusions. As
I will discuss below, see infra notes 517-525 and accompanying text. many such repeals were incomplete
California's 1863 repeal was particularly incomplete, granting African Americans the nght to testify while
retaining the bar against other nonwhites. See Act of Mar. 16. 1863. ch. LXVIII. 1863 Cal. Stat. 60. 60.
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TABLE 3. ABOLITION OF RULES AGAINST TESTIMONY
BY NONWHITES AND CIVIL PARTIES
STATE RACIAL EXCLUSION CIVIL PARTIES ALLOWED4
ABOLISHED453
Kansas Feb. 12, 1858 Same
Kentucky Jan. 30, 1872 Same
Louisiana455  Mar. 13, 1867 Same
Oregon Oct. 11, 1862 Same
North Carolina Mar. 10, 1866 Two Days Later
South Carolina Sept. 21, 1866 Two Days Earlier
Virginia Feb. 28, 1866 Two Days Later
California Mar. 16, 1863 Six Weeks Later
Florida Oct. 25, 1865 Three Months Later
Alabama Dec. 9, 1865 Feb. 14, 1867
Arkansas Feb. 6, 1867 1874
Delaware Not Found 4-1 Apr. 6, 1881
Georgia Dec. 15, 1865 Dec. 15, 1866
Illinois Feb. 7, 1865 Feb. 19, 1867
Missouri July 4, 1865 Mar. 20, 1866
Ohio Feb. 10, 1849 Mar. 11, 1853
Tennessee Jan. 25, 1866 Mar. 13, 1868
Texas Oct. 8, 1866 May 19, 1871
West Virginia Feb. 27, 1866 Feb. 7, 1868
Indiana Dec. 20, 1865 Mar. 17, 1861
Maryland July 2, 1866 Mar. 2, 1864
Mississippi Nov. 25, 1865 1857
I have arranged the states in this order for a reason. The first group of states,
which make up almost half the total, abolished their racial exclusion law and
453. For citations to the relevant statutory provisions, see infra Appendix B.
454. See supra Table 2.
455. As noted above, Louisiana did not have a racial exclusion law per se, but rather provided that
nonwhite status could be used to impeach a witness. See supra note 451.
456. I have been unable to locate a statute repealing Delaware's racial exclusion law. It seems safe,
however, to include Delaware among those states that repealed their bar against civil parties only after they
had begun to permit nonwhites to testify. Nonwhites surely must have been testifying in Delaware by 1881.
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their civil parties bar at or near the same moment. In the second group, the
racial exclusion law came down first, with the civil parties bar following
during the next several years. In only three of these twenty-two states did the
civil parties bar fall first.
By focusing on the three anomalous states-Indiana, Maryland, and
Mississippi-we can perhaps discover why states that had racial exclusion laws
generally clung to their civil parties bar. Each of these three states dropped its
civil parties bar even while excluding nonwhites from the witness stand. In
doing so, they had to address this question: What happens when a party is not
white? Indiana's 1861 statute resolved this difficulty in an unexpected way:
Every free white person of competent age shall be a competent
witness in any civil cause or proceeding, and no person shall be
disqualified as a witness ... because such person is a party in said
action or proceeding.
... Provided, That where a negro, Indian, or person excluded on
account of mixed blood is a party to a cause, his opponent shall also
be excluded .. .
The state of Indiana apparently was willing to take inequality only so far.
Although it chose to prevent nonwhites from testifying, it scrupled to pit a
nonwhite litigant who could not speak at trial against a white adversary who
could.458 Hence if one party was not white, then neither party could
testify.459 The laws of Maryland and Mississippi did not similarly trouble
themselves to assure a fair fight. Each state made civil parties competent and,
within the same statute, made it clear that the state's racial exclusion law
would remain dominant.46° Therefore nonwhites, even when parties, would
be incompetent to testify, while their white opponents could testify against
them.
As for the other nineteen states in Table 3, I suggest that they maintained
the old bar against civil parties because their lawmakers saw no good way to
reconcile testimony by parties with their racial exclusion laws. That is, they
rejected both the Maryland-Mississippi solution and the Indiana solution. Even
457. An Act in Relation to Witnesses and To Repeal Section 238 of Article 13 of the Act. ch. XXVII.
§ 2, 1861 Ind. Acts 51, 52.
458. The Indiana legislature considered but rejected a proposal to permit testimony by nonwhites in
the same session in which it made civil parties competent. See 8 BREVIER LEG. REP. 328 (Ind.) (Drapicr
& Drapier) (1861); House of Representatives, INDIANAPOUS J.. Mar. 4. 1861. at 2. The proponent argued
that "parties dealing together, should be placed on equality as to the evidence of such transactions - Id.
(remarks of Mr. Bundy).
459. A New Jersey statute of the same era expressed a similar pnnciple more generally. See A
Supplement to the Act Entitled "An Act Concerning Witnesses." 1859 NJ. Laws 489-90 (providing that
no party may "be swom in any case when the opposite party is prohibited by any legal disability from
being sworn as a witness").
460. See Act of Mar. 2, 1864, ch. 109, § 1.1, 1864 Md. Laws 136. 136-37. An Act To Establish
Circuit Courts, To Define Their Jurisdictions. and To Regulate the Practice Therein (adopted 1857)
(codified at Miss. REv. CODE ch. LXI, § 17, arts. 190-93 (1857)).
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in an otherwise unfair world, lawmakers may have recoiled from the spectacle
of permitting a white party to testify against a black opponent who could not
speak-the Maryland-Mississippi solution. As for the Indiana solution, they
may have seen a different problem: Under that state's law, white parties had
the right to testify unless their opponent happened to be nonwhite. Perhaps the
image of a world in which white parties could testify against white adversaries
but must sit silently when facing black adversaries was too discordant for
Southern tastes.
Unfortunately, I have found no contemporary commentary bearing on these
issues. Still, the circumstantial case points strongly toward this conclusion: In
those states that maintained racial exclusion laws, legislators chose to avoid an
awkward clash between those laws and rules permitting testimony by civil
parties simply by resisting the latter as long as they retained the former. Once
those states abolished their racial exclusion laws in the wake of the Northern
victory, there was no longer reason to resist the transatlantic trend toward
testimony by civil parties. In fact, once those states abolished their racial
exclusion laws, they had an affirmative reason to permit civil parties to
testify-and to do so quickly. This may explain the legislative actions of the
first group of states in Table 3. We will return to that twist' in the story in the
next section, for it helps to explain why South Carolina was the only Southern
state to permit criminal defendants to testify in the 1860s.
D. The Link to African Americans' Right To Testify: Criminal Defendants
The question we have just addressed is why the South lagged behind the
North in abolishing the old bar against testimony by civil parties. In a sense,
by using England as the standard for when this change "should" have
happened, we can ask why the North was "on time" while the South was
"late." But when we turn to those state laws that, beginning in 1864, gave
criminal defendants the right to testify, we must ask why the North was
"early"-for the English did not make this change until 1898.461 Again, I
suggest we might find the answer in the racial exclusion laws of the South.
The earliest hint that the South's refusal to let nonwhites testify might
have something to do with the North's seemingly disconnected decision to let
criminal defendants testify appears in the appendix to John Appleton's 1860
Treatise on the Law of Evidence.4 62 Appleton had, as I have said,463 merely
gathered together in this treatise essays he had published separately many years
earlier. To these, he now added a largely unrelated appendix on the exclusion
of nonwhite witnesses, which he condemned as "disastrous" and
461. See supra note 408 and accompanying text.
462. APPLETON, supra note 401.
463. See supra text accompanying note 436.
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"enormous."'' 4 It is revealing that the arguments Appleton mounted against
racial exclusion laws sounded much like the arguments he made over and over
again in the body of the treatise attacking, in succession, all of the old
competency rules: As civilization progresses, "It is seen that the credit of
witnesses can be more satisfactorily determined after than before a hearing. All
are received as witnesses, and the various corroborating and discrediting
circumstances are weighed and considered.""46 So intent was Appleton to
stake his opposition to racial competency rules on general principles that he
made it a point to preface his argument with the concession that the
rightfulness of slavery "may ... be fully admitted."6'
The inability of African Americans to testify in Southern law courts would
shortly become one of the preeminent political issues of the day. Only the
questions of black suffrage and of slavery itself generated more tension
between North and South during the closing years of the Civil War and the
first several years of the Reconstruction era. The strategy at which Appleton
hinted in his appendix-to attack racial competency rules on the same terms
as all other competency rules-soon found favor in the North. It is unclear
why Northerners shunned the more obvious strategy of attacking the Southern
racial exclusions as racist. Perhaps Northern politicians feared offending those
border and Northern states that still maintained such laws. Or perhaps
Northerners had their own doubts, founded in their own well-documented
racism,467 about whether nonwhite witnesses were fully as credible as whites.
In any event, they argued that, like all other once-disfavored classes of
witnesses (interested persons, felons, atheists), nonwhites should be permitted
to testify, and juries should be permitted to assess their credibility one by one.
But that argument pointed North as well as South. By staking the case
against racial exclusion laws on general principles, Northerners exposed
themselves to the countercharge of hypocrisy should they be caught harboring
any of the old competency rules. The North proved to be intensely sensitive
to the charge of hypocrisy, whether made by Southern forces or, as was often
the case, from within its own ranks.46 It chose to abandon the last of its old
464. APPLETON, supra note 401, at 27.
465. Id. at 272.
466. Id. at 271.
467. See JAMES D. BILOTTA, RACE AND THE RISE OF THE REPUBLICAN PARTY. 18-8-1865, at 447.63
(1992); GEORGE M. FREDRICKSON, THE ARROGANCE OF RACE. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES 0% SLvERY.
RACISM, AND SOCIAL INEQUALITY 44-46 (1988). In the Indiana legislature in 1865. both opponents and
proponents of a bill to abolish that state's racial exclusion law put in frank terms their belief in black
inferiority. See 8 BREVIER LEG. REP. (Ind.) (Dapier & Drapier) 148-49. 282-84 (1866)
468. In the first years after the Civil War, for example. some Southern sshites justified their states'
new, restrictive labor legislation by pointing out that the Union army and Freedmen'! Bureau had similar
labor regulations and that Northern vagrancy laws sometimes had similar impact. Southern v.hites noted.
too, that Northern blacks often could not serve on juries. join militias, or attend public schools See ERIC
FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA'S UNFINISHED REvOLLTrION 1863-1877. at 208 (1988) Dunng wartime
congressional debates, there was of course no one to speak for the deep South Senators and
Representatives from border and Northern states, however, often noted their colleagues' hypocntical
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competency rules rather than to bear the risk of that accusation. In the pages
ahead, as I trace the course of the Northern attack on Southern racial exclusion
rules, I will pay particular attention to this dynamic of charge and
countercharge. The North-South battle over the issue of black testimony laws
was waged in three major campaigns: in 1862, 1864, and 1866. We will see
that the countercharge of hypocrisy was made at almost the earliest
opportunity.
1. The Campaign of 1862
When Senator Charles Sumner of Massachusetts first took up the fight
against Southern black testimony laws in 1862, he lacked modem
constitutional weaponry. Congress as yet had no power to outlaw race-based
evidence rules in state courts. Sumner launched his campaign instead at the
seat of federal power, the District of Columbia, and at first achieved modest
success. On two successive bills that proposed to free slaves in the District,
Sumner offered and won amendments that provided, first, that proceedings
under the Act shall be held "without the exclusion of any witness on account
of color' 4 69 and, more broadly, "[t]hat in all judicial proceedings in the
District of Columbia there shall be no exclusion of any witness on account of
color., 470 Sumner also attacked the practice by which federal courts sitting
in Southern states adopted the host state's exclusion of black witnesses. Here
he met repeated defeats-first on June 28, 4 7' then on July 3.472
Sumner's third sally merits closer attention. On July 15 Sumner moved to
add the provision that "there shall be no exclusion of any witness on account
of color" to a bill that made other adjustments to the rules governing witness
competency in federal courts.473 Immediately we see the rhetorical dynamic
I described earlier: Northerners shunned the accusation of racism in favor of
stances. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 2d Sess. 3355-57 (statement of Sen. Foster of Connecticut);
see also infra notes 478-480 and accompanying text (discussing Foster's argument).
469. An Act for the Release of Certain Persons Held to Service or Labor in the District of Columbia,
ch. 54, 12 Stat. 377 (1862). Sumner proposed the amendment on April 3. See CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong.,
2d Sess. 1518 (1862). The amendment passed the Senate, see id., as did the bill, see id. at 1526. President
Lincoln signed the bill into law on April 16. See id. at 1680, 1686.
470. CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 2d Sess. 3138 (1862); see also An Act Supplementary to the "Act
for the Release of Certain Persons Held to Service or Labor in the District of Columbia," ch. 155, 12 Stat.
538, 539 (1862).
471. Sumner offered to amend a bill that would free the slaves held by Southern rebels to provide that
"in all proceedings under this act there shall be no exclusion of any witness on account of color." CONG.
GLOBE, 37th Cong., 2d Sess. 2995 (1862). His amendment failed by a vote of 14 to 25. See id.
472. Sumner attempted to amend a proposal to alter the rule of decision in common law and equity
actions in federal courts to forbid "exclusion of any witness on account of color." Id. at 3098-99. He lost,
14 to 21. See id. Even after the vote, debate continued. See id. at 3099-101.
473. See id. at 3354. The bill made state law the rule of decision regarding witness competency in
federal equity and admiralty trials-a principle that already governed in common law trials in federal
courts. See id. It became law on July 16, 1862. See An Act in Relation to the Competency of Witnesses,
and for Other Purposes, ch. 189, 12 Stat. 588, 588-89 (1862).
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general principles of evidence law. By so doing, however, they exposed
themselves to the countercharge of hypocrisy. Standing in favor of Sumner's
amendment, Senator Wilkinson of Minnesota employed the same reasoning
that Jeremy Bentham and John Appleton had directed at the whole scheme of
competency rules:
I do not see, and I never have been able to understand, why a
court should exclude any person from testifying. The object of
testimony in a court is to arrive at the truth. Now, in the State of
Minnesota the plaintiff in a suit, and the defendant, and everybody,
may testify, and there is no reason why all intelligent persons should
not be permitted to testify in court. The object of testimony is to
arrive at the truth, to arrive at the facts, and there is no earthly reason
why a negro, if he knows the facts, should not be permitted in a court
of justice to testify to them. I base my support of this proposition of
the Senator from Massachusetts upon the simple question of justice,
of arriving at the facts. The question of slavery has nothing to do with
it, as I understand ....
Now, sir, the true rule is not to exclude men, but to allow the jury
to determine upon the credibility of the witness. 4
Wilkinson showed his facility with the jargon of evidence theorists by adding,
"in regard to the question of the admission of the testimony of a negro, it is
a question of credibility, and not a question of competency."" ' Moments
later, Sumner echoed Wilkinson's reasoning,476 as did Senator Howard of
Michigan.477
After Wilkinson thus staked the defense of Sumner's amendment on
general principles independent of race, Senator Foster of Connecticut moved
to exploit the Northern weakness that Wilkinson unwittingly had exposed. As
sponsor of earlier legislation that Sumner had burdened with an amendment to
permit testimony by nonwhites, Foster perhaps was annoyed at Sumner's
474. CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 2d Sess. 3355 (1862).
475. ld. at 3356.
476. Sumner said:
Make any objection that you please to the credibltr of a witness: show that he is not
intelligent, that he is not worthy of belief, that his character is bad, and make all proper
deductions from his testimony on this account: but do not say that he is absolutely incompetent.
that he cannot be heard in court; that no matter how intelligent, truthful, or respectable he may
be, he cannot be admitted to testify if he happens to be black. Such an exclusion of testimony
is cruel to the witness, degrading to courts which administer such a rule. and dtstructive of
justice, which requires evidence from every quarter.
Id.
477. Howard phrased the point this way:
When a negro is offered as a witness in court, the question should not be respecting his
admissibility as a witness, but as to the weight to be given to hi'. testimony. Let him stand upon
precisely the same basis as to credit that other persons stand in the same court
Id. at 3357.
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tactics.178 Though he professed to favor the testimony of blacks,4 79 he
pointed up the hypocrisy in Wilkinson's reasoning. Foster demanded to know
of Wilkinson whether in Minnesota atheists are permitted to testify. When
Wilkinson said they were, Foster quickly took new aim:
In most of the States, I think, the belief in the existence of God is
required in order that a man shall be admitted as a competent witness
in a court of justice. I am pretty sure it is so in the State of the
honorable Senator from Massachusetts; and that that law has been
administered there within a few years past, even in a capital cause. It
was asserted that a man who was charged with a capital offense,
murder I think, escaped conviction because the person who saw the
deed committed was a man who either did not believe in the existence
of God, or who lacked that religious faith which by the law of
Massachusetts was requisite in order to make a man a competent
witness in a court of justice; the honorable Senator will correct me if
I am wrong; .... I am quite sure the law of Massachusetts does not
allow an atheist to testify.48
Although Foster was wrong (Massachusetts had permitted atheists to testify
since 1860),4"t Sumner did not correct him. Sumner's proposal was again
defeated: yeas 14, nays 23.482
2. The Campaign of 1864
In June 1862, before the final defeat of Sumner's proposal, John Appleton
had written to Sumner to offer his encouragement. Appleton declared himself
"half inclined" to write a small publication attacking racial competency rules,
the "monstrous absurdity of [which] ... when fully set forth would even
astonish [their] own advocates. 483 Appleton did not write his tract then,
478. Introducing the Rules of Decision Bill on July 3, Foster said without prophecy, "it is a little
bill ... which I think will not occupy time or create division." Id. at 3098. A moment later, after Sumner
proposed his amendment, Foster reconsidered: "Of course .... that will produce discussion and division,
and defeat the bill ..... Id. Sumner's amendment to this legislation was defeated. See supra note 472.
479. Foster noted his own professional experience:
But when [Sumner] speaks of my "favorite rule of exclusion," as though I was opposed to
having black men testify, I would say that, in the course of my professional life, I presume I
have examined more black men as witnesses than he ever did white ones, and did it, I hope,
courteously, without a thought that I was not getting the truth in the majority of cases.
Id. at 3357.
480. Id. at 3355.
481. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 131, § 12 (1860) ("Every person not a believer in any religion shall
be required to testify truly under the pains and penalties of perjury; and the evidence of such person's
disbelief in the existence of God may be received to affect his credibility as a witness."). Foster was not
way off mark. As late as 1854 the Massachusetts high court had restated the incompetency of atheists. See
Commonwealth v. Smith, 68 Mass. (2 Gray) 516, 516 (1854). But see Hunscom v. Hunscom, 15 Mass. (14
Tyng) 184, 184 (1818) (holding that a witness's atheism went only to credibility, not to competency).
482. See CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 2d Sess. 3358 (1862).
483. Letter from John Appleton to Sen. Charles Sumner (June 25, 1862), microformed on Sumner
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however, and for about a year and a half, little was heard from either man on
the subject. Late in 1863, Appleton raised the issue again: "I believe you have
not by act of Congress removed the disability of black men as witnesses-If
not done, and [if] I have leisure I shall be half inclined to write a letter on the
subject .... Then, in January and February of 1864, both men took up
the topic in earnest. Appleton wrote his promised "letter"-38 handwritten
pages485-and sent it to Sumner with the suggestion that "[ilt is as long as a
reasonable speech in Congress."4 ' But Sumner had written his own
dissertation on the topic47-arguably a more scholarly treatment than
Appleton's. With a brief nod to his supporter from Maine,"' he merely
appended Appleton's work to his own.
Although both Appleton and Sumner condemned the exclusion of
nonwhites as racist,4 9 both also attacked the exclusionary laws as a violation
of modem evidence theory, which rejected all competency rules. Appleton said
flatly that "[t]he exclusion of testimony from whatsoever source attainable is
presumably wrong." ''  Sumner wrote that racial exclusions may "be treated
as belonging to that system of evidence which, in defiance of reason,
undertook to declare in advance that certain classes of witnesses were
incompetent to testify .... The whole system of exclusion was covered with
ridicule by Jeremy Bentham, who exposed its irrational character. " '
Congressional supporters of 1864 legislation to roll back racial competency
rules likewise grounded their support in general principles of evidence law.
Papers, Reel 26. No. 82 (Chadwyck-Healy Inc.). Da~id Gold discus.es the Sumner-Appleton
correspondence in detail in his excellent biography of Appleton See GOLD. supra note 429. at I Il - Il
484. Letter from John Appleton to Sen. Charles Sumner 2-3 (Oct 10. 1863). mu roforyn'd on Sumner
Papers, Reel 29, No. 363 (Chadwick-Healy Inc.).
485. See Letter from John Appleton to Sen. Charles Sumner (Jan 24. 1864). mucroforrned on Sumner
Papers, Reel 30, No. 261 (Chadwick-Healy Inc.): see also S. REP No 38-25. at 18-28 t1864. nitcrojormed
on Sumner Papers, Reel 77, No. 597 (Chadwick-Healy Inc.)
486. Letter from John Appleton to Sen. Charles Sumner (Jan I. 1864). :ncrofortned on Sumner
Papers, Reel 30, No. 151 (Chadwick-Healy Inc.).
487. See SENATE COMM. ON SLAVERY & FREEDMEN. 381tt COG. ExCIL SION OF \\'rrLSSES oN
ACCOUNT OF COLOR (Comm. Print. 1864), reprinted in 8 WORKS OF CHARLES SI.'sE.R 176 iBoston, Lee
& Shepard 1874).
488. Sumner praised the general treatment of competency rules in Appleton's eidence treatise and
called Appleton a "distinguished authority on the exclusion of colored testimon, - Id. reprinted ti 8
WORKS OF CHARLES SUMNER. supra note 487. at 201 & n 2
489. See, e.g., id., reprinted tit 8 WORKS OF CHARLES Si'MER. supra note 487. at 203 tcompanng
these laws to the persecution of the Moors in Spain and of the Jes s in man, countries and to India's caste
system); Letter from John Appleton to Sen. Charles Sumner. supra note 485. at 37 (ridtculing the notion
that "the Almighty had so failed as to have created whole races of men so untrustuorthy that it vould be
unsafe even to hear their testimony").
490. Letter from John Appleton to Sen. Charles Sumner. supra note 485 (manuscnpt at 14)
491. SENATE COMM. ON SLAVERY & FREEDMEN. 38T1! CONG. EXCLLSION OF WiTNESSES ON
ACCOUNT OF COLOR (Comm. Print. 1864). (citation omitted) reprinted tin 8 VORKS OF CIARLES SL INER.
supra note 487, at 201.
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Senator Collamer, who introduced the year's first legislation on the topic,49
defended it in such terms:
[T]he general practice and the tendency of opinion now is to take
away all disqualification of witnesses upon any ground, and to leave
their testimony to go to the jury and the court for them to weigh it
and do justice. In many of our States now, even the parties to an
action are competent witnesses; and no objection in point of law
exists in nearly all the States on account of a man's religious
sentiments. All those disqualifications have been swept away, and we
think it time to do it here in relation to colored people, and to make
them competent witnesses in the United States courts. The courts and
the juries of course will judge of their credibility.493
With Collamer's legislation pending, Sumner once again moved to amend an
unrelated bill by adding a provision "[t]hat in the courts of the United States
there shall be no exclusion of any witness on account of color."4  He made
the now familiar argument that the exclusion of blacks should go the way of
other testimonial exclusions. 95
Sumner's reassertion that the issue was not race but evidence law
prompted Senator Buckalew of Pennsylvania to the floor: "As this is a
proposition in relation to the laws of evidence, I offer an amendment to cover
the whole subject; I move to add, 'or because he is a party to or interested in
the issue tried.1'4 96 Perhaps out of malice toward Sumner's amendment,
Buckalew sought to attach to it a much broader reform: the qualification of
both civil parties and criminal defendants in the federal courts. Sumner
naturally did not want to see his own reform burdened, but found himself
trapped by his own tactics:
Mr. SUMNER. I am in favor of that proposition taken by itself,
but I do not wish to see it put upon this.
492. Collamer's legislation aimed primarily at abolishing the prohibition against black mail carriers.
Because, he claimed, it would be dangerous to have mail carriers who were disabled from testifying against
mail thieves, his legislation provided generally "[t]hat in the courts of the United States there shall be no
exclusion of any witness on account of color." CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., I st Sess. 837 (1864).
493. Id.
494. Id. at 3259.
495. See id. at 3260 ("Let the witness be admitted always to testify, leaving the jury to be the judges
of his credibility."). Senator Howard of Michigan spoke in similar terms:
The general principle is that every person may be used as a witness who has arrived at
years of discretion ....
... I will put the case upon the same ground upon which the case of every white witness
is placed by the common law; and that is that the jury, if the case be one before a jury, is to
judge of the credibility of the witness and of the amount of credit to be given to his whole
story.
Id. at 3261.
496. Id. at 3260-61.
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Mr. BROWN, (to Mr. Sumner.) That is just what other people say
about yours. [Laughter.]
Mr. SUMNER. I understand that, but I wish to secure this justice.
Mr. BUCKALEW. I wish to secure the additional justice provided
by my amendment.
497
On the unexplained suggestion of Senator Wilkinson,49' Buckalew quickly
agreed to restrict his amendment to civil parties only.499 As it would happen,
criminal defendants would not win the right to testify under oath in federal
courts until 1878.500 But the balance of Buckalew's proposal passed,5 ' as
did Sumner's amendment to which Buckalew's was attached (Buckalew voting
no),502 as did the underlying legislation.0 3
Hence civil parties won the right to testify in federal court as a direct
consequence of Charles Sumner's struggle to end the exclusion of black
witnesses in federal courts sitting in Southern states. Senator Buckalew
exploited the weakness in the rhetorical strategy of Sumner and his
confederates: If "the general practice and the tendency of opinion now is to
take away all disqualification of witnesses upon any ground," as Senator
Collamer claimed that it was, 5°4 then the exclusion of civil parties-indeed
of almost any witness-must end. The Senate did not then carry such
reasoning through to its logical conclusion by permitting criminal defendants
to testify. The absence of debate on this issue can leave us with no conclusion
but that the notion of testimony by criminal defendants struck many in the
Senate as a more radical innovation still than the testimony of civil
parties-more so even than the testimony of black witnesses in Southern
courts.
Yet Maine acted that same spring to permit testimony by criminal
defendants. 505 I cannot prove that Maine's first-in-the-nation defendant
testimony law responded in any direct way to the debate then raging in
Congress about racial exclusions. On the one hand, Maine surely would soon
497. Id. at 3261.
498. Wilkinson said merely:
If the Senator from Pennsylvania will modify his amendment so as to have it apply only to civil
actions, I will vote for it. I cannot vote for a proposition to allow a party charged with
counterfeiting in a criminal action, or any other felony, to be a witness in his own case; but if
he will confine his amendment to civil actions I will vote for the proposition, for I am in favor
generally of parties testifying in courts.
Id.
499. See id. Senator Carlile objected to the modification-again without explanation. See 1d.
500. See Act of Mar. 16, 1878, ch. 37. 20 Stat. 30 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3481 (1994)).
501. See CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., Ist Sess. 3261 (1864).
502. See id.
503. See An Act Making Appropriations for Sundry Civil Expenses of the Government for the Year
Ending the Thirtieth of June, Eighteen Hundred and Sixty-Five. and for Other Purposes. ch 210. § 3. 13
Stat. 344, 345 (1865).
504. CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., Ist Sess. 837 (1864); supra text accompanying note 493.
505. See supra Table I.
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have adopted a law to permit defendant testimony. Already in 1859 it had
permitted persons charged with certain minor crimes to testify at trial.
506
Although I have not found any useful commentary on this earlier law, the most
natural inference is that it served as a trial run for the later, broader law.
Appleton, then a justice on the state's supreme judicial court, would be
elevated to chief justice in 1862,507 perhaps gaining the additional clout he
needed to finish the reform he had sought for thirty years. Appleton openly
advocated for the 1864 legislation,508 and he was the only authority the
judiciary committee of the Maine Senate cited in recommending its
passage.509
On the other hand, one cannot but wonder at the timing of the law change
and at other circumstances hinting at a connection with events in Washington.
In late January 1864, Appleton contributed a weighty manuscript to Sumner's
campaign against the Southern racial exclusion laws.50 Less than two weeks
later, an ardently Unionist legislator from Appleton's own community-one
Lewis Barker-introduced the Maine legislation that would permit criminal
defendants to testify.511 I have found no recorded debate on the proposed
legislation, no public commentary, and no private correspondence among the
parties that might shed light on the reasons for the bill's passage or its
introduction in this particular legislative session. I can only speculate that
Appleton might have confronted legislators with the proposition that Maine's
failure to permit criminal defendants to testify, in violation of the general
principles of evidence law that Appleton had preached for decades, could
expose Sumner and his cause to the charge of hypocrisy. Had Appleton pitched
the defendant testimony law in these terms, 512 the Maine legislature no doubt
506. See An Act Relating to Witnesses and Evidence, ch. 104, 1859 Me. Laws 97, 97 (extending the
testimonial right to persons charged with libel, nuisance, simple assault, assault and battery, or the violation
of any municipal or police ordinance).
507. See GOLD, supra note 429, at 35.
508. In 1866 Appleton wrote to John Quincy Adams 11 of the Massachusetts House: "I had no doubt
that the interests of justice required that the [1864 law change in Maine] should be made, and so far as I
had any influence, freely used it in favor of its adoption." Letter from John Appleton to Rep. John Quincy
Adams (Feb. 24, 1866), in H.R. 361, 1st Legis. Sess. 7 (Mass. 1866).
509. See S. 43-15, 1st Legis. Sess. 2 (Me. 1864).
510. See supra notes 485-486 and accompanying text.
511. Barker introduced the legislation on February 5. See 43 J. H.R., STATE ME. 199-200 (Feb. 5,
1864). Barker was from Stetson, a town not far from Appleton's Bangor in Penobscot County. See
DOCUMENTS PRINTED BY ORDER OF THE LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF MAINE 225 (Augusta, Stevens
& Sayward 1864). He was a Union Party member, see id. at 228, and traveled nationally to speak in
support of the war effort, see A.W. Paine, Address in Bangor, Me. (Oct. 31, 1890), in IN MEMORIAM:
LEWIS BARKER (n.p., 1890) (unpaginated document).
512. Had he made such a pitch, it might have explained the oddly slave-like imagery that Barker used
when he announced the bill's passage to Appleton with a triumphant telegram: "The bill has passed. I thank
God that the padlock has been removed from the lips and that citizens accused of crime may hereafter
testify in their own behalf." Charles Hamlin, John Appleton, in 5 GREAT AMERICAN LAWYERS 41, 50
(William Draper Lewis ed., 1908) (quoting Barker's telegram).
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would have been receptive: It had proved to be one of the most militantly
pro-black state legislatures in the country.
5 3
For all the evidence shows, Maine permitted criminal defendants to testify
in 1864 because Appleton's Benthamite reasoning finally triumphed in
legislative minds. Appleton's influence cannot, however, explain the stark,
indeed nearly perfect North-South split between those states that chose to
follow Maine's lead in the next few years and those that did not. To expose
other forces at work, we will need to look closely at those Northern states that
gave defendants the right to testify-I will look hardest at Massachusetts-and
at the one Southern state that seemingly broke ranks to permit defendants to
testify-South Carolina. Only very close scrutiny can avail us, because the
issue of defendant testimony (unlike that of black testimony) rarely disturbed
the public consciousness. We must hunt for the small shards of evidence
thrown off when minor legislation explodes in the midst of general warfare.
3. The Campaign of 1866
a. Massachusetts
Sumner's successful 1864 amendment to an appropriations act secured the
right of nonwhites to testify in federal court. In the absence of any perceived
federal power to dictate evidence rules in the state courts, that was as much as
Congress could then do. The North's victory the following year, however, put
it in the position to dictate the terms of readmission to the Union and of the
withdrawal of federal forces. There was little debate about whether repudiation
of slavery should be among those terms. After Tennessee acted quickly to
ratify the Thirteenth Amendment, most of the South abandoned any hope of
retaining slavery. There was, in contrast, scarcely any question of making
black suffrage a condition for readmission. Although the most radical of
Northern voices called for giving newly freed slaves the vote, support for
universal suffrage even in the North fell far short of a critical mass. Between
these two issues lay the question of granting freedmen the right to testify in
state courts of the South. For a season, it ranked among the most hotly
contested political issues in the nation.
513. In 1855, Maine enacted a personal liberty law that forbade official participation in prosecutions
under the Fugitive Slave Act. See GOLD, supra note 429, at 104. In 1857. the lcgudlature declared the
Supreme Court's Dred Scott decision to be "not binding in law or conscience." Id. at 100 The Senate asked
the supreme judicial court to decide whether Maine's African Amencan residcnt, were U S citizens and
hence entitled to vote. The result was never in doubt: The court ruled affirmatively with a single dissent.
See Opinions of the Justices, 44 Me. 505 (1857). Appleton voted with the majority and authored a long
separate opinion. See id. at 521 (Appleton. J.. concumng).
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A quick glance at any major Northern newspaper during the fall of 1865
reveals the intensity of Northern concern about the right of blacks to
testify. 14 Hardly a day passed without news or commentary on the progress
that one or another Southern legislature had made toward full participation by
freedmen in the courts.1 5 Officials of the Union Army, claiming they spoke
for the President, declared that Freedmen's Courts would not surrender
jurisdiction to civil authorities until Southern states made blacks competent to
testify.
51 6
By and large, Southern states did what they had to do to rid themselves
of the Freedmen's Courts, though they did no more. Only four Southern
states-Arkansas, 51 7  Louisiana, 18  South Carolina,5t9  and Tennessee 520
-removed all distinctions of color from the qualification of witnesses during
the 1860s. Each of the rest granted blacks the right to testify only in those
cases in which a black person was a party or, in a criminal case, the
victim. 52' That is, an African American person who happened to witness a
crime by a white person or a civil dispute between two white persons remained
514. See, e.g., The Progress of Reconstruction, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 3, 1865, at 4. As the Tmes wrote:
Mhe denial of the suffrage will not, of itself, be a fatal objection (to the readmission of
Southern states].
But the denial to the freedman of the power to testify in court against the white man, we
believe, would be a fatal objection. It strikes not at a mere civil franchise, but at a natural
right-the right of protecting life and property. When a white man .may take a freedman's life
or property with impunity, if no other white men be present, the freedman has no security for
either. We believe that the government would be bound to consider the continuance of that
monstrous feature of the black code as proof positive of a design to make the freedman still a
victim of all practicable injustice and oppression, and therefore proof positive of the unfitness
of the southern states to be restored to their old power.
Id.; see also The President's Policy, and the Opposition, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 11, 1865, at 4 ("It is impossible
to urge a respectable reason for this miserable attempt to deny the freedmen the right to appear as witnesses
before legal tribunals. Its only possible motive is a desire to keep the freedmen down to their old cattle
level.").
515. In October 1865, when Northern concern with the problem of racial exclusion laws was quite
high, the New York Daily Tribune mentioned the issue at least 21 times, the New York Herald at least 12
times, the New York limes at least I I times, and the Springfield Republican at least 16 times.
516. See Freedmen's Affairs in Mississippi, SPRINGFIELD REPUBLICAN (Mass.), Oct. 6, 1865, at 3;
Matters in South Carolina, SPRINGFIELD REPUBLICAN (Mass.), Oct. 26, 1865, at 2; The Tennessee
Freedmen, SPRINGFIELD REPUBLICAN (Mass.), Dec. 18, 1865, at 2; The Virginia Legislature, SPRINGFIELD
REPUBLICAN (Mass.), Dec. 18, 1865, at 2.
517. See An Act To Declare the Rights of Persons of African Descent, No. 35, § 1, 1867 Ark. Acts
98.
518. See An Act To Amend and Re-Enact Article Twenty-Two Hundred and Sixty-One of the Civil
Code of the State of Louisiana, No. 70, § I, 1867 La. Acts 141, 143.
519. See infra notes 554-563 and accompanying text.
520. See An Act To Do Justice and Render Persons of African and Indian Descent Competent
Witnesses in the Courts of this State, ch. XVIII, 1866 Tenn. Acts 24, 24 (making blacks competent
"[because] such persons are by an act of Congress competent witnesses").
521. See, e.g., TEx. CONST. of 1866, art. VIII, § 2, reprinted in 1866 TEX. GEN. LAWS 881; An Act
To Protect Freedmen in Their Rights of Person and Property in This State, No. 86, § I, 1866 Ala. Acts 98,
98 (adopted Dec. 9, 1865); Act of Dec. 15, 1865, tit. XXXI, No. 251, § I, 1866 Ga. Acts 239, 239; An
Act To Confer Civil Rights on Freedmen, and for Other Purposes, ch. IV, 1866 Miss. Laws 82; An Act
Concerning Negroes and Persons of Color or of Mixed Blood, ch. 40, § 9, 1866 N.C. Pub. Laws 99, 102
(providing the text of an act passed on March 10, 1866); An Act in Relation to the Testimony of Colored
Persons, ch. 24, 1866 Va. Acts 89, 89-90.
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incompetent to testify. Moreover, several Southern states refused to permit
blacks to testify by deposition or sworn affidavit-a privilege they sometimes
extended to whites.522 The point of this restriction, as the legislature of
Florida made clear,5 23 was to ensure that no white Southern jury (and the
juries would remain white for the time being) would mistakenly give a black
affiant the credit they reserved for whites. Most strikingly, the North Carolina
law required that "whenever a person of color shall be examined as a witness,
the court shall warn the witness to declare the truth. '24 Although the
President seemed content with the halfway measures taken by most Southern
states, some of the more perceptive Northern newspapers, including Horace
Greeley's New York Tribune, demanded purer equality for black witnesses. 5
As controversy churned over the right of freedmen to testify, a different
issue suddenly seized the North in a fit of self-accusation. On October 2, 1865,
Connecticut voters rejected a free suffrage referendum, and the liberal Northern
press announced that such Northern hypocrisy would undermine the cause of
suffrage everywhere. In Boston, the Daily Advertiser lamented:
[I]t is not unlikely to have an adverse moral effect ... that a New
England State has declined a system which New England is somewhat
forward in urging as the general rule for reconstruction at the
South.... [A]ny reluctant Carolinian or Mississippian may fairly
reply to us,-why require impartial suffrage at the South, when
Northern States have not only neglected to adopt it, but in the marked
instance of a New England State have rejected it?1
26
Greeley's Tribune added with somewhat more bile:
Connecticut must surely feel proud of the laudations heaped on her
for her recent vote by every still rancorous Rebel in the land. The
522. See, e.g., TEX. CONST. of 1866 art. VIII. § 2. reprinted in 1866 TEX. GEN. LAws 881; No. 86.
1866 Ala. Acts 98; Ch. 4, 1865 Miss. Laws 82; Ch. 24, 1866 Va. Acts 89.
523. See An Act Concerning Testimony, ch. 1472. 1865 Fla. Laws 35, 35-36 (forbidding blacks to
testify by deposition "otherwise than in such manner as will enable the court or jury to judge of the
credibility of the witness").
524. Ch. 40, § 10, 1866 N.C. Pub. Laws Stat. 99, 102.
525. See, e.g., Civil Rights, N.Y. DAILY TRIB., Mar. I. 1866, at 4. As the Tribune wrote:
We believe no single Southern State has yet enabled Blacks to sue and be sued. to give
testimony and rebut testimony, on equal terms with Whites.... What can be more absurd than
to provide that a Black may testify in cases between Blacks and Whites. but not when the
parties are both White? If he would ever swear falsely, would he not be likely to do so in a case
between a White and a Black? And, if his oath can be taken in cases where he will naturally
have bias, why not in cases where he is likely to have none?
Id.; see also. e.g., The Freedmen's Bureau Bill, BURLINGTON FREE PRESS (Vt.). Jan. 26. 1866. at 2 ('7htis
is not the most liberal concession of equal rights conceivable, inasmuch as the colored man is permitted
to testify personally or by affidavit only in cases to which colored persons are paries."): Liberty and
Equality in Virginia, SPRINGFIELD REPUBLICAN (Mass.). Apr. 17. 1866, at 2 (calling Virginia's refusal to
permit blacks to testify in cases between two whites "ridiculous").
526. BOSTON DAILY ADVERTISER, Oct. 4. 1865. at 2. The Advertiser went on to argue gamely that
there are stronger reasons to insist on universal suffrage in the South than in Connecticut. See id.
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Montgomery Mail (Alabama) construes that vote to foreshadow the
expatriation of all Colored Americans from the land of their
birth... : "... Connecticut says [the Negro] is not wanted here, and
for once Connecticut is right."527
Months later, Massachusetts Governor John Andrew attacked Charles Sumner's
plan for counting only those blacks who could vote when determining Southern
representation in Congress. Andrew worried that the denial of black suffrage
by Connecticut (and by Wisconsin as well) would expose Sumner to Southern
charges of hypocrisy.
528
Such freely flowing self-accusations make it plain that even in victory the
North felt it had to live by the rules it sought to impose on the South.529
Two weeks after the Connecticut vote, a perceptive Boston lawyer took
advantage of this mood of guilty self-examination to argue that the North had
to guard against the charge of hypocrisy in the context of testimonial
exclusions as well. The lawyer, Frederic William Sawyer, was a frequent
contributor to the Boston Daily Evening Transcript,530 an influential
newspaper that previously had supported the right of criminal defendants to
527. N.Y. DAILY TRIB., Oct. 14, 1865, at 4; see also Connecticut Against Equal Suffrage, SPRINGFIELD
REPUBLICAN (Mass.), Oct. 4, 1865, at 4 ("Nor would it be less preposterous to say to southern men that
we cannot trust them to do justice to the freed negroes unless they can protect themselves by the ballot,
while we can trust ourselves to do justice to our own colored citizens without that protection.").
528. See DAVID DONALD, CHARLES SUMNER AND THE RIGHTS OF MAN 244-45 (1970).
529. Indiana Governor Oliver Morton put the Northern sensibility this way in an 1865 speech:
Let me inquire for a single moment, in what condition is Indiana to urge negro suffrage in
South Carolina, or in any other State?... We not only exclude them from voting, we exclude
them from testifying in the courts of justice. We exclude them from our public schools, and we
make it unlawful and a crime for them to come into the State of Indiana at any time subsequent
to 1850.... [W]ith what face, I say, can Indiana go to Congress and insist upon giving the
right of suffrage to the negroes in the Southern States? If her Congressmen asked to do this,
they will naturally be asked in turn, what have you done with these people in your own state?
Speech of Governor Morton, printed in Reconstruction and Negro Suffrage, INDIANAPOLIS DAILY J., Oct.
2, 1865, at 2; see also New York and the Suffrage Question, SPRINGFIELD REPUBLICAN (Mass.), Sept. 6,
1865, at 4 ("[Republican party] leaders did not dare propose to give political equality to the colored men
of Ohio, and they were thus estopped from demanding the enfranchisement of the freedmen of the South;
for how could they ask the late slaveholders to give the ballot to the ignorant freedmen while they
themselves still withhold it from their own intelligent colored citizens?"); SPRINGFIELD REPUBLICAN
(Mass.), Nov. 14, 1865, at 2 (editorializing in similar fashion about inequalities in the laws of Wisconsin,
Minnesota, New York, and Ohio).
530. The correspondence, quoted infra text accompanying note 532, is signed merely "Carl." William
Cushing identified "Carl" as Sawyer and noted that he was a "regular contributor" to the Transcript
beginning in 1847. WILLIAM CUSHING, INITIALS AND PSEUDONYMS: A DICTIONARY OF LITERARY
DISGUISES 50 (London, Thomas Y. Crowell & Co. 1886). Sawyer practiced law in Boston from 1840 until
his death in 1875. See 5 APPLETON'S CYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY 407 (James Grant Wilson
& John Fiske eds., New York, D. Appleton & Co. 1888). I have not discovered any legal writings by him,
though it appears likely that he concentrated in maritime law. In 1840, he published the Merchant's and
Shipmasters Guide, and in 1856 he wrote to Charles Sumner to lobby for reform of the maritime law, see
FREDERIC WILLIAM SAWYER, THE MERCHANT'S AND SHIPMASTER'S GUIDE (Boston, Benjamin Loring &
Co. 1840); Letter from Frederic W. Sawyer to Sen. Charles Sumner (Mar. 8, 1856), microformed on
Sumner Papers, Reel 13, No. 54 (Chadwick-Healy Inc.). I am grateful to Virginia Smith of the
Massachusetts Historical Society for helping me to identify "Carl."
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testify.53' Sawyer's argument appeared as the lead item on the front page of
October 16, 1865. I reproduce it here nearly in full:
LIGHT IN THE COURTS OF LAw. Any one who loves justice, and
believes in light, rather than darkness, will agree with the Transcript,
in advocating the right of the colored men to testify in the Courts of
law. There is no pretence that justice can be intelligently administered
without admitting to the stand anybody and everybody of sound mind
who knows anything about a given case .... For a long period we
were in the same gross darkness in this matter of allowing witnesses
to testify that now prevails at the South. We had our proscribed
classes as well as they. Ours were shut out on account of the color of
their minds, and not of their skins. If one was an infidel, or interested
in the suit, or husband or wife of one of the parties, or defendant in
a criminal prosecution, or a State Prison convict, he was adjudged too
morally black to be believed.
We have gained ground wonderfully in the way of civilization in
the last two years in those respects, but we are so little ahead of the
South in the matter, that this communication is to suggest that the
North and South go hand in hand in this proposed reform. That is to
say, let us put our reform in black and white. When we insist, as in
truth and justice we ought, that black men shall be admitted as
witnesses in courts of law, let us insist that white men shall be
admitted too. In our city of Boston this year, before it closes there
will have been disposed of more than fifteen thousand cases where the
party most interested in the case, and knowing, too, all the facts of it,
has been, or will be, excluded from testifying. If this controversy over
the colored man's right to testify should result in setting white men
free in that particular it will do a good thing. There ought to be no
restrictions whatever on the right to testify when the witness is of
sound mind and sufficient age, but if there is to be any restriction it
may just as well be based on the color of the skin as anything
else.5
2
531. On August 2, 1865, the editors of the Transcript compared our system of criminal justice
unfavorably with the French: "The French system is the natural process by which truth is reached, which
is to hear both parties and let the credibility of each have its due weight in the verdict Our system shuts
out what must necessarily be the only witness of a crime secretly commitied . . . - Local lntelhgence,.
BOSTON DAILY EVENING TRANSCRIPT, Aug. 2, 1865. at 4. It is unclear from the context whether these
sentiments were original or reprinted from another paper.
532. Light in the Courts of Law. BOSTON DAILY EVENING TRANSCRIPT. Oct. 16. 1865. at I Alexis
Haller, my research student in the summer of 1996. found this remarkable bit of evidence.
At about the time of Sawyer's publication, the New York limes also editorialized about Southern
racial exclusion laws. Although the limes did not make reference to Northern defendant testimony laws.
it did state the case against racial exclusion laws in terms of the general evidence theory that rejects all
competency rules:
[I]t cannot be said that [the emancipated slave] is not qualified to give evidence.. Of late
years the policy of jurisprudence everywhere has been to abolish all disqualifications for
rendering testimony, and to let objections apply to the credibility only. Even personal interest
in the case no longer excludes from the witness stand. in most legal jurisdictions. The theory
is, and all experience goes to confirm it. that no false testimony can stand the ordeal of a
thorough cross-examination ....
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Sawyer's complaint that "the party most interested in the case, and knowing,
too, all the facts of it," was excluded from testifying can be a reference only
to the exclusion of defendant testimony in criminal cases, as no other
broad-based exclusionary law survived in Massachusetts.
Sawyer's prophecy that "this controversy over the colored man's right to
testify [might] result in setting white men free" to testify for themselves in
criminal cases was no idle guess. Sawyer wrote between two sessions of the
Massachusetts legislature. In the previous session, a bill to permit defendant
testimony had failed despite substantial support in both houses.533 In the next
session, a virtually identical bill passed into law.534 The only surviving pieces
of legislative history are two judiciary committee reports that recommended
passage of the bill and that appended letters from John Appleton. 535 The two
committee reports differed somewhat, as did the two Appleton letters, and the
reports differed a little from the letters, but all four documents recite the
familiar Appleton-Benthamite arguments that all competency rules frustrate a
search for the truth. Although an election would soon strengthen the
Republican representation in the Massachusetts House-and would give the
defendant testimony law a new sponsor with a famous name, John Quincy
Adams 1-Sawyer knew none of that as he wrote. What he knew was that
black testimony laws had become one of the most pressing social and political
issues of the day.
Sawyer may have had one other piece of news in mind as he wrote. On
August 31, 1865, the Transcript reported the acquittal of James Williams, who
had been accused of stabbing a man to death on the streets of Bangor, Maine.
The President's Policy, and the Opposition, supra note 514; see also Negro Testimony, SPRINGFIELD
REPUBLICAN (Mass.), Jan. 3, 1866, at 4 (providing a similar argument).
533. The text of the 1865 bill appears in S. 195, Ist Legis. Sess. 9 (Mass. 1865): "In the trial of all
criminal cases ... it shall be the privilege of the defendant, upon his own request, but not otherwise, to
be a competent witness." The Senate approved this version of the act on April 25. See 1865 MASS. SENATE
J. 588 (unpublished document, on file with the Massachusetts State Library). On May 9, the House passed
the bill, but with two amendments, one of which provided that "the omission of the defendant to avail
himself of the privilege of so testifying, shall not be used against him, in argument or otherwise, nor create
any influence to his prejudice." S. 262, 1st Legis. Sess. 2 (Mass. 1865). The Senate refused to concur in
the House amendments, see 1865 MASS. SENATE J. 733 (unpublished document, on file with the
Massachusetts State Library), and so the bill died.
534. On January 22, 1866, John Quincy Adams II proposed in the House that his judiciary committee
take up the issue of defendant testimony. See 1866 MASS. HOUSE J. 46. On May 12, the House approved
a bill providing that "[i]n the trial of all ... proceedings against persons charged with the commission of
crimes or offences, the person so charged shall at his own request, but not otherwise, be deemed a
competent witness." An Act in Relation to Evidence in Criminal Prosecutions (unpublished document, on
file with the Massachusetts Archives and with author). The Senate approved the bill on May 19, but added
the words, "Nor shall the neglect or refusal to testify create any presumption against the defendant." 1866
MASS. SENATE J. 719; see The Adjournment Promised This Week, SPRINGFIELD REPUBLICAN (Mass.), May
21, 1866, at 4. On May 23, the House approved the Senate amendment, see 1866 MASS. HOUSE J. 423;
it approved the bill on May 24, see 1866 MASS. HOUSE J. 428; Act of May 26, 1866. ch. 260, 1866 Mass.
Acts. 245.
535. See Letter from John Appleton to Darwin E. Ware (Feb. 22, 1865), in S. 195, Gen. Ct. (Mass.
1865); Letter from John Appleton to John Quincy Adams II (Feb. 24, 1866), in H.R. 361, Gen. Ct. (Mass.
1866).
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Williams's trial had caused a sensation in Bangor, where John Appleton
himself presided at the trial.536 The Boston press paid note, at least in part
because Williams was among the first accused murderers to take advantage of
Maine's 1864 law permitting defendant testimony. As the Transcript told it,
The remarkable simplicity and apparent truthfulness of the prisoner,
his prompt and ready answers, freedom from all contradiction and
equivocation, and in fact every test of truth were so striking, that the
court, jury and the crowd of listeners were all convinced that he was
fully justified in the killing. Without his own testimony, however, he
probably would have been severely dealt with by the law." 7
I would not make much of the Williams case were it not for an odd
passage in an obscure article in the 1914 edition of the Maine Law Review.
The author claimed to have spoken with Albert Paine, who was a prominent
member of the Maine bar in the 1860s and who himself claimed to have been
the chief inspiration behind Maine's 1864 law.53 After telling of the jury's
swift acquittal of Williams, the article recounted Paine's memory of what
happened next:
[Williams's acquittal] caused a furor in the Boston and New York
papers, and Mr. Paine was invited by one of the Adams family who
was then sitting in the Massachusetts Legislature to come to Boston.
He accepted the invitation, and sitting in Mr. Adam[s]'s seat while the
session was in progress, wrote with his own hand the draft of the law
which was passed with almost unprecedented haste .... "'
There is so much of this brief passage that is exaggerated or demonstrably
536. The Bangor Daily Whig & Courier provided detailed coverage. See Trial of James H Wilham
for the Murder of James McGraw, BANGOR DAILY WHIG & COURIER. Aug. 22, 1865. at 3; Trial of James
H. Williams for the Murder of James McGraw, BANGOR DAILY WHIG & COURIER. Aug, 23. 1865. at 3;
Trial of James H. Williams for the Murder of James McGraw. BANGOR DAILY WHIG & COURIER. Aug.
24, 1865, at 3; Closing of the Murder Trial: Aquittal of the Prisoner. BANGOR DAILY WHIG & COURIER.
Aug. 25, 1865, at 3; The Law in Regard to Homicide-The Charge of Chief Justice Appleton in the Case
of James H. Williams, Indicted for Murder of James McGraw. BANGOR DAILY WHIG & COURIER. Aug.
28, 1865, at 2.
537. Released on His Own Testimony, BOSTON DAILY EVENING TRANSCRIPT. Aug. 31. 1865. at 2 The
Transcript lifted much of the first line of this quote from the coverage of the Boston Daily Advertiser See
Letter from Bangor, BOSTON DAILY ADVERTISER. Aug. 28. 1865. at I. The Advertiser. unlike the
Transcript, noted in its coverage that in earlier murder cases red after the passage of Maine's I864 law.
the defendants' "lame and contradictory testimony" had made conviction "all the more certain ' Id. Indeed.
that was the judgment of the Maine Attorney General in his annual report of 1864. See REPORT OF TIE
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE OF MAINE 6 (Augusta. Stevens & Sayward 1864)
538. See Mark A. Barwise, Scientific Proof and Legal Proof. 8 ME- L. REV. 67. 76 (1914). 1 thank
Herbert Silsby as well as Jeem Trowbridge of the Bangor Historical Society for leading me to the Barwise
article.
539. Id. at 77.
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falseo4 that it would be reckless to adopt it in any particular. Yet there is
excellent evidence that both Paine and John Appleton were in Boston on May
9, 1866, the day the defendant testimony law cleared one of several legislative
hurdles. -4' In fact, evidence suggests that Paine was in the State House at the
very time the House of Representatives, where Adams sat, voted on the
bill. 42 There is some appeal to this possible link between Paine, the
Williams trial, and the ultimate passage of a defendant testimony law in
Massachusetts: For Williams was black, a fact reported in the Boston
press,543 and his race added a new dimension to the North's vulnerability to
Southern charges of hypocrisy.
540. Although the Boston papers did cover the Williams case, see supra note 537 and accompanying
text, there was nothing remotely like a "furor," and any reference at all to the matter in the most prominent
New York papers has proved elusive. John Quincy Adams II was not "then" sitting in the Massachusetts
legislature. He was elected in November 1865-the Williams trial had been in August-and took his seat
in January 1866. It is hard to imagine how Paine could have written the law in the same session in which
it passed, as the law had to go from one chamber to the other and back again over the course of I I days.
See supra note 534. Moreover, there was nothing "unprecedented" about the haste with which the 1866 act
was passed. Not only was the whole matter considered for months before its ultimate defeat in 1865, but
the 1866 legislature required four months to turn Adams's initial proposal into law, See supra note 534.
Perhaps, though, Paine meant only that the Massachusetts House acted on the legislation with
unprecedented speed on the day he was there.
541. In a journal entry of May 13, 1866, Bangor lawyer John Godfrey wrote that he had steamed to
Boston the previous Monday (May 7), that his companions on the boat included Paine, and that they met
up with Appleton in Boston. Godfrey and Paine returned home on Thursday, May 10. See THE JOURNALS
OF JOHN EDWARDS GODFREY: BANGOR, MAINE 1863-1869, at 214-17 (James B. Vickery ed., 1979)
(hereinafter GODFREY]. On Wednesday, May 9, the Massachusetts House amended the defendant testimony
bill and ordered it to a third reading. See 1866 MASS. HOUSE J. 389.
Still there are discrepancies between Godfrey's account and Paine's. First, Godfrey went to Boston
to lobby before the legislature for a railroad bill. Although he does not say so explicitly, he leaves the
strong impression that Paine was there on the same business-and not, at the invitation of Adams, to speak
about the Williams case or assist with the defendant testimony law. See GODFREY, supra, at 214-17.
Moreover, although the Massachusetts House amended the defendant testimony bill on May 9, while Paine
was in town, the best inference I can draw from legislative papers is that the amendment consisted merely
of the deletion of one clause from section I and the deletion of section 2. Compare Mass. H.R. 361, at 13
(printing the bill on April 30, 1866), with An Act in Relation to Evidence in Criminal Prosecutions
(transcribing the bill as passed by the House on May 12, 1866) (unpublished document, on file with the
Massachusetts Archives and with author). Not only was there nothing for Paine to write while sitting in
Adams's chair, but this amendment made the bill, which until then had exactly tracked Maine's 1864
defendant testimony law, a little less like the Maine law. In any event, none of the handwritten documents
contained in the legislative jacket for this act seems to bear Paine's handwriting. See Letter from Albert
W. Paine to Oliver Otis Howard (Nov. 8, 1873) (Bowdoin College Library, 0.0. Howard MSS No. 1233 1)
(providing an example of Paine's handwriting).
I thank David Gold for pointing me to Godfrey's journal entry.
542. According to Godfrey's journal, he and others from Maine were in the Massachusetts Senate at
the time the railroad legislation that concerned them passed that house by a vote of 23 to 10. See GODFREY,
supra note 541, at 217. Although Godfrey does not say, the context suggests Paine was among the group.
The journal of the Massachusetts Senate reports that the Senate approved a railroad bill on May 9 by a vote
of 23 to 10 and that the vote had been scheduled to take place at 3:30 p.m. See 1866 MASS. SENATE J. 665,
669. The journal of the House reports that the defendant testimony bill was amended and passed to a third
reading on the afternoon of May 9. See 1866 MASS. HOUSE J. 389.
543. See The Fourth in Bangor-An Indian Regatta and a Murder, BOSTON HERALD, July 5, 1865,
at I; Letter from Bangor, Me., BOSTON DAILY ADVERTISER, Aug. 24, 1865, at I; Letter from Bangor Me.,
BOSTON HERALD, July 8, 1865, at 4.
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Legal reformers in Massachusetts had long lamented that the operations of
the criminal justice system affected African Americans disproportionately . '
The end of the Civil War could only exacerbate matters. In 1865 the warden
of the state prison worried publicly about a northward immigration of poor,
unskilled freed slaves who would overburden the state's penal institutions.5
Of the 15,000 criminal defendants whom Sawyer complained the old
exclusionary law would silence, a fair number would have been African
American. Those political leaders who fretted about the North's ideological
purity in the eyes of the South must have feared that one such defendant
might, like Williams, take center stage at a celebrated trial.
The prospect of a black man sitting silently at his own trial, accused (as
Williams was) by white men, perhaps caught in the throat of those
Massachusetts politicians who cried righteously of black witnesses silenced in
the courts of the South. It is at the very least interesting that Paine's aging
memory should have emphasized the role of the Williams case, in which the
new Maine law operated to free a black man accused of murder. He apparently
did not mention two earlier murder cases in Maine, in which two white men
accused of murder took advantage of the state's new law, testified on their
own behalf, and, by all accounts, assured their own convictions.6 In a
political landscape not colored by the struggle between North and South, these
latter cases would have made better ad copy.
b. Other States
Massachusetts was only one of many Northern, Midwestern, and Western
states that acted in 1866 and succeeding years to permit criminal defendants
to testify. I have chosen to focus on Massachusetts in part because it was one
of the earliest states to follow Maine's 1864 lead, but also because the close
historical connection between Maine and Massachusetts helps us to test
whether the passage of defendant testimony laws in the 1860s and 1870s was
simply another instance of the nation going as Maine goes. That is, if even in
544. In 1826, the Boston Prison Discipline Society called attention to the high proportion of blacks
in the Massachusetts State Prison. See HINDUS, supra note 402. at 236. In 1850. African Americans
accounted for 0.9% of the Massachusetts population but 8.6% of the prison population See id at 175-78
Hindus reports that the overrepresentation of blacks in the prisons of Massachusetts was "constant-" Id. at
237.
In 1849, in the midst of a reform movement to abolish the death penalty in Massachusetts. a black
man named Washington Goode was convicted of murder. His race heightened the reformers' concern The
Prisoners' Friend implored, "Let it not be said that the last man Massachusetts suffered to be hung was
a colored man!" I JOHN M. SPEAR & WENDELL PHILLIPS. PRISONER'S FRIEND 400. 401 (Boston. Charles
W. Spear 1849).
545. See HINDUS, supra note 402, at 237 (citing REPORT ON, THE STATE PRISON 22 (Boston, 1865)).
The sensationalist Boston Herald often featured black defendants in its accounts of the goings-on in the
local courthouses. See, e.g., Superior Criminal Court-Putnan. J.. BOSTON HERALD. May 12. 1865. at 2
I cannot say whether such stories gained greater prominence as the Civil War drew to a close
546. See supra note 537.
1997]
The Yale Law Journal [Vol. 107: 575
Massachusetts the story was more complicated than that-and I hope I have
shown that it was-then we must look for a more complicated story elsewhere
as well.
In most states, unfortunately, the surviving record proves to be too thin to
bear analysis. In others, such as California, the record has more depth but
neither supports nor refutes the argument I have laid out above. 7 And in
Connecticut, perhaps the only Northern state in which legislative debate about
a defendant testimony law survives, the evidence, though mixed, is largely
unhelpful to my thesis. Two Hartford newspapers printed summaries of the
House debate on the bill, 5  which became law in July 1867.549 Elements
of the debate support my view that ancient notions of the power of the oath
survived surprisingly late. One legislator, a trial judge, confessed that he had
recently presided at the trial of a man who, in the judge's mind, "was innocent:
yet [I] was obliged to convict" because "the testimony was positive against
547. In 1851, California barred testimony by nonwhites in its courts. See Act of Apr. 29, 1851. ch.
V, § 394, 1851 Cal. Stat. 113, 114. In 1863, after Republican and Unionist victories in the elections of
1861 and 1862, the legislature made African Americans competent to testify and, six weeks later, made
civil parties competent as well. See An Act To Amend an Act Entitled an Act To Regulate Proceedings
in Civil Cases in Courts of Justice of this State, ch. CCCCXXVIII, 1863 Cal. Stat. 701 (adopted Apr. 27,
1863); An Act To Amend an Act Entitled an Act To Regulate Proceedings in Civil Cases in the Courts of
Justice in this State, ch. LXVIII, 1863 Cal. Stat. 60 (adopted Mar. 16, 1863); Robert J. Chandler, Friends
in Time of Need: Republicans and Black Civil Rights in California During the Civil War Era, 24 ARIz. &
W. 319, 324-29 (1982) (discussing the effect of the 1861 and 1862 elections on the racial exclusionary
rule); Paul Finkelman, Prelude to the Fourteenth Amendment: Black Legal Rights in the Antebellum North,
17 RUTGERS L.J. 415, 422 n.33 (1986) (attributing the 1863 law change to the Republican Party's rise to
power in California); Arnold Roth, The California State Supreme Court, 1860-1879: A Legal History 101
(1973) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Southern California) (on file with author).
In April 1866, California became the second state in the Union to enact a defendant testimony law.
See Act of Apr. 2, 1866, ch. 644, § 1, 1865-1866 Calif. Stat. 865, 865. (In May, Massachusetts became
the third.) At the beginning of the 1866 legislative session, the state's Republican attorney general
announced that a defendant testimony law should be one of the state's legislative priorities for the year and
made a suggestive but inconclusive reference to the issue of black testimony:
Author of the law admitting parties to the record and in interest to testify, and in favor of negro
testimony, I do not see why some other disabilities should exclude. I am urging the modification
now as purely a legal question, and in this light surely some of the grounds of exclusion are
indefensible....
These disabilities should go to the credibility, not to the competency; to the weight, not
to the entire exclusion; should be addressed to the jury, not the judge.
REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL FOR THE YEARS 1866 AND 1867, at 7 (n.p., D.W. Gelwicks n.d.).
Unfortunately, whatever debate there may have been in the California legislature on the question of
defendant testimony went unreported. In contrast, the local press gave extensive, seemingly verbatim
coverage to the lively 1863 debates on the issue of testimony by nonwhites. See, e.g., SACRAMENTO UNION.
Mar. 5, 1863 (reporting legislative debate); SACRAMENTO UNION, Mar. 6, 1863 (same); SACRAMENTO
UNION, Mar. 7, 1863 (same).
Supporters of the "as goes Maine, so goes the nation" theory would find some support in two aspects
of the California record: The California defendant testimony law followed the text of the Maine law word
for word. Moreover, California's governor, who supported the new law, hailed from Maine. He stated his
support for the defendant testimony law in terms Appleton would have approved: "Open the door wide for
the admission of evidence, and let the jury be allowed unrestricted latitude in judging of its quality." 1867-
1868 CAL. SEN. J. 34 (emphasis in original).
548. See Accused Parties Testifying for Themselves, HARTFORD DAILY TIMES, June 28, 1867, at 2;
Allowing Criminals To Testify, HARTFORD DAILY COURANT, June 29, 1867, at 6.
549. See Act of July 19, 1867, ch. 96. 1867 Conn. Pub. Acts 106.
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him. '550 Another legislator complained that under the existing law, "any
scoundrel can trump up a charge against any innocent man, and swear a crime
upon him.' 551 Moreover, two legislators opposed the law on the grounds that
it would "open a door to perjury" 552-betraying an unmodern fear that the
jury could not discern a lie when it saw one. But at least one legislator
defended the law in terms Appleton or Bentham might have used, arguing that
"[c]redibility is the only proper test, and this will be decided by the jury in the
case of a prisoner as readily and as justly as in the case of a witness. " "
And no legislator made any reference to the problem of racial exclusion laws
in the South.
But in South Carolina, the defector from the general Southern resistance
to permitting defendant testimony, commentators and lawmakers left an
unusually clear and concise historical trail-and here the trail leads directly
back to the controversy over racial exclusion laws. Toward the end of 1865,
South Carolina enacted a Black Code that shared with Mississippi's the
distinction of being the most severe in the South."5 On the question of black
testimony, South Carolina made the barest concession that would satisfy the
President in an effort to persuade him to return jurisdiction from the
Freedmen's Courts to civil authorities: "In every case, civil and criminal, in
which a person of color is a party, or which affects the person or property of
a person of color, persons of color shall be competent witnesses."5"5 The
next sentence constituted South Carolina's first substantial departure from the
old common law system of exclusionary laws: "The accused, in such a
criminal case, and the parties, in every such civil case, may be witnesses, and
so may every other person who is a competent witness .... "'16 My
emphasis of the word "such" makes the already transparent legislative motive
a little more so: The South Carolina legislature did not want it ever to happen
that a black person could testify against a white person who could not testify
in his own defense.
From here, the historical record grows only clearer. The inequities and
humiliations imposed by the Black Codes of South Carolina and other
Southern states drew swift condemnation from the North. The Northern press
began to agitate for stronger constraints on Southern self-government than the
conciliatory terms of Presidential Reconstruction had thus far imposed. Hoping
550. Accused Parties Testifying for Themselves. supra note 548 (remarks of Mr Storo
551. Allowing Criminals To Testif., supra note 548 (remarks of Mr Ives).
552. Id. (remarks of Mr. Woodward); see also Accused Parties Testifvig for Themnselves. supra note
548 (remarks of Mr. Graves) (using similar words).
553. Allowing Criminals To Testify,. supra note 548 (remarks of Mr. Sumner)
554. See FONER, supra note 468. at 199, 200, 202.
555. An Act To Establish District Courts, § 30, 1865 S.C. Stat. 25. 25 Only three members of the
South Carolina convention that enacted this law favored giving freedmen the nght to tctif) in cases in
which blacks were not directly involved. See FRANCIS BLrrt.ER SI'.KIS & ROBERT HILLIARD WOODY,
SOUTH CAROLINA DURING RECONSTRUCTION 42 (1966).
556. § 30, 1865 S.C. Stat. at 25 (emphasis added).
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to stave off more Radical Congressional Reconstruction, South Carolina proved
to be quite aggressive in accommodating Northern demands.557 In the late
summer of 1866 the Governor called a special session of the legislature, which
set to work on a new law code that would reverse the abuses of the previous
year and permit state courts to regain jurisdiction from the federal Freedmen's
Courts.558
As the legislature prepared to eliminate all distinctions of color from the
rules governing witness testimony, a correspondent for the Charleston Courier
worried that the elimination of the racial exclusion laws, combined with the
survival of the other old competency rules, might create an unseemly
imbalance. On August 20, 5'9 and again on September 5,560 1866, this
correspondent described how two freedmen, charged with crimes, had
attempted to claim that a white person had put them up to the act. After the
second of these accounts, the correspondent continued:
This is by no means the only instance in which a freedman guilty
of crime has endeavored to implicate a respectable citizen as an
accomplice .... Our citizens have reason to be sensitive on this
subject .... Perhaps our Legislature, in view of the great changes
which have come upon the land and the necessity of providing for the
protection of the people, will at last realize the importance of giving
the parties to a cause, either in a civil or criminal action, the right to
testify. The Court or Jury can decide on the degree of credit to be
attached to such evidence. In support of this suggestion some of the
first lawyers in the State could be named, and it certainly is a measure
in which the safety and interests of the individual citizen are deeply
involved. It is a current opinion that with fifty dollars enough
testimony of a certain kind can be manufactured and brought up to
convict almost any one of the gravest crimes; and it is therefore
considered important that an accused person shall be allowed to give
his own testimony on oath, which in a nicely poised case might be
557. "Realizing the futility of the policy they had been pursuing, the South Carolina leaders modified
their conduct in hopes of averting the doom which Congress seemed to have in store for them. They revised
the 'black code'...." SIMKINS & WOODY, supra note 555, at 58. At the August 1866 national union
convention, Governor James L. Orr of South Carolina is said to have marched arm in arm with General
Darius Nash Couch of Massachusetts. See Frederick W. Dallinger, Massachusetts in Reconstruction
(1865-1871), in 4 COMMONWEALTH HISTORY OF MASSACHUSETTS 556 (Albert Bushnell Hart ed., 1930).
558. Governor Orr opened the session with these words: "I have convened the General Assembly in
extraordinary session, for the purpose of recommending such modifications of existing laws with reference
to persons of color as will entitle the tribunals of this State to exercise jurisdiction over them in all
cases ... ." JOURNAL OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA, BEING
THE EXTRA SESSION OF 1866, at 9 (Columbia, Julian A. Selby 1866). He added later that "[wlhen our laws
are so modified that all persons may be tried before the same tribunal, and, upon conviction, subjected to
the same punishment for the same class of offences, all reason for the interference of Federal authority with
the administration of justice will have ceased." Id.
559. See Our Sumter Correspondence, CHARLESTON DAILY COURIER, Aug. 20, 1866, at 4.
560. See Our Sumter Correspondence, CHARLESTON DAILY COURIER, Sept. 5, 1866, at 4.
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sufficient to turn the scales in his favor. It is in the power of the
Legislature to give this additional safeguard to the citizen.5"'
One can see between the lines the writer's concern that white citizens were
now at the mercy of freedmen who, for "fifty dollars," would "'manufacture[]"
"enough testimony of a certain kind ... to convict almost any one of the
gravest crimes."
The legislature proved sympathetic to the correspondent's concern. Bowing
to Northern pressure to eliminate color-based distinctions in its laws, it decreed
"[t]hat all persons hitherto known in law in this State as slaves, or as free
persons [of] color, shall have the [same] right to ... give evidence ... as
white persons now have. ' 62 But the legislature also bowed to the concerns
of its white citizenry and eliminated entirely the common law bar against the
testimony of interested persons, civil parties, and criminal defendants. 6
South Carolina's was not the only Southern state legislature to address the
fear that freedmen, now made competent to testify under Northern pressure,
might testify against whites who were barred from testifying under the old
competency rules. In neighboring North Carolina, at the same moment the
legislature grudgingly made nonwhites competent "in all controversies...
where the rights of persons or property of persons of color, shall be put in
issue," it also provided that "no person shall be deemed incompetent to bear
testimony in such cases, because of being a party to the record."6 Two days
later, North Carolina simply made all civil parties competent.5 5 In Alabama,
in the same act by which the legislature made African Americans competent
in a limited group of cases, it provided that "in all cases ... in which a
freedman ... is a witness against a white person, or a white person against a
561. Id. I owe this striking quotation to Alexis Haller's sharp eye
562. An Act To Declare the Rights of Persons Lately Known as Slases and as Free Pcrsons of Color.
No. 4798, 1866 S.C. Acts Extra Sess. 393. 393-94. In proposing this expansion of the nghts of freedmen
to testify at the outset of the special legislative session. Governor Or told the legislators
[The former provision), admitting persons of color to testify in all cases %%here theinselses
or their race are directly concemed. and excluding them by implication in all cases %%here they
are not interested, cannot be reconciled with sound policy or just discnmination The) are
admitted in that class of cases where their interest, sympathy, association and feelings would
be most likely to pervert their consciences and invite to false sweanng. and are excluded from
testifying in all cases where no motive could exist to sw-ear falsely, except that of a depraved
heart. The distinction is illogical and indefensible, and it cannot be denied that it has its
foundation in a prejudice against the caste of the negro.
JOURNAL OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE STATE OF SOtTit CAROLIA. BEIG TIlE EXTRA
SESSION OF 1866. supra note 558, at 10.
563. See No. 4798, 1866 S.C. Acts Extra Sess. at 393-94. The Govemor signed the act into laws on
September 20, 1866. See JOURNAL OF ThE SENATE OF ThE STATE OF SOL-nt CAROLIA. BEING TIlE EXTRA
SESSION OF 1866, at 57 (Columbia, Julian A. Selby 1866) The Courier announced its approal of the
downfall of the competency rules. See Tire Late Change in the Rules of Evideace, CIIARSTO% DAILY
COURtER, Oct. 5, 1866, at 2.
564. An Act Conceming Negroes and Persons of Color or of Mixed Blood. ch 40. § 9, 1866 N C
Pub. Laws 99, 102 (emphasis added).
565. See An Act To Improve the Law of Evidence. ch 43. § 2. 1866 N C Law s 112. 112
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freedman ... the parties shall be competent witnesses., 566 It is very likely
that this same impulse is what moved several other states-California, Florida,
Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Oregon, and Virginia-to make civil parties
competent at virtually the same time they made nonwhites competent. South
Carolina may have been unusual, therefore, only in this narrow sense: In
seeking to avoid the spectacle of freedmen testifying against whites who, as
parties, were incompetent to testify, most states were content to abolish only
the civil parties ban. In also permitting testimony by criminal defendants,
South Carolina protected even accused criminals from this perceived ignominy.
E. The Link to African Americans' Right To Testify: Assessing the Evidence
The political dynamic at work in South Carolina was very unlike that in
Massachusetts. In South Carolina, external forces demanded that the state
permit blacks to testify. Insecure white citizens then demanded that all
competency rules be dropped so that white parties would not find themselves
silenced in the face of a black person's accusation. In Massachusetts, a
campaign to force the South to abolish its racial exclusion laws required the
North to abolish its own competency rules--otherwise the South could have
complained of Northern hypocrisy. These two political dynamics have a certain
appealing symmetry, but as historical explanations, they are in no sense
synergistic. That is, the rather clear evidence that South Carolina permitted
criminal defendants to testify because it had been forced to permit blacks to
testify does not make my theory of what happened in the North appreciably
stronger.
A good deal remains to be explained about the pattern of adoption of
defendant testimony laws. The clear North-South bias outlasted any live
controversy about the legality of racial exclusions. The Civil Rights Act of
1866567 decreed that all persons shall have the same right to give evidence
as white persons. Although some Southern and border states denied that
Congress had power under the Thirteenth Amendment to dictate the rules of
evidence in state courts,568 the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment in
1868 surely settled all such doubts. Meanwhile, Radical Reconstruction was
altogether reshaping the political landscape of the South. Yet, of the nineteen
state and territorial legislatures that acted during the 1870s to grant criminal
defendants the right to testify, none belonged to the old Confederacy, and only
566. An Act To Protect Freedmen in Their Rights of Person and Property in This State, No. 86, 1866
Ala. Acts 98 (adopted Dec. 9, 1865).
567. An Act To Protect All Persons in the United States in Their Civil Rights, and Furnish the Means
of Their Vindication, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27, 27 (1866).
568. See, e.g., Bowlin v. Commonwealth, 65 Ky. (2 Bush) 5, 7, 10 (1867). For the legal and historical
context of this case, see Robert D. Goldstein, Blyew: Variations on a Jurisdictional Theme, 41 STAN. L.
REV. 469, 483-513 (1989).
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two were border states. Not until the 1880s did the Old South begin to fall in
line.
I cannot explain the long survival of this North-South distinction, though
I can offer guesses about its cause. If, as I have argued, Northern states first
passed defendant testimony laws as part of their campaign to force Southern
states to abandon their racial exclusion laws, then it perhaps should not
surprise us that Reconstruction legislatures in the South did not rush to permit
defendants to testify. Not only were the racial exclusion laws in question
largely gone, but even at the height of Radical Reconstruction the fear of
perceived hypocrisy that once had motivated the North would have been
altogether alien to a Southern lawmaker. As for later years, it surely seems
possible that Southern states continued to shun defendant testimony laws
because they still associated such laws with Northern Radicalism. The
comment of one North Carolina legislator in 1881, who opposed a defendant
testimony law as a "Yankee innovation," gives some force to this speculation
(though the legislator seems to have directed the remark at a clause of the bill
that permitted defendants' spouses to testify)i 69 A satisfying explanation of
the persistence of the North-South bias past the 1860s, however, must await
more study. For now, I hope I have succeeded in the more modest task of
identifying the trigger that first set off the distinctly Northern explosion of
defendant testimony laws in the 1860s. In that decade, the long and slowly
rising historical trajectory of the jury's development as our system's lie
detector passed close to the gravitational field of a far greater historical force
and was, if only briefly, yanked toward the future.
V. THE ALLURE OF THE BLACK Box
The defendant testimony laws of the late nineteenth century removed the
last great barrier shielding juries from full frontal credibility conflicts of the
sort they face so routinely today. In 1882, not even twenty years after Maine
first let accused criminals take the oath in their own defense, one observer
declared that the direst predictions of the opponents of the new laws had come
true:
Experience has, beyond all question, proved [the defendant's option
to testify] to be the most powerful and the most fruitful incentive to
perjury ever devised by the legislator. In total disregard of that
ever-present and irresistible instinct of self-preservation, which is
"nature's first law," it holds out to the man guilty of crime the
overpowering temptation of denying his guilt under oath, in the
569. A Field Day in the House, DAILY CHARLOTrE OBSERVER. Feb. 20. 1881. at I (remarks of Mr.
Manning).
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delusive hope that he will be believed, thus adding perjury to his
other crime.570
The jury now faced the most demanding lie-detecting task it had yet
encountered: In criminal cases, where the standard of proof was beyond a
reasonable doubt and the stakes were the life or liberty of the defendant, the
jury would have to listen to the prosecution's sworn accusation and the
defendant's sworn denial and label one of them truth and the other lie.
Yet the system did not, as I hope I have made clear, invest the jury with
this new lie-detecting role because of a conviction that the jury had grown
equal to the task. It is true that over the preceding centuries the system had
slowly complicated the jury's lie-detecting work in criminal cases, first by
permitting the defendant to call witnesses, then by permitting those witnesses
to be sworn. It is true that Bethel's rule and the other common law evidence
rules that sought to guide juries when they confronted apparent conflicts of
oaths had slowly eroded. And it is true that in the decades before Maine and
other Northern states tore down this last great barrier to conflicts between
oaths, many jurisdictions had begun to dismantle the system of competency
rules that sought to keep the most likely liars from reaching the witness stand.
There is no doubt that the bar against sworn defendant testimony would have
fallen in due time-this was surely one of those battles between past and
future that the future was destined to win.' Still, the epochal conflict
between North and South brought change before its time. The system perhaps
had to struggle to summon the confidence in its juries that its laws now
proclaimed.
We catch glimpses of this struggle in the early resistance by some of the
system's players to the full consequences of change. California trial judges
advised juries to take particular care in evaluating the defendant's testimony
in light of "the consequences to him relating from the results of this trial and
the inducements and stipulations which would ordinarily influence a person in
570. Departures from the Common Law Rule as to Testimony by Husband and Wife, 3 CRIM. L. MAO,
155, 162 (1882). The previous year, during debate about whether to adopt a defendant testimony law, a
North Carolina legislator said it "ought to be entitled a bill to allow defendants to commit perjury." A Field
Day in the House, supra note 569 (remarks of Mr. Rowland). Another argued that North Carolina's 1866
law permitting civil parties to testify "had worked a full crop of pejury." Id. (remarks of Mr. Glenn). On
the other hand, two legislators expressed full confidence that the jury could detect any such perjury.
"[L]iars cannot fool juries," said one. Id. (remarks of Mr. Day). The other declared that "[a] jury of twelve
men are quick and sharp to tell whether a man is telling the truth." Id. (remarks of Mr. Grainger).
571. Cf. GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 65 (1974) ("The future, of course, won, as it
always does."). Some contemporaries perceived the issue in these terms. In 1881, a North Carolina
newspaper paraphrased the words of a legislator advocating a proposed defendant testimony law: "(He said]
the method proposed was up to the spirit of the age and in accordance with its progress. He did not desire
to see North Carolina left behind. He knew that some day it would be adopted, and the present was as good
a time as any." The General Assembly of North Carolina, RALEIGH NEWS & OBSERVER, Feb. 2, 1881, at
2 (remarks of Mr. Davidson).
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his situation. 572 Rejecting a defendant's challenge to this instruction in 1882,
the state's supreme court noted curtly that "[it is only by virtue of a provision
of the Code that [the defendant] is permitted to testify at all, and it is manifest
that he labors under the strongest temptation to which any witness could be
subjected. '5 73 But while courts in some cases worried that juries would
weigh the defendant's oath too heavily, courts in other cases took care that
juries not dismiss his oath too lightly. In 1886, the Nebraska Supreme Court
considered the consequence of the state's 1873 statute giving criminal
defendants the right to testify.574 Nebraska had not formerly required
corroboration of a victim's testimony in rape cases, 575 but the court now held
that when a man charged with rape denied the victim's accusation under oath,
a jury could not convict unless some additional evidence weighed with the
victim's account.576 As the Missouri Supreme Court explained in adopting
Nebraska's new rule, the defendant's sworn denial "creat[es] an equipoise of
oath against oath" that bars conviction without corroboration.5 7 Although the
Missouri court retracted its reasoning in 1897 and affirmed "the jury's duty
and prerogative ... to weigh all the evidence and credit that which to them
appears most reasonable and creditable, 57'  Nebraska adhered to its rule,"
79
and turn-of-the-century courts in Illinois, "" Oklahoma,8  and New
Mexico582 followed Nebraska's lead.
Such cases show the system's growing pains as it adjusted to the jury's
expanding lie-detecting role. The system has long since overcome this
adolescent awkwardness at the new credibility conflicts in its courts. But even
today we can see artifacts of an earlier time-reminders that the system was
572. People v. Morrow, 60 Cal. 142, 147 (1882); see also State v. Maguire, 69 Mo 197. 201-02
(1878) (approving an instruction "that by the statutes of this State the defendant is a competent witness in
his own behalf, but the fact that he is a witness testifying in his own behalf. may be considered by the jury
in determining the credibility of his testimony"): St. Louis v. State. 8 Neb. 405. 418 (1879) (endorsing an
instruction that the jury was "at liberty to consider the great interest which [the defendant) has in the
result").
573. Morrow, 60 Cal. at 147. 1 am grateful to Barbara Babcock for this reference
California's modem-day instruction advises juries that they may "consider anything that has a
tendency in reason to prove or disprove the truthfulness of the testimony of the witness, including . [tlhe
existence or nonexistence of a bias, interest, or other motive." CALIFORNIA JURY INsTRUCnOS, CRIuIuNAL
§ 2.20 (West 1993). It does not highlight the criminal defendant's particular motive to lie. The Ninth
Circuit's pattern instruction says simply, "You should consider the testimony of the defendant just as you
would the testimony of any other witness." NINTh CIRCUIT MODEL CRIMINAL JURY INSmRLCIONS § 3 07
(1995).
574. See Matthews v. State, 27 N.W. 234, 237 (Neb. 1886). Tait Swtger pointed me to this very
interesting line of cases.
575. See, e.g., Garrison v. People, 6 Neb. 274. 283 (1877).
576. See Matthews, 27 N.W. at 237.
577. State v. Patrick, 107 Mo. 147, 173 (1891); see also td. at 149 (argument of defense counsel)
(citing Matthews to the court).
578. State v. Mareks, 140 Mo. 656. 668 (1897).
579. See Klawitter v. State, 107 N.W. 121, 121 (Neb. 1906).
580. See Stevens v. People, 41 N.E. 856, 858 (III. 1895).
581. See Sowers v. Territory, 6 Okla. 436, 451 (1897).
582. See Mares v. Territory, 10 N.M. 770, 778 (1901).
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once not so confident in the jury's role as full and final arbiter of the
credibility of witnesses. Followers of the O.J. Simpson murder trial will recall
that Judge Ito instructed the jurors on an only slightly modernized version of
the rule of falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus. Without naming Detective Mark
Fuhrman and without highlighting Fuhrman's proved lie about his past use of
a racial slur, Ito advised the jury that "[a] witness who is willfully false in one
material part of his or her testimony is to be distrusted in others." '583
Although California, like other states that have retained some version of this
rule, merely provides that juries may disbelieve the entire testimony of a
witness who has lied about one material fact, this more modern version of the
rule spares a jury, if it chooses, the task of wrestling with the comparative
credibility of competing witnesses.
Moreover, many modem jurisdictions continue to require something more
than a lone witness to make out a prosecution for perjury.5" It is not that
perjury is too serious a crime for conviction to ride on a single witness's
word-after all, a single witness is enough to condemn a defendant for murder.
Rather, this rule recalls the system's old reluctance to pit one oath against
another. We see more startling relics of the old ways in scattered statements
that sworn testimony is presumed truthful.5 5 The corollary rule that the jury
may not disbelieve the unimpeached, uncontradicted testimony of a
disinterested witness seems still to thrive in civil courts586 and, although
583. Pre-Instructions to the Jury, People v. Simpson, No. BA097211, 1995 WL 23581, at *36 (Cal.
Super. Ct. 1995); see also CALIFORNIA JURY INSTRUCTIONS, CRIMINAL § 2.21.2 (West 1993) (providing
quoted language). More typically, modem juries are told that they "may believe everything a witness says,
or part of it, or none of it." NINTH CIRCUIT MODEL CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 3.07 (1995).
584. See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
585. See, e.g., Adams v. State, 542 N.E.2d 1362, 1370 (Ind. Ct. App. 1989) ("You should attempt to
fit the evidence to the presumption that the defendant is innocent and the theory that every witness is telling
the truth." (quoting INDIANA PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS, CRIMINAL, Preliminary Instruction No. 1.23,
at 25)); State v. Hart, 625 P.2d 21, 31 (Mont. 1981) ("A witness is presumed to speak the truth- but this
presumption may be repelled .... ); State v. Kessler, 458 P.2d 432, 434 (Or. 1969) ("Now every witness
is presumed to speak the truth. This presumption may be overcome .... "). But see, e.g., Williams v. State,
520 So. 2d 179, 181 (Ala. Crim. App. 1987) ("In Alabama, there is no presumption that a witness is telling
the truth."); Laster v. State, 521 A.2d 1289, 1290-92 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1987) (holding it error to instruct
a jury that witnesses should be presumed truthful, at least where the only witnesses are state witnesses)
State v. Thompson, 504 N.W.2d 838, 840-43 (N.D. 1993) (holding it reversible error to instruct, "If you
find a conflict in the evidence, you should reconcile it, if you can, because each witness is presumed to
have told the truth").
The Supreme Court has acknowledged that there is "substantial unanimity among federal courts of
appeals that [a presumption-of-truth instruction] ought not to be given." Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141,
146 (1973); see id. at 143-44 & n.4, 145; see also Walter W. Jones, Jr., Annotation, Propriety and
Prejudicial Effect of Instruction, in Federal Criminal Trial, That Witnesses Are Presumed To Tell the Truth,
8 A.L.R. FED. 319 passim (1971).
586. Guy Wellborn points to various authorities for the modem rule. See Olin Guy Wellborn III,
Demeanor, 76 CORNELL L. REv. 1075, 1100 & n.120 (1991) (citing FLEMING JAMES, JR. & GEOFFREY C.
HAZARD, JR., CIVIL PROCEDURE § 7.19, at 364-65 (4th ed. 1992); 9A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTIIUR
R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2527, at 286-88 (2d ed. 1995) (deeming "preferable"
the "majority view" that "the jury is required to believe ... uncontradicted and unimpeached evidence from
disinterested witnesses"); Edward H. Cooper, Directions for Directed Verdicts: A Compass for Federal
Courts, 55 MINN. L. REV. 903, 930-40 (1971) (same); W.E. Shipley, Annotation, Credibility of Witness
Given Uncontradicted Testimony as Matter for Court or Jury, 62 A.L.R.2d 1191 (1958) (noting that many
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generally rejected in criminal courts,8 7 makes occasional appearances there
in a vaguer and more permissive form.5 Perhaps, as Fleming James and
Geoffrey Hazard suggest, the rule "amounts to a holding that reasonable people
could not disbelieve such testimony on the basis of demeanor evidence."' 9
Even if the rule were nothing more than a vote of no confidence in the jury's
powers to detect a lie based on a witness's demeanor, it would be hard to
reconcile with our modem image of juries as the sole and unconstrained judges
of credibility.
We find, too, relics of those rules that pronounced on the credibility of
certain witnesses. In many modem jurisdictions, the testimony of an
accomplice standing alone remains insufficient to support a criminal
conviction.' 9° Until about a generation ago, a rape victim's uncorroborated
word was in many places insufficient to convict (whether or not the defendant
denied the charge under oath-the condition of Nebraska's unusual rule).59'
Corroboration rules for accomplices and rape victims are vestiges of the
institutional suspicion we saw directed at such witnesses in proceedings at the
Old Bailey over two centuries ago.592 But these rules reflect suspicions about
the jury as well-an institutional fear that the jury will fail to see how
untrustworthy such witnesses are and will overcredit their testimony. 93 By
deeming accomplices and rape victims less credible than other witnesses as a
matter of law, such rules deny to juries the full power to assess credibility.
but not all American jurisdictions follow the rule in civil cases)).
587. See Shipley, supra note 586, at 1210-1I.
588. See, e.g., Sweany v. State, 607 N.E.2d 387. 389 (Ind. 1993) (approving a "pattern" jury
instruction stating, "You should not disregard the testimony of any witness without a reason and without
careful consideration").
589. JAMES & HAZARD, supra note 586, § 7.19, at 364-65.
590. As of 1990, the date of the last thorough survey. 16 states and Puerto Rico had accomplice
corroboration statutes; two states had established the rule by case law. See Christine J. Saverda. Note.
Accomplices in Federal Court: A Case for Increased Evidentiar" Standards. 100 YALE Li 785. 790-91
nn.40-41 (1990); Edmund J. O'Meally. Recent Decision. Tumer v. State-Should an Accomplice's Ercited
Utterance Corroborate His In-Court Testimony?, 42 MD. L. REv. 571. 573 nn.18-19 (1983).
591. See 7 WIGMORE, supra note 44, §§ 2061-2062, at 342-57 (describing corroboration rules of
various jurisdictions as of 1940). As of 1972. 15 American junsdictions maintained some form of
corroboration requirement in rape cases. See Note, The Rape Corroboration Requirement: Repeal Not
Reform, 81 YALE L.J. 1365, 1367-68 (1972) (citing statutes embracing a corroboration requirement).
592. See supra notes 319, 327-328 and accompanying text: see also SUSAN Es'TRIc'i. REAL RAPE 43-
47 (1987) (arguing that courts enforced the corroboration requirement when they mistrusted the
complainant's testimony); 7 WIGMORE, supra note 44, § 2061. at 345 (quoting Hale's notorious injunction
that "it must be remembered that [rape] is an accusation easily to be made and hard to be proved; and
harder to be defended by the party accused, tho never so innocent"); Note. Corroborating Charges of Rape.
67 COLUM. L. REv. 1137, 1138 (1967) ("Surely the simplest, and perhaps the most important, reason not
to permit conviction for rape on the uncorroborated word of the prosecutrix is that that word is very often
false.").
593. See Note, supra note 592, at 1139 (reasoning that a jury "cannot always be trusted to resolve (a
rape charge] fairly" because of "'the respect and sympathy naturally felt by any tribunal for a wronged
female"' (quoting 3 WIGMORE, supra note 44. § 924a, at 459)).
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Corroboration rules of course have begun to fade. Those applying to rape
victims have largely passed from the scene,594 and those addressing
accomplices are now rarer than they were.595 But the disappearance of these
rules probably owes little to a conviction that juries have grown more able to
assess the credibility of these supposedly troublesome witnesses. Corroboration
rules in rape cases were abolished in the 1970s, together with other features
of the old rape law that protected the defendant at the victim's expense. Like
laws that defined away the possibility of marital rape and that exposed rape
complainants to the most invasive interrogation about their sexual pasts,
corroboration rules in rape were brought down by a social revolution and not
by a legal reform. The gradual demise of accomplice corroboration rules
probably owes much more to a sharpened political distaste for anything
hindering the prosecution of crime than to new faith in the jury's capacity to
594. No American jurisdiction retains a general corroboration requirement in rape cases. Georgia
abolished the last remaining statutory rule in 1978, see An Act To Amend Code Section 26-2001, Relating
to Rape, So as To Delete the Provision That No Conviction Shall Be Had for Rape on the Unsupported
Testimony of the Female; To Repeal Conflicting Laws; and for Other Purposes, No. 754, 1978 Ga. Acts
3, 3-4 (adopted Jan. 20, 1978), and Nebraska the last remaining common law rule in 1989, see An Act
Relating to Criminal Procedure; To Eliminate the Requirement of Corroboration of Testimony for Certain
Offenses; To Repeal Section 29-2013, Reissue Revised Statutes of Nebraska, 1943; and To Declare an
Emergency, 1989 Neb. Laws 443. Several states still require corroboration in specific cases. See, e.g., CAL.
PENAL CODE § 262 (West 1997) (requiring corroboration in cases of spousal rape if the victim made no
complaint to an official or counselor within one year); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-3 (1996) (requiring
corroboration in statutory rape prosecutions); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-69 (1996) (same); N.Y. PENAL LAW
§ 130.16 (McKinney 1987) (requiring corroboration when alleged lack of consent is due to mental defect
or incapacity); TEX. CRIM. P. CODE ANN. § 38.07 (West 1995) (requiring corroboration when the victim
made no complaint within one year of the assault, unless the victim was less than 18 years old).
595. Between 1973 and 1990, seven of the 24 American jurisdictions that had retained accomplice
corroboration statutes abandoned them. See Saverda, supra note 590, at 790-91 n.40. At least one state,
however, newly adopted the rule by case law. See State v. Copeland, 677 S.W.2d 471, 474 (Tenn. Crim.
App. 1984) (citing McKinney v. State, 552 S.W.2d 787 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1977)).
The history of the accomplice corroboration rule in the United States does not carve a straight line.
In England, as noted earlier, a corroboration rule that was clearly in force during at least part of the 18th
century was abandoned toward the end of the century and replaced by a cautionary instruction to the jury.
See supra note 326 and accompanying text; see also FRANCIS WHARTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF
EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL IssuEs 353 (Philadelphia, Kay & Brother, 8th ed. 1880). By the mid-19th century,
most American jurisdictions seem to have followed the later English practice: The jury had the power to
convict on an accomplice's uncorroborated word, but trial judges had the obligation to wam the jury to use
great caution or even, simply, to acquit. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Larrabee, 99 Mass. 413, 415 (1868)
("[I]t is usual to instruct the jury ... that it is unsafe to convict upon such evidence .... ); People v.
Costello, I Den. 83, 87 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1845) ("The court certainly should advise great caution on the part
of the jury .... "); State v. Wingo, I 1 S.C. 275, 275 (1878) ("'.The presiding judge ought to advise the
jury to acquit the prisoner."' (quoting authority)). Francis Wharton put the point more strongly: Not only
should the judge "advise the jury not to convict" on uncorroborated accomplice testimony, but the judge
should set aside the verdict if the jury nonetheless convicts. See WHARTON, supra, at 352-53. This
"general[]" rule, as Wharton calls it, id. at 352, of course differs very little from a true corroboration
requirement.
Those states that enacted formal corroboration rules seem to have done so between 1850 and 1900.
See Derek J.T. Adler, Note, Er Post Facto Limitations on Changes in Evidentiary Law: Repeal of
Accomplice Corroboration Requirements, 55 FORDHAM L. REv. 1191, 1202-03 nn.69-70 (1987). Wigmore
explained these statutes as a reaction to laws passed earlier in the 19th century forbidding trial judges to
comment to juries on the evidence. See supra notes 447-448 and accompanying text. In lieu of the old
cautionary instruction, he says, many states put in place strict corroboration rules. See 7 WIOMORE, supra
note 44, § 2056, at 315-21.
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judge accomplice testimony. Once again, as we have seen throughout the long
history I have sketched here, social and political forces worked changes in the
law that required the system, after the fact, to stake more faith in the jury's lie-
detecting role.
It hardly seems likely, however, that a series of widely spaced and
seemingly disconnected social forces-the Glorious Revolution of 1688, the
American Civil War of the 1860s, the feminist revolution of the 1970s-could
account fully for the jury's growing role as the system's lie detector. Such a
historical account, implausible on its face, would grow ungainly and ridiculous
if it tried to account for all the other moments and trends that in great ways
and small have increased the factfinding autonomy of the jury. Some of these
I have mentioned already: The newly found right of criminal defendants in the
middle of the sixteenth century to call unsworn witnesses, which I can attribute
to no particular historical event except perhaps the anecdotal and unexplained
largesse of Queen Mary; the slow deaths of Bethel's rule, the principle of
numerology, and the rule offalsus in uno; and the demise of competency rules
in civil cases in the mid-nineteenth century, which Jeremy Bentham or Andrew
Jackson may or may not have inspired.596
It would be foolish to argue that each of these trends and events traces to
a political or social controversy that operated outside the justice system. I
make no such claim here. On the contrary, when all of these historical
transformations are lined up alongside one another, they permit one broad and
inescapable historical generalization: At least over the last several centuries and
arguably since its founding, the criminal trial jury has consistently increased
its lie-detecting role, while the role of the oath in assuring the accuracy of
evidence at trial has steadily diminished. Perhaps, as I have argued here,
specific events external to the justice system triggered the most notable
transformations along this road. Something internal to the system, however,
must have made those transformations so welcome and enduring-otherwise,
we would expect to see some reversals along the road. Yet, the jury's role as
the system's lie detector has only grown and has never, for a sustained time,
diminished.597
596. There are many other such moments and trends that I have not considered here. both for want
of space and because they do not bear directly on the jury's lie-detecting role---hough they do bear on its
general factfinding powers. The most important of these was the 1670 ruling in Bushel's Case. 124 Eng.
Rep. 1006 (C.P. 1670), which barred trial judges from fining and imprIsoning jurors who insisted on
returning a verdict with which the judge disagreed. Perhaps the best. most comprehensive treatment of
Bushel's Case is in GREEN, supra note 19. at 23649.
Bushel's Case is the most notable event within a broader trend away from direct judicial meddling
in jury factfinding. Judges may no longer quiz the jury on the nature of its deliberations, call on the jury
to reconsider a verdict unsatisfactory to the court, or require the jury (at least in criminal cases) to answer
special interrogatories rather than return a general verdict See WAYNE R. LAFAVE & JEROLD H. IsRAEL
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 24.7a, at 1050 (2d ed. 1992) (noting that special verdicts in criminal cases are
"not favored").
597. In the 19th century, many states increased the factfinding and lie-detecting powsers of juries by
barring trial judges from commenting on the strength of the evidence or the credibility of witnesses By
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I suggest that the most substantial force behind this enormous historical
trend has been the system's concern with its own apparent legitimacy. In
Part I, I argued that this concern drove the system to embrace the oath as a
channel to divine wisdom after the abolition of the ordeal had removed the
divine sanction from criminal verdicts. Yet, the oath, for reasons that are
perhaps already too clear, was an inherently unstable source of systemic
legitimacy. Its illusory power to assure truthful outcomes depended on a
contorted scheme of feints and screens. Because obvious perjury would have
exposed the oath's incapacity to guarantee truthful testimony, the system did
not undertake to punish perjury. Because contradictory oaths would have
exposed the oath as a failure, the system forbade contradictory oaths. When the
system finally relented and began to permit defense witnesses to contradict the
oaths of prosecution witnesses, it forbade them to do so under oath. When it
later permitted defense witnesses to be sworn, it did what it could to prevent
head-to-head credibility conflicts that would have exposed one witness as a
liar. A bevy of competency rules sought to keep the likeliest liars from the
witness stand, and Bethel' rule helped juries to evade the conclusion that
oaths were in conflict.
As we now know, these contorted maneuverings to protect the system's
legitimacy actually eroded that legitimacy. Bentham aimed his most withering
ridicule at the old system of competency rules, which he said purported to
guard the truth but in fact merely hid from the jury many potential sources of
truth.59 ' But long before Bentham and long before the Enlightenment or the
Scientific Revolution, ordinary people must have shaken their heads in
1913, 41 states had followed this trend in reversing the old common law practice that permitted such
comment. See Krasity, supra note 447, at 595; supra notes 447-448 and accompanying text. In the 1940
edition to his treatise, Wigmore expressed great hope that states had begun to repent "[tihis unfortunate
departure from the orthodox common law rule," 9 WIGMORE, supra note 44, § 255 I, at 504-05, and were
restoring judges' right to comment, see id. § 2551a, at 512-13. In a footnote, Wigmore then listed three
states that recently had acted to permit judicial comment (California, Michigan, and New Mexico), two
states that had considered but rejected such action (Colorado and Massachusetts), and one state in which
a commission had proposed the change in 1937, with no update on its progress (New York). See id. §
255 1a, at 513 n.4.
In the 1981 edition of Wigmore's treatise, in an otherwise virtually unchanged paragraph, both the
proclamation of progress among the states and the footnote are gone. See 9 JOHN HENRY WIOMORB,
EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAWv § 2551 a, at 674 (James H. Chadbour ed., 4th rev. ed. 1981). The
editor comments sadly that "[d]espite the progressive movement [of the 1930s], the latest development is
retrogressive"-that is, toward more lie-detecting power for the jury. Id. at 678.
In California, which restored judicial comment in 1934 by constitutional amendment, see 9 WIGMORE,
supra note 44, § 255 1a, at 513 n.4, judges retain that power today. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1093 (West
1997) ("The judge may ... make such comment on the evidence and the testimony and credibility of any
witness as in his opinion is necessary .... "). They may not, however, 'usurp the jury'9 exclusive function
as the arbiter of questions of fact and the credibility of witnesses."' People v. Melton, 750 P.2d 741, 752
(Cal. 1988) (quoting People v. Cook, 658 P.2d 86, 91 (1983)). In at least a few other states, judges may
still comment on the weight of the evidence. See, e.g., State v. Marra, 610 A.2d 1113, 1130 (Conn. 1992);
Commonwealth v. Rough, 418 A.2d 605, 610 (Pa. Super. 1980).
598. See supra notes 394-398 and accompanying text.
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wonderment at a system designed to find truth that permitted only one party
to the cause to present any sworn evidence at all.
The jury, in contrast, promised a remarkably reliable source of systemic
legitimacy. Its usually private and inarticulate decisionmaking protected it from
the sort of embarrassing public failures that so regularly threatened the oath.
Although two oaths all too easily could conflict, the jury's verdict stood alone
and, at least within the system's formal bounds, was almost immune from
contradiction. Moreover, whether by tradition or conscious design, the jury's
verdict has been largely impenetrable. There never has been a mechanism by
which the defendant or anyone outside the system could command the jury to
reveal its decisionmaking processes. 599 The jury's secrecy is an aid to
legitimacy, for the privacy of the jury box shrouds the shortcomings of its
methods.
One source of legitimacy the jury could never comfortably claim is
divinity. Despite its other obvious advantages, the jury lacked what the oath
could offer at a time when the recent abolition of the ordeal had left the
system in search of a substitute source of divine sanction. Exactly when and
precisely why the system began to feel comfortable enough with the notion of
human factfinding to begin expanding the jury's lie-detecting role remain
mysteries. The answers no doubt have something to do with the progressive
secularization and democratization of English and American societies. Perhaps
they also have something to do with the sheer passage of time and our ever
greater familiarity with the jury, whose great old age helped win it reverence.
In any event, one thing may be said with some certainty about the system's
gradual abandonment of the oath and its embrace of the jury as its source of
legitimacy in truthfinding: It was exceedingly slow. No matter how vividly we
try to paint the jury's superiority as a source of legitimacy, the system gave up
its hold on the security of the oath and invested the jury with the role of lie
detector only with great reluctance. I have not tried here to explain the slow
pace of change. Perhaps the resistance to change by common law institutions
does not require much explanation.
But slow as it may have been, change was inexorable. Once the process
of shifting lie-detecting authority to the jury had begun, it was likely to
proceed until the jury had absorbed near-complete autonomy over the
599. Today the law goes to great lengths to protect the pnvacy of the deliberation process See FI
R. EVID. 606(b) (generally barring testimony of jurors to impeach a jury's verdict): Tanner v United Sttes,
483 U.S. 107, 122-25 (1987) (interpreting Rule 606(b) to prevent jurors from testifying that other jurors
had used alcohol and narcotic drugs during the trial). In 1956. after the Chicago Jury Project bugged the
deliberations of several civil juries with the rial judges' perurbsion. Congress made it a crime to record
jury deliberations in a federal cour. See Act of Aug. 2. 1956. ch. 879. § 1. 70 Stat 935 (codified as
amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1508 (1984 & Supp. 1996)): cf JAY KA'-z. -XPERImIEN'TA'no.% wmi HbIAN
BEINGS 67, 84-91 (1972) (reproducing the transcript of a 1955 Senate subcommittee hearing at which
University of Chicago Law School Professor Harry Kalven. Jr, was accused of Communist leanings
because of his role in the buggings).
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factfinding process. That was in part because the conditions required to sustain
the oath as a source of legitimacy were fundamentally at odds with the jury's
mode of operation. To protect the oath, the system had to exclude whole
categories of testimony, but as Bentham and his followers made clear, for the
jury to discern the truth it had to hear all the witnesses.
That the transition, once begun, proved unstoppable was due also to the
power of those it served. One could cast the jury's increasing factfinding
autonomy as a defeat for judges, who thereby lost power to control outcomes
as the jury gained in power. The judges, however, perhaps saw it differently.
For them, the power of decision was a political minefield, where false steps
ended careers. Sir Thomas More saw that this was so in 1533. "I durst as well
trust the truth of one judge as of two juries," he wrote. "But the judges be
such wise men, that for the avoiding of obloquy they will not be put in the
trust. ' '600 Hale remarked following the judgment in Bushel's Case,"I which
forbade judges to punish juries for their verdict, that "it were the most unhappy
case that could be to the judge, if he at his peril must take upon him the guilt
or innocence of the prisoner. ''602 No doubt George Jeffreys, who presided
with such relish over many of the late Stuart treason trials and over the perjury
trial of Titus Oates and who took such evident pleasure in steering the juries
toward guilty verdicts, had time to rethink the virtues of such judicial
prerogatives as he whiled away his last days in the Tower of London.0 3
The inexorable flow of factfinding power to the jury was due, finally, to
the jury's capacity to erase all blemishes. The system's need for legitimacy,
as Edson Sunderland wrote in 1920, demands that "[t]he record ... be
absolutely flawless, but such a result is possible only by concealing, not by
excluding mistakes. '' 604 The jury's hidden decisionmaking process and its
one- or two-word verdicts leave all mistakes and causes for criticism locked
in the black box of the jury room. The jury's inscrutability, in Sunderland's
marvelous imagery,
covers up all the shortcomings which frail human nature is unable to
eliminate from the trial of a case .... [C]oncrete details are
swallowed up, and the eye of the law, searching anxiously for the
realization of logical perfection, is satisfied .... It serves as the great
600. GREEN, supra note 19, at 115 n.29 (quoting SIR THOMAS MORE, THE APOLOGY OF SIR THOMAS
MORE, KNIGHT 150 (1930) (1533)).
601. 124 Eng. Rep. 1006 (C.P. 1670); see supra note 596.
602. 2 HALE, supra note 98, at 312-13; see also I HOLDSWORTH 3d ed., supra note 43, at 348 (stating
that the collaboration of the jury "helps to preserve the dignity of the Bench; for, if the judge preserves this
judicial attitude, no odium can attach to him whatever be the verdict of the jury"); I STEPHEN. supra note
28, at 573 (stating that trial by jury "saves judges from the responsibility-which to many men would
appear intolerably heavy and painful-of deciding simply on their own opinion upon the guilt or innocence
of the prisoner").
603. See 10 DICTIONARY OF NATIONAL BIOGRAPHY, supra note 123, at 718; KENYON, supra note 162,
at 259.
604. Edson R. Sunderland, Verdicts, General and Special, 29 YALE U. 253, 262 (1920).
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procedural opiate, which draws the curtain upon human errors and
soothes us in the assurance that we have attained the unattainable. 61
Because it emits no light, the black box of the jury room has become the
system's black hole, drawing into itself all of the questions of fact for which
the system needs an unquestionable answer.
We could perhaps regard the wonderful convenience of jury lie detecting
with more equanimity if there were any sound evidence that juries are good
at this task. But most of the evidence we have suggests that juries have no
particular talent for spotting lies. Not only do experimental subjects rarely
perform much better than chance at distinguishing truth from falsehood,'
but they think they are better lie detectors than they are.W? And we could
perhaps feel more complacent about where this long history has brought us if
we knew that we had reached at last a stopping point where we could pause
to assess the state of affairs. But the jury's lie-detecting role is still growing.
In the last decade or two, more than half the states have relaxed their hearsay
rules to admit evidence of out-of-court statements made by child victims of
sexual abuse.608 The hearsay rule traditionally has rested on the presumption
605. Id. Sunderland was speaking of the institution of the general '%erdict and not of jur)
decisionmaking generally. But of course the virtue of the general %erdict is that it does not tas do special
interrogatories) require the jury to disclose its thought processes
606. See Mark Gregory Frank, Human Lie Detection Ability as a Function of the Liar's Motivation
1 (1989) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Comell University) (on file with author) Lie-detecting talent is
not an easy thing to measure. In the context of real trials. sse almost neser can knov. if the jury has made
correct credibility judgments. To measure the talent of jurors as lie detectors, therefore. %%e hase to resort
to the techniques of the social sciences. Almost all attempts bN social scientists to meisure lie-detecting
talent have two shortcomings. The first, and less damning, is that these studies generally imeasure the
capacity of persons but not of jurors to detect lies They make little attempt to se if the collecti ¢.
deliberative process improves the accuracy of lie detection
The second, far greater flaw of these studies is that they fail to replicate smith any realism the trial
witness's intense interest in being believed. See id. Sometimes the attempts of social scientists to create a
real incentive to lie seem ridiculous. In one experiment. subjects v ere asked to make statements about
whether they had cheated on an exam. The experimenters asked half of them to pretend that they really
had cheated on the exam and the other half to pretend that they had been unjustly accused The researchers
then tested to see if experimental jurors could tell who was "lying." wellborn. supra note 586. at 1082
Another study employed nursing students as experimental hars. Researchers told the students that their
capacity to lie effectively was an important part of being a good nurse The researchers then asked the
would-be nurses to watch a video screen and to describe what they saw on the video as pleasant ocean
scenes. At some point, the image on the screen switched to one of horble carnage, but the nurses sere
told to describe it as a flowery park. Later the researchers showed videotapes of the nursing students to
experimental jurors to test whether they could tell when the students were telling the truth and %shen they
were lying about the images on the screen. The study found that very few vie%% ers of the s ideotapes "did
better than chance" at this task. See PAUL EKMAN. TELLING LIs: CLL ES TO DECEtT I, TIlE MARKEI'Pt..At
POLITICS, AND MARRIAGE 54-56, 85-87 (1992): see also Frank. supra. at 14-15 (reporting a study
employing "liar's poker," in which successful liars received small monetary rewsardsj
607. See Wellborn, supra note 586. at 1082-88 (summarizing studies)
608. See LUCY S. McGOUGH. CHILD WTNEssEs" FRAGILE VoIct-s IN TIlE AMERI(.A% LEGAL SYSTEM
146, 169-88 (1994); Dana D. Anderson, Note. Assessing the Rehabilr of Child Testinmoni. in Se nial Abuse
Cases, 69 S. CAL. L. REv. 2117, 2128-30 (1996) The debate surrounding these ness child hearsay laws
has focused on the defendant's incapacity through cross-examination to expose possible lies There has been
no general expression of concern about the jury's capacity to discharge its ness he-detecting task We see
here yet another example of social and political forces bringing about a change in the lass that has the
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that it is beyond the jury's power to assess the credibility of an out-of-court
speaker.w° Now, in cases of child sexual abuse, jurors confront a credibility
question that is an order of magnitude more difficult than anything they have
seen before: Jurors have to decide whether they believe a child whom they
cannot see,61° whose sense of reality they cannot assess, and who apparently
lacks the emotional maturity to testify in court-and they have to decide
whether their belief in the child's credibility is solid enough to support a
verdict beyond a reasonable doubt.6"
It is a fair prediction that in the coming decades, the hearsay rule will
break down more generally, and we will commit to the jury's black box a
whole new category of credibility determinations. We can put such questions
before the jury entirely without fear of embarrassment, because the way the
jury resolves the questions and, in all likelihood, the soundness of its answers
will remain forever hidden. Perhaps the allure of the black box as a means
toward apparent certainty in an uncertain world has tempted us to entrust the
jury with more and harder questions than it has the power to answer. Today,
after an evolution spanning centuries, there is almost no kind of credibility
dispute we will not trust a jury to resolve. The system no longer shields juries,
as it did for centuries, from head-to-head conflicts of oaths. Hence we can ask
the jury whether it believes the sworn accuser or the sworn defendant. We can
do so even when their two stories are equally plausible, even when there is no
other evidence in the case. And even if the jury returns a verdict of guilty,
indicating it has resolved this intractable dilemma beyond a reasonable doubt,
we accept its verdict without hesitation. For the jury is the system's lie
detector.
unintended consequence of expanding the jury's lie-detecting role.
609. I have chosen not to include the development of the rule against hearsay in my sketch of the
historical development of the jury's lie-detecting role. That is in part because the credibility of out-of-court
witnesses is a somewhat tangential inquiry. It is in part, too, because the development of the rule against
hearsay is a complicated affair, one that has absorbed a great deal of the labor of others and is better left
for a later, separate study. Even the timing of the rule's first emergence in common law courts is a topic
of debate, with Wigmore and an older school fixing the event in the late 17th or early 18th century. and
Langbein putting it almost a century later. Compare 5 WIGMORF, supra note 44, § 1364, at 9, with
Langbein, supra note 286, at 1174-76, 1186-90. Frank Herrmann has recently argued that the hearsay rule
has a far deeper heritage than its application in common law courts. See Frank R. Herrmann, The
Establishment of a Rule Against Hearsay in Roman-Canonical Procedure, 36 VA. J. INT'L L. I passim
(1995).
610. Some state statutes provide for videotaped statements by absent child witnesses, which permit
a jury to see and hear the witness--though the quality of recording of course varies. See MCGouCGt, supra
note 608, at 194-95, 213-14, 220.
611. One study found mock jurors to be quite willing to believe an absent child witness. See Jonathan
M. Golding et al., The Believability of Hearsay Testimony in a Child Sexual Assault Trial, 21 LAW & HuM.
BEHAV. 299, 306-09, 312, 316, 318-19 (1997).
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APPENDIX A: STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS PERMrT-ING
TESTIMONY BY CIVIL PARTIES
Alabama: An Act in Relation to the Competency of Witnesses. No 403. § 1. 1867 Ala. Acts
435, 435.
Arkansas: ARK. CONST. of 1874, sched.. § 2. rrpr-nted in A DIGEST OF 17IE STATUTES OF
ARKANSAS 106-07 (Columbia. Press of EWA' Stephen 1894)
California: An Act To Amend an Act Entitled an Act To Regulate Proceedings in Ci% il Cases
in Courts of Justice of this State, ch. CCCCXXVIII. § 2. 1863 Cal Star 701. 701
Connecticut: An Act for the Regulation of Civil Actions (adopted 1848) (codilied at CONN
REV. STAT. tit. I. ch. X, § 141 (1849))
Delaware: An Act in Reference to the Competency of Witnesses. ch 537. § 1. 16 Del Laws
708, 708 (1881).
Florida: An Act Concerning Testimony. ch 1472. § I. 1865 Fla. Acts 35, 35 (adopted Jan
16, 1866).
Georgia: An Act To Declare Certain Persons Competent Witnesses as in the Act Set Out.
and for Other Purposes. No 189. pmbl & § I. 1866 Ga. Law% 138. 138
Illinois: An Act Relating to the Competency of Witnesses in Cstl Cases. § I. 1867 111
Laws 183, 183.
Indiana: An Act in Relation to Witnesses and To Repeal Section 238 of Article 13 of the
Act, ch. XXVII, § 2. 1861 Ind Acts 51. 52.
Kansas: An Act To Establish a Code of Civil Procedure. ch. XI. tit X. § 310. 1858 Kan
Sess. Laws 65, 115.
Kentucky: An Act To Amend the Laws of Evidence in this Commonwealth. ch. 139. § I.
1872 Ky. Acts 12. 12.
Louisiana: An Act To Amend and Re-Enact Article Twenty-Two Hundred and Sixty-One of
the Civil Code of the State of Louisiana. No. 70. § 1. 1867 La Acts 141. 141-42
Maine: An Act Additional in Relation to Witnesses. ch. 266. § I. 1856 Me Lass 314.
314.
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An Act To Enable Parties in Civil Actions and Proceedings To Be Witnesses
Therein, ch. 305, 1857 Mass. Acts 655, 655.
Act of Mar. 11, 1861, No. 125, §§ 4339-4340, 1861 Mich. Pub. Acts 168, 168.
An Act To Establish Circuit Courts, To Define Their Jurisdictions, and To
Regulate the Practice Therein (adopted 1857) (codified at Miss. REV. CODE ch.
LXI, § 17, arts. 190-93).
An Act in Relation to the General Statutes of the State of Missouri, ch. 144, § I,
1866 Mo. Laws 586, 586.
An Act Relating to the Competency of Witnesses, ch. 1952, § 1, 1857 N.H. Laws
1868, 1868.
A Supplement to the Act Entitled "An Act Concerning Witnesses," ch. CLXVI,
§ 1, 1859 N.J. Laws 489, 489.
An Act To Amend Section Three Hundred and Ninety-Nine of the Code of
Procedure, ch. 353, 1857 N.Y. Laws 744, 744.
An Act To Improve the Law of Evidence, ch. 43, pmbl. & §§ 1-2, 1866 N.C.
Laws 112, 112.
An Act To Establish a Code of Civil Procedure, tit. X, ch. I, § 310, 1853 Ohio
Laws 57, 108.
An Act To Provide a Code of Civil Procedure, ch. 1, tit. III, § 700, 1862 Or. Laws
3, 174-75.
An Act Allowing Parties in Interest To Be Witnesses, No. 31, § 1, 1869 Pa. Laws
30, 30.
Certain Provisions Respecting Evidence, tit. XXVII, ch. 187, §§ 34-35, 1857 R.I.
Acts 30, 30.
An Act To Make Parties, Plaintiffs and Defendants, in All Cases, Competent to
Give Testimony in Such Cases, in Like Manner as Other Witnesses, No. 4780,
1866 S.C. Acts 377, 377-78.
An Act To Make the Rules of Evidence in the Federal and State Courts, Uniform,
ch. LXXV, § 1, 1868 Tenn. Pub. Acts 94, 94.
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Texas: An Act Further Regulating Proceedings in the Several Courts of the State of
Texas, ch. CIV, § 1. 1871 Tex. Gen. Laws 108. 108.
Vermont: An Act Relating to Witnesses. No. 13. § 1. 1852 Vt Laws I1. II
Virginia: An Act To Repeal an Act Entitled an Act Relating to Witnesscs. ch 21. § I. 1866
Va. Acts 87, 87.
West Virginia: An Act in Relation to the Competency of Witnesses. ch 14. §§ 1-2, 1868 W Va
Acts 10. 10.
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APPENDIX B: STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS ABOLISHING
RuLEs AGAINST TESTIMONY BY NONWHITES
Alabama: An Act To Protect Freedmen in Their Rights of Person and Property in This State,
No. 86, § 1, 1866 Ala. Acts 98, 98 (adopted Dec. 9, 1865).
Arkansas: An Act To Declare the Rights of Persons of African Descent, No. 35, § 1, 1867
Ark. Acts 98, 99.
California: An Act To Amend an Act Entitled an Act To Regulate Proceedings in Civil Cases
in the Courts of Justice in this State, ch. LXVIII, § 1, 1863 Cal. Stat. 60, 60.
Florida: FLA. CONST. of 1865, art. XVI, § 2, reprinted in 1866 Fla. Acts 125, 145.
Georgia: Act of Dec. 15, 1865, tit. XXXI, No. 251, § 1, 1866 Ga. Acts 239, 239.
Illinois: Act of Feb. 7, 1865, § 1, 1865 I11. Laws 105, 105.
Indiana: An Act Defining Who Shall Be Competent Witnesses in Any Court or Judicial
Proceedings in This State, ch. LVI, § 1, 1866 Ind. Acts 162, 162 (adopted Dec.
20, 1865).
Kansas: An Act To Establish a Code of Civil Procedure, ch. XI, tit. X, § 314, 1858 Kan.
Laws 65, 116.
Kentucky: An Act To Amend the Laws of Evidence of this Commonwealth, ch. 139, § 7,
1872 Ky. Acts 12, 14.
Louisiana: An Act To Amend and Re-Enact Article Twenty-Two Hundred and Sixty-One of
the Civil Code of the State of Louisiana, No. 70, § 1, 1867 La. Acts 141, 143.
Maryland: Although the other states on this list (with the possible exception of Delaware)
repealed their racial exclusion laws by statute or constitutional provision, in
Maryland the change seems to have been the result of a state court ruling
construing the Federal Civil Rights Act.6"'
Mississippi: An Act To Confer Civil Rights on Freedmen, and for Other Purposes, ch. IV, §
4, 1866 Miss. Laws 82, 83.
Missouri: MO. CONST. of 1865, art. I, § 3, reprinted in MO. GEN. STAT. 20, 21 (1866).
612. See W.A. Low, The Freedmen's Bureau and Civil Rights in Maryland, 37 J. NEGRO HiST. 221,
239-41 (1952).






Virginia: An Act in Relation to the Testimony of Colored Persons. ch 24. § 1. 1866 Va.
Acts 89, 89.
West Virginia: An Act To Amend the Law in Relation to the Competency of Witnesses. ch 89.
§ 1, 1866 W. Va. Acts 85. 85.
An Act Concerning Negroes and Persons of Color or of Mixed Blood. ch 40. §
9, 1866 N.C. Pub. Laws 99, 102.
An Act To Authorize the Establishment of Separate Schools for the Education of
Colored Children, and for Other Purposes. § 6. 1849 Ohio Laws 17, 18
An Act To Provide a Code of Civil Procedure. ch. 1. tit. Ill. § 701. 1862 Or Acts
3, 174-75.
An Act To Declare the Rights of Persons Lately Known as Slaves and as Free
Persons of Color, No. 4798. § I. 1866 S.C. Acts 393, 393
An Act To Do Justice and Render Persons of African and Indian Descent
Competent Witnesses in the Courts of this State, ch. XVIII, 1866 Term Acts 24.
24.
TEx. CONST. of 1866, art. VIII, § 2. reprinted tn 1866 T-X GEN LAws 881Texas:
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